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ABSTRACT
Between 1790 and 1840, the U.S. federal government instituted its so-called “civilization
plan,” which encouraged Southern Indians to embrace republican values, patriarchy, yeoman
farming, and individual property rights. The policies included in the civilization plan were highly
influential, as the Native South transitioned from an economy built on the deerskin trade into one
of cottage industries, plow-based agriculture, and ranching. Through a detailed examination of
one Southern Indian community, the Chickasaws, my dissertation defines the civilization plan in
terms of the ideology that the federal government envisioned and how the plan was interpreted
on the ground level. My work centers on three pillars of analysis--land, leadership, and labor-that defined Chickasaw change and persistence during the early nineteenth century. I argue that
the Chickasaw Indians, living in present-day northern Mississippi, reinterpreted this policy from
one built on republican ideology, acculturation, and dispossession of indigenous land, to one that
fit within their own cultural lexicon and accelerated ongoing economic change in Chickasaw
country.
My dissertation will be the first to examine the civilization plan on the ground level in the
Native South. The Chickasaws dealt with changes in labor for both men and women, the
incorporation of raced-based slave labor, the importance of physiography and geopolitical space,
and the internal and external political responses by headmen during the civilization plan. The
Chickasaws did not encounter incipient violence that hindered economic development,
destabilized boundaries, and prompted hostility that other Southern Indians encountered. Instead,
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as my work suggests, the Chickasaws used their geopolitical position to successfully implement
programs of the civilization plan on their own terms and within their cultural worldview.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
About seventy-five miles east of the University of Mississippi via Federal Highway 78
towards Atlanta, is Itawamba County, Mississippi. Founded in 1836, the county is a “pastoral
heartland along the beautiful Tennessee-Tombigbee Watery,” according to its website, and is
home to a nationally-recognized community college.1 Prior to the forced removal of its
indigenous inhabitants in the 1830s, Itawamba County was located in the heart of land occupied
by the Chickasaws; today the Chickasaws still consider it a part of their homeland. The county
itself, in fact, is named after a Chickasaw headman best known to historians and laypeople as
Levi Colbert. Upon entrance into the county, about one mile along Highway 78, drivers pass a
welcome sign that recognizes the indigenous origins of the county’s name, but emphasizes that
the town is now fully “American:” “Itawamba Welcomes You: Native American Name, Classic
American Community.” The sign presents a sharp dichotomy, one that separates the original
owners of northern Mississippi, the Chickasaws, from the history of the state itself and from the
“classic American community” that Itawamba County promises to its visitors. This sign
reinforces a mythic American past, one that assumes that “Classic American” does not include
the first owners of Itawamba County, the Chickasaws.
With its appropriation of Chickasaw country and rewriting of history, the sign in
Itawamba County is illustrative of American federal designs to remove Southern Indians from
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“Welcome to Itawamba County, Mississippi,” Accessed 3/21/20, http://itawambacoms.com/.
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their country and reconstitute it for American citizens. Itawamba County itself was founded in a
period of territorial expansion of the United States, when the federal government forcefully, and
often illegally, removed Indian communities from their homelands to designated territories west
of the Mississippi River. In the American South, this was often done to accommodate a new
Southern economy built on commercial crop production, especially cotton, and ranching. Prior to
their forced removal, however, Chickasaw men and women participated in, and instigated, a
similar economy. The namesake of the county, Levi Colbert, was in fact a wealthy Chickasaw
who, along with his brothers, George, William, and James, owned travel stands, cotton
plantations, black slaves, and large herds of cattle in the early nineteenth century. About sixty
miles north of Itawamba County, the Colberts also owned a ferry that crossed the nearly milewide Tennessee River. These economic developments were part of a changing Southern
landscape in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Chickasaws, like other Southern
Indians, transitioned from an economy built on the deerskin trade and communal farming to one
that included commercial crops, animal husbandry, and the development of stands, ferries, and
cottage industries. Although their forced removal from their homelands in the 1830s initiated a
process of erasure of this history from our collective memory, it is worth remembering. Far from
being peripheral to the story of southern economic development in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century, the Chickasaws were central players.
Economic changes that the Chickasaws made in the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth
century coincided with the foundation of the first federal Indian policy of the United States,
called the civilization plan. The civilization plan encouraged Indian communities to embrace
republican values, patriarchy, yeoman farming, and individual property rights. For nearly a half
century, the civilization plan remained the dominant Indian policy, replaced only with the
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passage of the Indian Removal Act in 1830. The plan itself derived from enlightenment policies
meant to integrate Indians into the new American nation and transform them into yeoman
farmers and ranchers. While the civilization plan was benevolent compared to the removal
schemes that later replaced it as federal policy, these policies shared a final goal: the acquisition
of land from Indian communities.2 In what one historian has termed “expansion with honor,” the
federal government justified their acquisition of Indian land by arguing that, in exchange for land
cessions, the United States would deliver Indian communities from savagery and barbarism.3
This dissertation is the first to comprehensively address the ramifications of the
civilization plan on the American South. For nearly a half century, programs instigated by the
plan were intimately connected to Southern Indian economic changes and dominated federal,
state, and territorial interaction with indigenous communities. The plan is also instrumental in
how historians comprehend the political ideology and cultural identity of American citizens in
the decades prior to forced Indian removal, how they viewed their Indian neighbors, and how
they considered their own territorial expansion. Despite the importance of the civilization plan,
however, there has yet to be a focused study of its effects on Indian communities in the
American South. Previous studies on the Native South acknowledge the economic and cultural
significance of the civilization plan, but only address it in a piecemeal fashion and in the context
of a different historiographical question, which often shadows its importance and how Southern
Indians adopted and rejected the programs it espoused. My dissertation rightly asserts the
importance of the civilization plan in the transformation of the American South in the late
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Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country: The Creek Indians and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2003), 12-21.
3
Robert F. Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present (New
York: Vintage Books, 1978), 134-145.
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and illustrates the different approaches by Southern
Indians to the plan and how they addressed the goals of the plan itself.
The focus of this study, the Chickasaws, illustrates the effects of the civilization plan and
how Native people transformed the plan once it was introduced in the Native South. I reconstruct
how the Chickasaws found immense success in the plan, but in a manner that was not altogether
in line with what federal leaders envisioned. For federal leaders, there were two primary goals
for the civilization plan. First, the economic transformation of the Native South that fit with an
economy that prioritized yeoman farming, commercial crop production, and ranching rather the
deerskin trade. The second goal was the acquisition of Indian land by the federal government for
white settlers and the extinguishment of indigenous political and territorial sovereignty. Similar
to the forced removal that followed, the civilization plan looked to finance an expansive
American state through Indian land. In the Native South, the civilization plan failed in its goal of
acquisition of land which eventually paved the way for forced removal. In Chickasaw country,
the goal of economic transformation was folded into ongoing economic change. These new
economic practices were immensely successful as the Chickasaws involved themselves in the
new American economy built on ranching and cotton. The success of this economic
transformation, however, halted and frustrated American land grabs for the first twenty-five
years of the civilization plan. This dissertation aims to understand why.
In order to assess the success and failures of the civilization plan in Chickasaw country, I
develop two terms that define how the Chickasaws addressed exterior challenges after the
creation and expansion of the United States. As I researched the civilization plan in Chickasaw
country, I recognized that their geopolitical location further from American settlers played a
significant role in this history. Residing at some geographical distance from the legitimate
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American boarders and with large Indian nations such as the Creeks and Cherokees standing
between them and state boundaries, the Chickasaws resided within what I term an “Interior
South.” The Chickasaws, unlike the Creeks and Cherokees, were located in the Interior South
and were physically distant from and buffered from frontier violence and land encroachments.
The Interior South’s location, then, allowed them to frustrate American goals of land acquisition
and to peacefully and gradually transform their economic practices on their own terms.
Their geographic location in the Interior South gave the Chickasaws an advantage in
early American geopolitics and allowed Chickasaw leaders to develop what I term is a
“pragmatic peace” with the United States. Rather than violently resist or capitulate to American
demands for land in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Chickasaw leadership
pragmatically adopted a neutrality with the US and its citizens to passively resist settler
encroachment and retain their political, economic, and territorial autonomy. This framework of
an Interior South and a pragmatic peace that I introduce in this dissertation directly influenced
how the Chickasaws developed a new economy with the help of the civilization plan and are
central to my argument on the success exhibited by the Chickasaws as they transitioned
economic roles.
Through the use of three “pillars” of evidence--land, leadership, and labor-- this
dissertation examines how the Chickasaw reinterpreted the civilization plan from one built on
republican ideology, acculturation, and dispossession of indigenous land, to one that fit within
their own cultural lexicon, accelerated ongoing economic change in their country, and would
solidify Chickasaw independence. Chickasaws transformed the civilization plan into an
economic tool meant to propel them to success in an evolving Southern economy, not as
assimilated Americans, but rather as successful Chickasaws. Chickasaw men and women worked
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to gradually alter their economic roles, incorporate slave labor, and adjust their settlement
patterns to take advantage of the new opportunities offered by a Southern economy that was now
reliant on commercial agriculture and ranching. They pragmatically repurposed the civilization
plan and used it as a tool in their transformation of new economic and settlement practices to fit
the changing global market. This dissertation argues that Chickasaws repurposed the policies of
the plan and maintained their social, political, and cultural identity while successfully integrating
themselves into the economy of the Antebellum South.
This dissertation examines the intersection of federal Indian policy and the Native South,
and my first chapter addresses recent historiography in both fields. While history on late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century Southern Indian communities often incorporate federal
Indian policy, it is often an aside to larger themes addressed in their work. Similarly, work
focused on federal Indian policy often address it from a top-down perspective or incorporate the
civilization plan into a multi-era study of federal Indian policies rather than a study that focuses
on the effects and consequences of the civilization plan on the ground. A dearth of historical
research on the Chickasaws requires that I incorporate current work on other Southern Indian
communities. An emphasis on the Creeks and Cherokees in recent historiography, however,
muddies and skews our analysis of the successes and failures of the plan due to Creek and
Cherokee proximity to American settlements and continuous violent encroachments and I argue
that my work fills a significant gap in how historians understand the development of the
American South.
In my second chapter, I introduce the ideological underpinnings of the civilization plan,
and the origination of the federal Indian policy. I argue that the plan itself was one born out of a
tumultuous federal government intent on gaining Native land but doing so in a manner that
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would not engage the nascent nation in costly Indian wars and that the larger global community
would accept. Reorienting the plan towards Chickasaw country, I examine how the policy was
communicated on the ground level and how Chickasaws turned an ideological plan meant to
gradually weaken their political and territorial autonomy into an economic stimulus package that
strengthened both.
The geopolitical location of Chickasaw country was vital to their adaption and adoption
of new economic practices endorsed by the civilization plan. In my third chapter, I outline how
the Chickasaw homeland in present-day northern Mississippi, northern Alabama, western
Tennessee, and parts of Kentucky proved conducive to new economic practices, like ranching
and commercial crop production. Furthermore, their geographical distance stalled for decades the
encroachment, land speculation, and settler colonialism prevalent in Creek and Cherokee country
that led to violence and land cessions. I propose that the Chickasaws lived in what I have termed
is an “Interior South,” giving them leverage in negotiating economic change in the new
antebellum South, negating violent encounters with American settlers, and keeping the deerskin
trade alive by exploiting their access to western territories.
In chapter four, I argue that an appearance of neutrality and friendship with the United
States shaped the political actions of Chickasaw headmen, like Tishomingo (O’Koy) and George
Colbert, as they asserted Chickasaw political autonomy and economic agency in the changing
American South. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the western frontier of the
United States was fraught with contested boundaries between Americans and Southern Indians,
often resulting in cycles of clan vengeance and vigilante justice. Violence and theft through
settler encroachment were the norm in Creek and Cherokee country, but they were not in
Chickasaw country. Instead, Chickasaws created what I have termed was a “pragmatic peace”
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with the United States to dictate their relationship with its frontiersmen. When violent actions by
Americans occurred, Chickasaws successfully petitioned for the prosecution and convictions of
the offenders. Chickasaws projected themselves as friendly neighbors to the United States and
their settlers, negating the use of indigenous violence as an excuse for settler reprisal and
contesting the narrative of a savage other for Southern Indians created by western frontiersmen.
In chapter five, I examine the manipulation of federal Indian agents by Chickasaw
headmen to exert authority and agency over new economic changes in their country. Federal
agents were constantly rotated in Chickasaw country, oftentimes through the efforts of the
Chickasaws themselves. I argue that the agency of Chickasaw leadership concerning federal
policies effectively challenges the perceived importance of federal agents in the changes that
occurred in the Native South.
My final chapter illustrates the economic changes in Chickasaw country throughout the
period of the civilization plan. With the introduction of commercial agriculture and ranching
Chickasaw men and women altered their economic roles to fit the new Southern economy and
incorporated the labor of enslaved black men and women. Drawing on previously underutilized
treasury records, I uncover the extent of economic changes for both the Chickasaw elite and rank
and file. Economic change, however, did not mean cultural acculturation. Through examination
of clothing and matrilineal kinship persistence, I argue for a limited integration that encouraged
economic transition while maintaining a social boundary between the Chickasaw and the United
States.
My dissertation will be the first to fully define and examine the civilization plan on the
ground level in the American South. I argue that the Chickasaws pragmatically adopted aspects
of the civilization plan to fit in the new economy, adapted other programs into their cosmology,
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and rejected some that did not suit their cultural worldview. In this sense, a plan that was a top
down, ideological, and republican federal policy became a bottom up implementation of the selfselected programs that the Chickasaws used to maintain and create political and economic
autonomy in a changing American South.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORIOGRAPHY
An ever-growing community of ethnohistorians are considering the histories of the
Native South before removal. Historian Claudio Saunt noted the remarkable growth of the study
of Southern Indians over the past generation, observing that the boom in Southern Indian studies
was unlikely to subside any time in the near future.1 Studies on the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century Native South, however, are heavily weighted towards studies of the
Cherokees and Creeks. This trend is probably due to the size of the Creeks and Cherokees, their
geopolitical location on the border of advancing American frontier settlers, their involvement in
the Creek War of 1813-14, and Cherokee legal battles after the Indian Removal Act. Due to these
interactions with Americans, records for the Creeks and Cherokees were readily available for
ethnohistorians to use to shape their research. Consequently, our understanding of the Cherokees
and Creeks have colored how ethnohistorians view the whole of the Native South and led to a
dearth of scholarship on other Southern Indians. While the 1980s and 1990s witnessed an influx
of Creek and Cherokee work, Chickasaw historiography was notably silent, with merely one
book published on the Chickasaws during that time.2 Recent scholarship, however, is drawing

1

Claudio Saunt, "The Native South: An Account of Recent Historiography," Native South 1 (2008): 45-60.
The single historical monograph on the Chickasaws during this period focused on Chickasaw slaves and freedmen
rather than the Chickasaws themselves. Daniel F. Littlefield, The Chickasaw Freedmen: A People Without a
Country(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980). Notable works on the Cherokees and Creeks during the period
include Thomas Hatley, The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians Through the Era of Revolution (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995); William McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); J. Leitch Wright Jr., Creeks & Seminoles: The Destruction and Regeneration
of the Muscogulge People (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986); and J. Leitch Wright, The Only Land They
Knew: The Tragic Story of the American Indians in the Old South (New York: Free Press, 1981).
2
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important distinctions between Southern Indian communities. A growing number of
ethnohistorians have turned their attention to the Choctaws, Chickasaws, Catawba, and smaller
Indian communities along the Gulf Coast, challenging previous conceptions of Southern Indian
persistence and change. These new studies shed light on the different approaches and challenges
that Southern Indians faced in the post-contact era and illustrate the need for continued research.
This dissertation continues this new historiography of the Native South, exploring the ways and
means that the Chickasaws approached and manipulated the United States and their so-called
civilization plan, the federal government’s first coherent Indian policy. Acting as signifiers of
cultural beliefs and ideology of the new republic, American federal Indian policy endorsed
assimilation and acculturation during the late eighteenth century until removal. These actions in
the Native South had philosophical, political, pragmatic, and materialistic ramifications for
Americans as they wrestled with who and what their new country would become. Federal Indian
policies reflected and shaped Southern Indian economic and cultural changes, but they were, in
turn, changed by Southern Indians and how they fit new realities of the changing American
South into their worldviews. Rather than a singular top down, ideological view of the civilization
plan, this dissertation seeks to understand the reasons behind adoption and reject of new cultural
and economic practices by the Chickasaws in a changing American South.
In the early twentieth century, anthropologists and ethnographers like John Swanton and
James Mooney provided the first pioneering steps into the ethnography and ethnohistory of the
Native South. Swanton and others, trained in early anthropology, published studies of Southern
Indians that included cultural customs, religious practices, folklore, and gender roles. The
majority of the ethnography conducted by them, however, focus on the Creeks and Cherokees
rather than the Chickasaws, although Swanton published a relatively brief ethnography of the

11

Chickasaws. Swanton’s research on the Chickasaws submitted to the Forty-Fourth Annual
Report on the Bureau of Ethnology in 1928 has since been reprinted and remains the most
comprehensive work from the era on the Chickasaws. Using the flawed concept of an
“ethnographic present,” Swanton collapsed social and cultural information of the Chickasaws
three hundred years to present a static portrait of Southern Indians. For example, in his
Chickasaw work, Swanton’s primary source is the journal of eighteenth century Indian trader
James Adair, but he also incorporates field work done by anthropologists and archaeologists with
contemporary Chickasaws in Oklahoma during the 1910s and 1920s.3 The flattening of
Chickasaw social structures by Swanton obscured or mistook as assimilation many of the
important structural changes in the centuries after contact. 4
In addition to Swanton, the early and middle twentieth century saw historian Dawson
Phelps and anthropologist Jesse D. Jennings publish a myriad of accounts on eighteenth and
early nineteenth century Chickasaws. Jennings’ excavations in the late 1930s provided detailed
accounts of Chickasaw material culture in the early and middle eighteenth century that proved to
be a starting point for archeological research by James Atkinson in the 1980s.5 Especially
relevant to this study are Phelps’ reports on the Chickasaw Agency constructed by the United
States to house federal agents and to encourage the Chickasaws and their adoption of ranching
and commercial agriculture, as well as reports that detail the taverns and houses along the
Natchez Trace. As the Natchez Trace Parkway historian, Phelps uncovered relevant documents
on the placement of travel stands and the creation of Colbert’s Ferry on the Tennessee River.

3

John Reed Swanton, Chickasaw Society and Religion (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), viii-x.
Thomas J. Pluckhahn and Robbie Ethridge, eds., Light on the Path: The Anthropology and History of the
Southeastern Indians (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006), 6.
5
James R. Atkinson, “A Surface Collection from the Chickasaw Agency Site, 22-Cs-521, on the Natchez Trace in
Chickasaw County, Mississippi,” Mississippi Archeology 20, no. 2 (1985): 46-63; Jesse D. Jennings, “Chickasaw
and Earlier Indian Cultures of Northeast Mississippi,” Journal of Mississippi History 3 (1941): 155-226.
4
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Phelps was also the first historian to partially list the chronology of Chickasaw agents during the
era of the civilization plan, noting the incredible turnover that played a vital role in Chickasaw
manipulation of civilization policies. Published in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, these reports
occurred in the same decades that the Mississippi state government began to push for the
creation of a highway across the state, using the historic Natchez Trace as a means to an end.6
Jennings and Phelps additionally collected and published journal entries from men traveling the
Natchez Trace in Chickasaw country, including the accounts written by Dr. Rush Nutt and
Joseph Bullen, both important descriptions of the Chickasaw cultural and ecological landscape in
the early nineteenth century.7
The first full historical monograph centered around the Chickasaws did not appear until
1971, with the publication of Arrell M. Gibson’s The Chickasaws. Gibson’s historical narrative
covered the period from first contact with the Spanish explorer Hernando de Soto in 1540 until
their dissolution as a tribal community at the dawn of the twentieth century with the Dawes Act.
Gibson incorporates Swanton’s ethnographic material in his first chapter, but the majority of his
research originates in National Archival material rather than ethnographic and archaeological
surveys. His narrative uses a declension model and paints the Chickasaws as tragic participants
in a colonial and American world that witnessed the “startling decline of the Chickasaws,” rather
than a focus on their resiliency or pragmatism.8

6

John D. Elliot, Jr., "Paving the Trace," Journal of Mississippi History LXIX, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 199-233.
Jesse D. Jennings, ed., "Nutt's Trip to the Chickasaw Country," The Journal of Mississippi History 9 (1947): 34-61;
Dawson A. Phelps, ed., "Excerpts from the Journal of the Reverend Joseph Bullen, 1799 and 1800," Journal of
Mississippi History 17 (October 1955), 254-281. Dr. Nutt’s and Mr. Bullen’s trips through Chickasaw country are
vital to how ethnohistorians study Chickasaw country in the early nineteenth century. Because of the rapid turnover
of federal agents, Chickasaw country lacks the ecological surveys that Benjamin Hawkins provide for the Creeks.
Instead, travelers through Chickasaw country- like Bullen and Nutt- provide us with the best surveys of the land,
with Nutt’s journal the most comprehensive.
8
Arrell Morgan. Gibson, The Chickasaws (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), 30.
7
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In the decades after Gibson’s book, historians overlooked the Chickasaws with the new
Indian history in the Native South that emphasized studies on the Creeks and Cherokees. This
period, however, saw much archeological data and publications on the Chickasaws for both pre
and post-contact periods. Archaeologists David Morgan, Jay Johnson, and James Atkinson,
among others, provided archeological evidence of settlements and migrations for the Chickasaws
in the early colonial period. As mentioned previously, Atkinson’s work in the 1980s made use of
the work done by Jennings in the 1930s and 1940s, identifying village cites of the Chickasaws
and clearly defining the Large and Small Prairies of the Black Prairie where the majority of
eighteenth century Chickasaw settlements were located.9 In the same year, Atkinson also
published a study on the Chickasaw agency site. His study corrected older and contrasting
reports on the site location, placing the agency near present-day Houlka, Mississippi and
identifying the transfer in the agency site in 1825 across the Tennessee River to present-day
northern Alabama.10
Studies by Johnson, Patricia Galloway, and Morgan tracked the distinct settlement
patterns of the Chickasaws, noting soil composition and drainage patterns that remain consistent
with pre and post-contact Chickasaws. For example, in 1989, Galloway, Johnson, and Beloken
defined Chickasaw settlement patterns for the late pre-contact and early-contact eras, noting a
preference by the Chickasaws for settling on upland ridges rather than occupying creek

James R. Atkinson, “The Ackia and Ogoula Tchetoka Chickasaw Village Locations in 1736 During the FrenchChickasaw War,” Mississippi Archeology 20, no.1 (1985): 53-72; Jay K. Johnson, "The Chickasaws," in Indians of
the Greater Southeast: Historical Archaeology and Ethnohistory, ed. Bonnie G. McEwan (Gainesville: University
Press of Florida, 2000), 100.
10
James R. Atkinson, "A Surface Collection from the Chickasaw Agency Site,” 60. Atkinson’s work on the
Chickasaw agency continued for well over two decades. For historians examining Chickasaw country during the
nineteenth century, Atkinson’s work is invaluable as a tool and guide. In the 1990s and early 2000s, he uncovered
and annotated thousands of documents concerning the agency from the National Archives in Washington DC and
contributed greatly to our understanding of the physical construction and measurements of the buildings at the
agency site.
9
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floodplains.11 The report contends that Chickasaw settlement locations were distinct, and unlike
other settlement patterns for Indian communities surrounding them. For the Chickasaws, their
settlement patterns indicated that they were “living in areas where few others had lived.”12 In
1996, Morgan used historical documents and changes in pottery from live shell to fossil shell
material as chronological markers to define Chickasaw migration north in the Black Prairie,
settling in the region near present-day Tupelo.13 But his work complements Atkinson, Galloway,
Johnson, and Beloken as he notes that the majority of Chickasaw settlements in the early and
later historic periods occur on upland ridges.14 Studies of settlement patterns, accumulated by
decades of archeological research, shed light on reasons for the Chickasaws to migrate, what
changed after migration, and what settlement patterns persisted well into the civilization era, and
are an underutilized source material for historians of the Native South.
The lack of historical work concerning the Chickasaws means that few contemporary
scholars have challenged older concepts concerning Chickasaw leadership articulated by
historians in the 1970s. Gibson’s monograph, for example, provided a historical narrative that
pitted “full bloods” against “mixed bloods” as leaders of the Chickasaws. To Gibson, a transition
of power from “traditional” chiefs, like Piomingo, to “mixed-blood” leaders, such as George
Colbert, began to occur by the mid-1790s that allowed the Colbert family to create hegemonic
leadership. Gibson argued that these “mixed-bloods” provided a unified leadership that
successfully blocked encroaching American settlers who had “profited from the easy entry they

Jay K. Johnson, Patricia Galloway, and Walter Beloken, “Historic Chickasaw Settlement Patterns in Lee County,
Mississippi: A First Aproximation,” Mississippi Archeology, 24, (1985), 45; Johnson, “The Chickasaws,” 100.
12
Johnson, et. al, “Historic Chickasaw Settlement Patterns,” 51.
13
David Morgan, “Historic Period Chickasaw Indians: Chronology and Settlement Patterns,” Mississippi
Archeology, 31, no.1 (1996), 11,22.
14
Morgan, “Historic Period Chickasaws,” 26-35. Morgan’s contention with Johnson over settlement in the upland
ridges concerns deer hunting in the mid-eighteenth century. Morgan suggests that horse herds, rather than deer
hunting, were primary reasons for the upland settlements. This argument, however, does not fall within the scope of
this project.
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enjoyed in every (other) Indian nation.”15 Gibson ascribed the firm negotiations of the
Chickasaws concerning removal in 1826 to the leadership of these “mixed-blood” leaders.16 This
leadership, Gibson argues, led to a domination of the political landscape of the Chickasaws by
members of the “mixed blood” elite.17
Setting aside the obvious problems with concepts such as “full” and “mixed-blood”
Indians, Gibson’s work provides a useful overview of the time period, but his terminology and
his argument are dated. In Splendid Land, Splendid People, Atkinson confronts Gibson and
refutes the concept that the Chickasaws were divided along the lines of full and mixed bloods
and argues instead that the Colberts acted in congress with other leaders of the Chickasaws. 18
Men with American family ties were some of the supporters of the new agricultural programs of
the civilization plan, and men like Levi and George Colbert certainly profited from ranching and
commercial crops, as well as other economic ventures like owning and operating a ferry system
on the Tennessee River. The majority of Chickasaw headmen, however, also endorsed the
civilization plan. Chickasaw headmen Tishomingo, Appassantubby, Ishtehotopa, and Samuel
Sealey all participated in plow-based agriculture and ranching by the 1830s.19
Like Gibson, Atkinson’s book, published in 2004, provides a general narrative history,
covering the Chickasaws from European contact until removal. Unlike Gibson, Atkinson
integrates much of the archaeological work done in the late twentieth century, accurately
reorienting positions of Chickasaw villages and migration patterns made possible only through
his cross-disciplinary approach. Atkinson highlights the political factions and alliances that
15
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evolved over the colonial and early republic eras, noting the interactions between Small Prairie
and Large Prairie settlements in the 1730s, the later consolidation of Chickasaws into larger
fortified towns due to wars with the Choctaws and the French, the political battles between
Wolf’s Friend and Piomingo over an American alliance, and the Colberts, Tishomingo, and other
Chickasaw headmen’s actions during the era of the civilization plan. Rather than a simple
bifurcation of positions, Atkinson illustrates the complexity and evolution of positions within a
politically flexible and savvy Chickasaw nation, one that requires much more research before
ethnohistorians fully comprehend the intricacies of Chickasaw leadership. 20
Recent studies by archaeologists and geographers using geographic information system
(GIS) mapping provide a new lens for ethnohistorians to view the settlement patterns of postcontact Chickasaws. GIS mapping, combined with data by archeologists like Atkinson, Johnson,
and Morgan and, early historical documents, provide an in-depth analysis of the changing
settlement patterns of the Chickasaws as they constantly sought to adapt to new economic and
political changes in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. In 2011,
archaeologists Wendy Cegielski and Brad Lieb, utilizing GIS mapping, published a report on the
migratory and settlement patterns of the Chickasaws. Their report created a model for
“understanding the settlement choices for societies going through cultural contact and rapid
transformation,” through the use of an intimate decade by decade approach rather than mapping
over centuries or longer periods.21
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By the period of the civilization plan, Chickasaw families had significantly integrated
European and American goods, like chinaware, iron pots and pans, and iron plows, into their
cultural and economic practices. These items, acquired through both trade and manufacture by
the Chickasaws themselves, complicate archeological evidence of the period. In fact, Johnson
notes that the only materials that archeologists can clearly define as Chickasaws from the period
originate from burial sites. 22 Geographer Michael Wall’s dissertation, “Rediscovery of a Native
American Cultural Landscape: The Chickasaw Homeland at Removal,” uses the records of the
Public Land Service System (PLSS) to map out Chickasaw settlements over a well populated
region of Chickasaw country in present-day northern Mississippi, providing physical and
geographic evidence of Chickasaw settlement patterns in the early nineteenth century. Arguing
that the creation of historical markers that center on white American settlements reinforce a
mythic past that exclude Chickasaw developments in the early nineteenth century, Walls seeks to
create a “representation of the cultural landscape” of the Chickasaws in the decades before
removal.23 Using an ethnohistoric approach that incorporates historical documents and
archeological research, but centers on surveys conducted during removal, Walls successfully
plots out Chickasaw settlement patterns in a small portion of present-day northern Mississippi.
Wall’s dissertation illustrates and uncovers specific markers overlooked by historians that may
point out development and improvements built by the Chickasaws. 24 Mapping Chickasaw
“improvements” illustrate the extensive economic and settlement changes in Mississippi by
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Southern Indians and Walls provides a template for ethnohistorians to further examine mapping
to define Chickasaw cultural landscapes.25
Use of comparative studies of Indian communities within the Native South allows
ethnohistorians to fill in chronological gaps by exploring “relative cultures in the same general
culture area… which may be expected to share cultural traits,” and building off historiographic
arguments built around similar Indian communities.26 Due to the dearth of studies focusing on
the Chickasaws, I consider arguments and research on other Southern Indian communities to not
only better understand the Chickasaws, but also to better place this study in the larger context of
the Native South. The use of the Chickasaws in this dissertation, therefore, fills a gap in the
growing historiography of the Native South and questions preconceived notions of Southern
Indians, combating oversimplification of cultural norms and practices of integration.
The federal government envisioned their civilization plan as a top-down ideological
program, but Southern Indians had different responses to the civilization rhetoric of their federal
agents. In Creek Country, Robbie Ethridge argues that landscape defined Creek identity, with
townships located near or in river valleys that the Creeks considered the best farmland.27 The
Creeks faced an uncertain future when Indian Agent Benjamin Hawkins arrived in 1796, as links
to the global market economy through the deerskin trade were failing. Hawkins encouraged the
Creeks to adopt ranching and scientific agriculture to replace hunting. Ethridge’s work provides
a larger narrative that focuses on the changing landscape of Creek country during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and is one of the most comprehensive discussions of
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the impact of the civilization plan in the Native South due to her use of environmental history
and the records of Benjamin Hawkins.
Like most Southern Indians, including the Chickasaws, the Creeks employed an ancient
practice of swidden and hoe agriculture led by women, although they adopted metal tools and
some European cultigens in the eighteenth century.28 As an agent of the federal government in
Creek country, Benjamin Hawkins was commissioned to transition Creeks to plow-based
agriculture, but his attempts were adopted unevenly. He argued that the Creeks’ agricultural
practices were “wasteful and indolent” and continued to press for scientific agriculture that relied
on plows and monoculture.29 Claudio Saunt in A New Order of Things notes that most Creeks
grew frustrated with the civilization plan. Saunt posits that the years of drought from 1804-1812
solidified resistance and violence against Hawkins and his insistence on scientific agriculture.
Ethridge additionally argues in “Creeks and Americans in the Age of Washington” that Creek
country borders were continuously contested after the American Revolution and that “Creek and
American relations, no matter how cooperative, friendly, intimate, and mutually beneficial, were
played out in the larger context of American westward expansion.”30 Between drought and
ongoing conflict with Americans encroaching on their boarders, Saunt argues that the Creeks
“must have been struck by the failure of ‘civilization’ to provide for them,” with some
expressing their anger with violence that later boiled over into the Red Stick War of 18131814.31
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In his book, Slave Country, Adam Rothman argues that the Red Stick War was
one of the primary catalysts for the creation of a new American South because it not only opened
twenty-three million acres to the United States for American settlement, but it also acted in
congruity with the Battle of New Orleans to finally remove the British from the region.32 After
the war, eighteenth century Enlightenment theories that had promoted the concept that Indians
could be “acculturated” gave way to hardening racial concepts in the United States which, by the
early nineteenth century, argued that Indians would remain Indian and non-white.33 While
Rothman’s book successfully illustrates the ongoing changes in American positions on race, it
ignores the agency and power that Southern Indian communities like the Chickasaws continued
to hold as instigators and participants of the new Southern economy built around ranching and
cotton.
The Red Stick nativist revolt, its causes, effects, and repercussions, is the most deeply
studied event during the period of the civilization plan in the Native South. Frustrated by the
increasing materialism of Creek country and the changing cultural and political norms during the
era of the civilization plan, some Creeks lashed out.34 The nativist “Red Sticks” sought a return
to “traditional” concepts of gender, politics, and economics, and did so through a millenarian
revolt that elevated religious leaders. Red Stick Creeks struck out and assaulted persons and
things that represented what Saunt terms the “new order” in a violent response to the changing
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economy. In one such example by Saunt, Red Stick warriors destroyed weaving material and
assaulted women who participated in the new economy, possibly as a rejection of the changes in
gender roles and Creek masculinity that the new order encouraged.35 In Sacred Revolt, historian
Joel Martin argues that the Red Stick War was not simply a response to a collapsing economic
and political sphere but as a millenarian conflict concentrated on the revitalization of a
spirituality that the Creeks abandoned with the inclusion of European social and economic
identities.36 Historian Michael Green argues in The Politics of Indian Removal that the
reorganization of political control away from town councils and towards a national council
“disrupted the lines of response that had traditionally kept headmen answerable to the needs of
the people.”37 The violent response to the internal and external changes wrought by the
civilization plan and increasing American encroachment was a political action, one that
illustrated the growing frustrations of common Creeks. Struggling to communicate with what
Green terms an increasingly “Anglicized” Creek leadership, the majority of Creek men rejected
the civilization plan.38
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Southern Indian leadership acted
essentially as first among equals. That is, they led an egalitarian society through consensus rather
than coercion. Anthropologist Charles Hudson notes that Southern Indian town councils at this
time were a democratic body that allowed anyone to voice their opinion. Hudson argues that the
“council did not coerce people, it simply sought harmony” and to reach a consensus. 39 These
egalitarian leadership concepts worked well during the eighteenth century of European imperial

35

Saunt, A New Order of Things, 267.
Martin, Sacred Revolt,7.
37
Green, The Politics of Indian Removal, 41.
38
Green, The Politics of Indian Removal, 40-42.
39
Charles M. Hudson, The Southeastern Indians (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 224.
36

22

conflict, as Indian communities employed play-off politics.40 Southern Indians utilized their
decentralized style of government to negotiate with multiple European nations to gain economic
and political advantages. Over time, negotiations with Europeans led to new ways for Southern
Indians to gain prestige and political power. In Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750-1830,
Greg O’Brien documents the evolution of power and authority within Choctaw country, most
notably the ascension of two chiefs, Taboca and Franchimastabe, who held differing
worldviews.41 Taboca maintained a role that O’Brien terms “traditional” with power emanating
from his role as a prophet and chief, mainly rooted in what James Taylor Carson termed the
cosmological order of the Choctaws that heralded back to the chiefdoms of the pre-contact era.42
Franchimastabe, on the other hand, gained and maintained power through the distribution of
European goods and contact with Americans. O’Brien argues that the ascension of the market
economy during the eighteenth century led to different avenues to gain political power for the
Choctaws and provides an important starting point for ethnohistorians of the Native South to
define evolving leadership structures in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
In Searching for the Bright Path, Carson argues that, for the Choctaws, long held cultural
and cosmological structures, like that of gendered divisions of labor and matrilineal kinship,
structured Choctaw approaches to massive exterior change and upheaval during the post-contact
era until removal.43 Focusing primarily on the century and a half prior to removal, Carson
contends that economic and cultural changes during the civilization period were relatively
superficial, arguing that even Choctaws most seen as acculturated by federal Indian agents did
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not abandon “the Mississippian values that coursed through their culture.”44 Carson focuses on
the cultural continuity of the Choctaws in the early nineteenth century, arguing that “things
persisted because they still made sense and still explained the world and its workings to
Choctaws in ways that resonated with what they believed was proper and true.”45
Carson’s brief examination of the changes in the Southern economy during the
antebellum period illustrates that Choctaw men and women successfully integrated themselves
into new economic ventures, especially that of ranching and cotton farming, but he argues that
they did so through long-held gendered practices. For example, when Choctaw women sourced
themselves out to nearby Alabama and Mississippi plantations, they did so because Choctaw
men refused to participate in itinerant agricultural labor. Sharecropping became a lucrative
economic business for Choctaw women, as goods and income generated independently of their
husbands preserved the “gendered structure of their culture.”46 Long-term cultural structures
oftentimes undergird and shape the transformation in indigenous societies that enter into a
commercial marketplace society, like the Choctaws did in the early nineteenth century. Men and
women participated in the market as buyers and sellers, but "in their homes, fields, and forests
they remained attached to the traditional cultural meanings and behaviors that had characterized
their pre-contact economy."47 To Carson, the use of these underlying structures as a moral
economy provided the Choctaws a means to culturally persist in a period of extreme economic
and political change.
Carson’s book illustrates how change was incorporated into the Choctaws’ already
established horizontal structures. Saunt in A New Order of Things argues, however, that
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disruptive change dominated the long eighteenth century. Covering the time period from 17331816, Saunt focuses on the role of property and individual power as the primary contributors to
the eventual Red Stick conflict. Saunt has argued that the accumulation of wealth by a minority
of Creeks caused friction among the less propertied Creeks and rubbed against the Creek
concepts of communal participation. Saunt singles out members of the Creeks with European
ancestry. These mestizos, or “mixed bloods,” according to Saunt, encouraged the acculturation
towards American ideals in political, social, and economic terms. During the Red Stick War,
members of the millenarian revolt specifically targeted items of economic value to acculturated
Creeks, including cattle, cotton cards and wheels, fences, and chains. The Red Stick War,
according to Saunt, primarily revolved around struggles between the haves and have-nots within
society, with mestizos the targeted haves.48
Saunt’s discussion of developing class divisions is notable, as it illustrates a growing rift
for the Creeks due to their incorporation into an individualistic, property-based capitalist system.
Saunt’s use of white ancestry, or “mixed blood,” to define the extent that Indians incorporated
themselves into the market, however, has drawn criticism from some ethnohistorians. In Mixed
Blood Indians, Theda Perdue argues against “mixed blood” Indians controlling Southern Indian
communities after the American Revolution. Noting that Saunt’s argument implies “an intrinsic
connection between ancestry and class that leaves little room for wealthy “full bloods or poor
mestizos,” Perdue argues that the concept of “mixed blood” did not exist for Southern Indians at
the time.49 Instead, Perdue argues that, by the end of the eighteenth century, the “political skills
that Native leaders needed changed dramatically,” but this change had little to do with their
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genetic mix.50 During this period, American traders married into Southern Indian families. Many
of these ties created productive economic relationships between traders and their new kinsmen.
With matrilineal kinship networks, the offspring of these marriages were full members of their
mother’s clan within Southern Indian communities. Because of their American fathers, many of
these so-called “mixed-bloods” were bilingual, had an intimate understanding of the changing
economic landscape, and had American networks of families, business partners, and friends.51
These valuable skills led to many of these “mixed-bloods” gaining political influence and power,
with some becoming headmen. For the Chickasaws, “mixed-blood” headmen like Levi Colbert
and William McGillivrey negotiated the new economic landscape of the civilization plan. Perdue
argues that, while these men gained political influence and power through their understanding of
the changing economy and their American networks, they continued Southern Indian political
ideologies of consensus rather than coercion.52
Examining key families and familial networks in the South, historian Natalie Inman
argues that the formation and evolution of these networks provides ethnohistorians with an
intimate view of the creation of intercultural and political relations in the late colonial and early
republic eras.53 In her book, Brothers and Friends: Kinship in Early America, Inman uses the
Colberts, the American Donelson family that included Andrew Jackson, and the Cherokee
families of Attakullakulla and the Ridges as case studies to illustrate the interpersonal
connections on the ground level while also providing a new perspective on familial
interconnectivity that suggests a reconsideration of how historians view familial ties in the
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antebellum South. For example, Inman argues against the “rugged individualism” of nucleated
American families in the South, noting that many, including the Donelson’s, relied on extended
kinship networks to “facilitate success in the competitive environment of the frontier.”54
For the Colberts, Inman details familial connections that originated from both their
Chickasaw matriline and their father’s American trading ties, which created a “dual heritage as
cultural brokers to serve the diplomatic interests of the Chickasaw people.”55 During the era of
the civilization plan, Inman notes that Indian headmen often adopted “cultural markers,” such as
dress and speaking English, that signified change to appease American officials and maintain
goodwill, all the while maintaining their cultural identity.56 Inman, however, extends the reach of
the Colbert family kinship connections too far at times, arguing familial connections of the
Colberts as instigators of action rather than decisions decided by the Chickasaws as a whole. For
example, Inman sees Colbert kinship relations behind the mobilization of a Chickasaw warrior
contingent sent to fight with the United States in the Northwest Territory when it was a position
agreed upon by the entire nation.
Family and kinship were ties that bound Southern Indians together across town, region,
and nation. But a person’s town affiliation also played an important part in their identity
construction, politics, and social structure. In 1993, Kathryn Braund argued in Deerskins and
Duffels that towns were the “heart of Creek social, political, and economic life.”57 Recent
historiography on Southern Indians further establishes townships and regions as centers of
political power. In Okfuskee, historian Joshua Piker illustrates the importance of towns within the
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social and political life of the Creeks during the eighteenth century, while historian Tyler
Boulware contends in Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation that Cherokee towns and regions
were “arguably the most recognized markers by which Cherokees distinguished themselves
during the colonial era.” 58 Cherokees and Creeks often identified themselves as members of
specific townships rather than as part of a larger Indian nation.59 For the Creeks, the collection of
towns formed a loose confederacy that proved difficult to unite throughout the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. Because of the amount of historiography concerning the Cherokees
and the Creeks compared to other Southern Indian communities, this centrality of region and
towns has been assumed for the rest of the Native South. This may not be the case for the
Chickasaws. This is not to say that town identity was not important to the Chickasaws. For
example, clan and township identity persisted throughout their settling out period during the
civilization era, with families of the same town settling near one another.60 But as I will argue,
Chickasaws were more apt to act in a unified manner due to their population size and the
landscape of northern Mississippi that they inhabited.61
Such unification of the Chickasaws aided them during the era of the civilization plan as
they attempted to retain economic and political power. The founding of the United States
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threatened the political and economic wellbeing of many Eastern Woodland Indians through
westward expansion and continued settler encroachment, both illegal and legal, on Indian lands.
With the ascension of the United States as the primary power in the South, play-off politics were
effectively eliminated, and Southern Indian communities dealt with a new threat to their political
autonomy. In The American Revolution in Indian Country, Colin Calloway explores the new
political landscape that emerged after the American Revolution and how the Chickasaws, along
with other Indian communities, responded to the founding of the United States and the loss of
Britain as their primary ally. Factions developed with the Chickasaws when leaders like Wolf’s
Friend negotiated with the Spanish, while Piomingo negotiated with the new United States.
Calloway argues that the years between 1777 and 1795 were politically intense, but that the
period “did not produce disintegration of the Chickasaw polity.”62 In other words, while political
factions for the Chickasaws existed, they were not overtly divisive nor did they produce violent
internal divisions as seen in other Southern Indian communities.
One should remember, however, that American independence was not a foregone
conclusion nor was there a consensus on what that independence might mean to Southern
Indians. Indeed, on the fringes of the thirteen colonies, the debate in the Native South concerned
which empires would remain, who would go, and what this meant for the disparate groups of
European settlers and frontiersmen, African slaves and freedmen, and Indian communities in the
American South. In her most recent book, Kathleen DuVal has argued in the congested
American South, “advantageous interdependence was a more logical goal” than outright
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independence.63 DuVal illustrates how Chickasaw headman Paya Mataha acted as a peace broker
throughout the 1760s and 1770s, eschewing the decades of warfare the Chickasaws conducted
throughout the Native South since the advent of the Indian slave trade. In this role, Paya Mataha
sought peaceful relations that centralized Chickasaw middle men, including negotiations with the
Quapaw, Choctaws, British, and Creeks, creating what DuVal terms one of the “most successful
diplomatic initiatives in history, turning decades of war into a permanent peace,” and instigating
an interdependent alliance with the Chickasaws at the epicenter.64 Paya Mataha’s end goals were
pragmatic, as the Chickasaw population had dwindled to around 1,600 by the end of the French
and Indian War. Knowing continued warfare was not a sustainable option, he sought to maintain
Chickasaw sovereignty through peace.65 DuVal argues that Paya Mataha acted as a
representative of the Chickasaw nation, contrasting the Chickasaws with the confederated Creeks
and the issues that Creek leader Alexander McGillivray encountered attempting to act as a
representative of the whole Creek nation to the British or Spanish.66 A unified position in
exterior political actions remained a hallmark of the Chickasaws for the majority of the
civilization plan era.
During the era of the civilization plan, the Chickasaws’ population hovered between
3,500 and 5,000, whereas their immediate neighbors, the Choctaws and Creeks, each numbered
between 15,000 and 23,000 respectively.67 The small population of the Chickasaws likely
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contributed to the lack of factionalism. In his dissertation, Daniel Flaherty argues that the
Chickasaws “emerged from the colonial era as the most ethnically and politically united”
Southern Indian community, and that this unity was a key factor in their political and diplomatic
relations during the long nineteenth century.68 Flaherty’s uses an international relations
perspective to frame his argument as he posits that Chickasaw leaders recognized western
rhetoric of sovereignty and used it against federal officials intent on subverting their political,
and territorial, autonomy.69 His argument intertwines Chickasaw political transformation and
their diplomatic relations with the United States, illustrating the changes during the American
Revolution, the era of the early republic, Indian removal, and Chickasaw decision making during
the American Civil War. Flaherty’s argument ascribes agency to a united Chickasaw community
that developed from a confederation of autonomous towns in the era after the American
Revolution to one of a constitutional government in 1856. Chickasaw manipulation and
recognition of the power struggles between state and federal governments prolonged their ability
to maintain autonomy until Reconstruction.70 He posits that the stability in these political
changes originated from the cultural and politically homogeneity of the Chickasaws, noting that
his study would probably yield altogether different results if he considered the more
heterogenous Creeks.71 Addressing the political turmoil of forced removal, Daniel Littlefield,
Amanda Paige, and Fuller Bumpers agree with Flaherty that the Chickasaws “escaped the
factionalism that rent other tribes during removal and were unified in their sense of national
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identity.”72 The transformation and changes for Chickasaw leadership, however, remained
decidedly Chickasaw in nature especially in the era of the civilization plan. In Social Order and
Political Change, Duane Champagne concludes that the Chickasaw stability that Flaherty
discusses sustained rather than altered political structures during the civilization plan.73
Chickasaw headmen and political leaders articulated Chickasaw concerns to American
leaders and other Indian communities during the era of the civilization plan, but Chickasaw
women also acted as agents of change and persistence during the period. Households in Southern
Indian communities were matrilineal and matrilocal. Theda Perdue argues in Cherokee Women
that women held control over Cherokee households, and that “home and hearth were part of a
woman’s domain.”74 Southern Indian labor was largely divided along gender lines, with women
farming and men hunting. Integration into the world economic system over the long eighteenth
century changed some things about this gendered labor. With the decline of the Indian slave
trade after the Yamasee War in 1715, the commercial deerskin trade expanded. The trade led to
Southern Indian men going on longer hunts in order to supply deer not simply for food and
clothing, but as capital in the global trade. Braund argues that the commercial deerskin trade
from 1685-1815 negated many feminine economic opportunities, as men now traded for metal
pots, cloth, metal tools, and liquor and relied less on women constructing household materials.75
Saunt argues that, by the 1790s, hoping to regain some of their economic power, women were
some of the biggest Creek proponents of the civilization plan as they eagerly adopted ranching,
weaving, and spinning cloth. Women also found markets for homemade products like hickory
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and bear oil, providing them a new role in an evolving economy.76 Through the civilization plan,
women found ways to enter into the marketplace that were previously closed to them.
Like Saunt, Ethridge also argues the importance of women in integrating themselves into
the market economy. Women found new spending and buying power as ranchers, weavers,
spinners, producers, and sellers in the marketplace. Due to their gendered role as farmers, Creek
Indian Agent Benjamin Hawkins “targeted” women to accept, adopt, and encourage the
civilization plan.77 Carson argues that language and cultural identification of new products
helped both men and women in adapting to shifting economic roles. For example, he argues that
gender roles persisted in the language manifested by Choctaw women and men in their
identification of cattle for sale. When ranching, women identified cattle as agricultural products,
while men considered them a substitute for deer, preserving gender roles of men as hunters and
women as farmers.78 As Indian families began to settle outside of towns to accommodate their
ranching needs, this new settlement pattern did not disrupt kinship practices or the positions of
women as heads of household. Ethridge notes in Creek Country that these changes in settlement
patterns did not disrupt kinship practices, matrilines, or town identification for the Creeks. 79
In “George Washington and the ‘Civilization’ of Southern Indians,” Perdue argues that
the civilization plan attempted to shift Southern Indian women roles to ones that were similar to
American women. Perdue focuses on the civilization plan from the viewpoint of federal
government elites and what they wanted from the plan. Referencing the “republican
motherhood” idealism, Perdue argues that Washington viewed the civilization plan through a
republican lens, one that elevated the male yeoman farmer and associated “civic virtue with
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masculinity.”80 Women were encouraged to participate in the market, but more so as weavers,
spinners, and producers in other cottage industries or as subordinate to men in agricultural
production. She contends that federal elites believed Indians needed to “develop a real sense of
property,” and that “Native men had to gain control over their own families,” referencing a
complete restructuring of Southern Indian matrilineal households. 81
Diminishing the role of women as farmers, however, meant a radical alteration of the
roles of women. Farming was not merely an economic venture, but firmly established their
feminine identity.82 For men, farming meant not only a shift in gender roles, but a violation of
spiritual and social order, a cultural concept that frustrated Indian agents attempting to
implement the civilization plan. Perdue notes in Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society,
1540-1866, that the marginalization of women in agricultural practices opened the possibility of
plantation-style farming.83 The association of farming with women “prevented the formation of a
class of enslaved agricultural workers” and the assumption of male-dominated plantation
systems until the beginning of the civilization plan.84
In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Chickasaws contributed to the
Indian slave trade as slave catchers, emerging as a militaristic slave society that contributed to
the destabilization of the region and the forced migration of Southern Indian communities. 85 A
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hundred years later, black slaves were incorporated into the Chickasaw economy as a new source
of labor. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, before the implementation of the civilization
plan, Choctaws and Chickasaws acquired black slaves and began to participate in the larger
antebellum slave society that pervaded the American South. The use of black slaves provided a
way for some Chickasaw men to accept the changing economy. Rather than plant or farm
themselves, Chickasaw men who owned slaves focused their attention on ranching, leaving their
fields to slave labor, or they acted as overseers, much like Southern plantation owners in the
United States.86
Littlefield in Chickasaw Freedmen argues that Indian owners of black slaves were more
lenient with their slaves than white Southerners. Littlefield attributes this to seventeenth and
early eighteenth century understanding of slaves as war captives and possible adoptive members
of the Chickasaws.87 But recent ethnohistorians challenge this claim of leniency among Southern
Indian slaveholders. In The House on Diamond Hill, Tiya Miles illustrates through a close
inspection of the former plantation of Cherokee headman James Vann that slaves were still
considered property and treated in a similar, and usually very brutal, fashion as slaves owned by
white Southerners.88 Miles confronts the issue of slavery within Indian nations, discussing the
earlier leniency school of thought that Littlefield endorses where slavery was much more
benevolent in Indian country. Noting generational shifts in Cherokee country during the early
nineteenth century that still accommodated Indianess into the new market economy, Miles
complicates the discussion of African slavery in Indian households. The Vanns were one of the
largest slaveholders in the South but still maintained political, social, and religious affiliation
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with the Cherokee. Miles illustrates through the Vann’s that slaves were still considered property
and oppressed just as much as in other Southern settings.
Claudio Saunt in Black, White, and Indian illustrates a working relationship between the
rise of class divisions and the importance of race by the time of Indian removal. He traces the
dichotomous decisions of the Grayson family concerning Africans, with one side deciding to
embrace African Creeks, the other enslaving them even if they were adopted kin. Saunt argues
that “abiding by America’s racial hierarchy was a survival strategy – part cynical ploy, clever
subterfuge, and painful compromise” that often led to heartbreaking decisions including that of
disowning family members or denying their past.89 This racial hierarchy emerged in order to
shield Creeks from federal intervention in the decades leading up to the American Civil War,
through Reconstruction, and into the early twentieth century. Unlike the white American
southerners, however, Saunt notes that Creek leaders sought to protect their cultural and social
norms that only partially required racial dichotomies. 90 Difficult changes over familial and racial
dichotomies developed in the antebellum period had long lasting consequence for the Creeks.
Saunt notes that “the struggle to save the Creek Nation during Reconstruction forced Creeks to
make difficult political decisions” that divided Creek communities and made reconciliation a
problem even in the modern era.91 By examining the Grayson family, Saunt illustrates that Indian
and African relations can be just as divisive and fraught as African and European relations in
North America.92
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Barbara Krauthamer, in Back Slaves, Indian Masters, focuses on the enslaved Africans
among the Choctaw and Chickasaws from the antebellum period, through removal, and until
eventual emancipation after the United States Civil War. Krauthamer examines the slaves
themselves and argues that these slaves held important roles as laborers and in Choctaw and
Chickasaw battles for cultural and political power against American advances. The use of slavery
by the Choctaws and Chickasaws was a choice by autonomous communities and the Indians
viewed any effort by the United States to change their status as slaveholders as an attack on their
authority throughout the antebellum period. Krauthamer illustrates that the Choctaw and
Chickasaw adopted the uses of racial slavery and adapted it as a political barrier while in presentday Mississippi and continued this practice after removal to Indian Territory.93
In Slavery in Indian Country, Christina Snyder explores the broader theme of slavery
practices in the Native South, and their evolution over three centuries. Like Saunt in Black,
White, and Indian, Snyder acknowledges that racial identities were still developing during the
civilization plan. Snyder discusses the changing relationship between slavery and Southern
Indians, defining the economic and social changes occurring from viewing slaves as sacrificial
retribution or potential adoptive members of clans, to slaves as commodities, and finally as
racialized slave labor. Snyder argues that “otherization” occurred throughout slavery, but with
the change to a racialized slavery in the 1800s, slavery “now focused solely on African
Americans and subjected them to a very narrow range of fates, namely transgenerational slavery
or sale to another master.”94 During the civilization plan, slavery within the Native South became
more “fixed and rigid.”95
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The civilization plan dominated federal Indian policy for four decades, but the topic itself
is either usually incorporated as part of a regional or tribal study, answering a different
historiographical question, or folded into larger discussions of federal Indian policy on a national
level such as treaty negotiations, the “fictive conquest” and assumption of lands immediately
after the American Revolution, trade factories, and Indian wars. Even then, the historiography
concerning the civilization plan is notably small. In 1962, Francis Paul Prucha published
American Indian Policy in the Formative Years, the first of many books he published over the
next two decades examining federal Indian policy. Viewing with disaffection the previous
historiography that far too often focused on Indian wars rather than the entirety of federal Indian
policy, Prucha’s research provided the foundation for historians interested in Indian-American
relations for the next decade. Prucha’s work, however, written before modern ethnohistorical
methods that emphasize Indian agency, tends to ignore the actions and responses by Indians to
federal policy. Because of this, Prucha tends to paint federal agents and policies as paternalistic
and benevolent.96
In 1973, Bernard Sheehan’s ideological history, Seeds of Extinction, delved into the
reasoning and Enlightenment theory behind the civilization plan. Sheehan sets the ground work
for bridging the divide between western European Enlightenment ideology and federal Indian
policy during the Federalist and especially the Jeffersonian era of American politics, arguing that
men as disparate in their political thinking as George Washington, Henry Knox, and Thomas
Jefferson were united in their actions and thought concerning Indian communities. Flush with
confidence from the American Revolution, the United States sought to imbue the Indians with
their republican idealism and cultural identity. Rather than missionaries or the Society of
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Friends, Sheehan posits that the origination of the civilization plan came from the “secular
progressives” of the era that embraced the Enlightenment spreading through western Europe.97
Written in the same decade, historian Reginal Horsman agrees with Sheehan concerning
the shared ideology of the civilization plan between Federalists and Jeffersonians. But rather than
the “republican fervor” that Sheehan notes from the conclusion of the revolution, Horsman
argues that a dichotomous view towards the Indians occurred during the era of the civilization
plan as federal elites endorsed an Enlightenment ideology while states and frontier settlers
ascribed to a racialized identification of Indians that portrayed them as savages and in the way of
the new “empire of liberty” they were intent on creating. Horsman incorporates the confederated
era of national Indian policy, including attempts by Americans to violently divest Indians of their
lands on the frontier after the cessation of British claims to land east of the Mississippi. In this
period, Horsman notes that the United States “assumed an attitude towards the Indians… which
ill-reflected actual American power,” leading to dysfunctional federal Indian policy built on
necessity rather than simple ideology.98 Horsman provides a narrative of the battle between state
and federal control of Indian policy through federal documents, but notes that the United States
were forced to concede to Americans squatting on Indian soil because, as Horsman states, when
it came down to using American soldiers against American frontiersmen or preserve Indian
sovereignty, the normal response was to align with the Americans.99 Rather than simply a
benevolent ideology built by federal leaders, Horsman brings the ideology that Sheehan
describes into the reality of an anxious and unsettled new United States. Horsman and Sheehan
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both conclude their works with the War of 1812 and what they term as a violent confrontation
and rejection of civilization policy with the advent of nativist revolts in the Northwest Territories
and Creek country. These conflicts ended, according to Horsman, the “first phase” of federal
Indian policy, and marked a shift to far more aggressive and violent settler colonialism and
federal directives.100
Federal Indian policies of the early republic embodied American personifications of
correct cultural, economic, and political structures, and how they viewed Indians and their place
in the United States. Gradually, federal policies shifted from those that embodied the
Enlightenment ideology of elevating Indian society and eventual assimilation into the United
States, to one of racist ideology and removal by the 1820s. Analyzing federal Indian policy
provides historians a viewpoint into the changing norms of Americans during this turbulent era.
In The White Man’s Indian, Robert Berkhofer examines the visions of Indians that white
Americans imagined, and how this affected federal, cultural, and academic ideology and policy.
Broken into four parts, one such section of The White Man’s Indian examines the means and
reasons for federal Indian policy. For the era of the early republic, he terms the civilization plan
as one viewed by federal elites as a type of “expansion with honor,” one that satisfied their
ideology in treating with indigenous peoples, dispossessing Indians of their lands, and the
“transformation of native lifestyles into copies of approved White models.”101 Berkhofer argues
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that the primary change from earlier colonial American views of Indians was the very ideology
of “Americanism.” This idealism of American norms meant that cultural values that Indian
communities espoused were antithetical to American views and consequently must be discarded
or destroyed.102 Berkhofer’s work is primarily an intellectual history of how white Americans
shaped their image of Indians to fit their needs, acting as a self-serving reason for the creation of
civilization and assimilation policies.
Rather than examine the Federalist and Republican periods as a whole, Anthony Wallace,
in Jefferson and the Indians, focuses on the intellectual paradoxes and policies of Thomas
Jefferson himself, as he attempted to wrestle with the often-dichotomous policies of civilization
and acquiring Indian land. Wallace argues that fears of an “external menace” of British or French
encroachment and intervention in the fledgling United States, along with what Jefferson viewed
as “internal assaults on freedom” by Federalists, shaped Jeffersonian Indian policy.103 Splitting
from Sheehan’s views of Jeffersonian civilization policies, Wallace notes a distinct divide
between Jefferson’s thought processes on Indians, arguing that Jefferson sympathized with
actions of self-determination enacted on the frontier whilst eschewing the violence often found
with such encroachment on Indian lands. For Jefferson, Wallace argues, the primary element of
his Indian policy was not the civilization and assimilation of Indians, but the justification of his
“desire to obtain Indian land, at almost any cost.”104
In his 2008 book, Red Gentlemen and White Savages, historian David Nichols challenges
historians of the early republic to consider Indian policy as a means of control and restoration of
order on the frontier for both federal elites and Indian headmen. Like Horsman, Nichols begins
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with the era of the confederated congress and the dysfunction originating from attempts by
congress to control white expansion in an orderly manner and to prevent a mad rush for Indian
land. In this fight for order, Nichols argues, Federalist leaders found an ally in many Indian
headmen who sought to control their own young warriors. Nichols argues against previous
historiography and asserts that land and cultural superiority were not the only reasons for
negotiation with Indian headmen. Instead, alliance building and orderly progress were primary
reasons for treaties and talks between the federal government and Indian communities. The
United States sought peace on the frontier and Nichols argues that “there could be no peace on
the frontier without the consent and goodwill of the Indians.”105 Directing the reader to events on
the ground in the Northwest Territories, the Ohio Valley, and the Native South, Nichols argues
that waves of frontiersmen and settlers entering into Indian country complicated the attempts by
Indian headmen and the federal government to control the frontier, and provided the Indians with
a severe disadvantage at the negotiating table as they fought to maintain their sovereignty against
a growing wave of American settlers.106 Similar to Horsman, Nichols argues that Jeffersonian
benevolence through Indian policies like the civilization plan and trade factories eventually gave
way to a starker expansion policy.
Nichols continues his research into Indian policy in the era of the early republic
with Engines of Diplomacy, wherein he delves into the creation of trade factories in Indian
country. Nichols understands the factory system as an attempt for the United States to create
outposts of political and economic power, whilst indebting Indians to the United States through
trade goods and diplomatic ties. In effect, the trade factories were meant to separate Indian
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communities from their reliance on British, French, and Spanish merchants and instead shift that
reliance to American goods. Indian participants, however, also shaped the use and function of the
trade factories. Rather than simply the “outposts of an American commercial empire” and de
facto embassies on the frontier, Indian communities transformed trade factories by dictating
where they could be built, treating them as “personal storehouses,” and constructing the social
and cultural etiquette for the factory. Rather than the outposts of an American empire of liberty,
Nichols argues, the “factors on the ground might well wonder whose empire really owned
them.”107
Treaty negotiations and trade factories that Nichols discusses illustrate that the federal
government did not have full control during the first few decades of the United States over how
Indian policy unfolded. In both avenues, the federal government relied on Indian headmen to
instigate and mitigate compromises that effectively allowed Americans access to Indian lands
without violent repercussions. Indian leaders also managed to use these tools to flip the script, so
to speak, on the federal government, manipulating federal policy in a way that benefited them
and their community. In other examples, such as the Ohio Valley, Shawnees likewise
manipulated the help of Quaker missionaries, utilizing not only their offer of an American-style
education in a new market economy, but hiring white Americans to work Indian fields for
them.108 Still, Nichols notes there was much variation between factories. Trade factories left
Creeks and Cherokees indebted to Americans, leading to large land cessions and frustrations
between differing tribal factions. For the Chickasaws and Choctaws, however, trade factory
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prices were used to pay down American debt, with both turning profits with their interactions
with trade factories during the first decade of the nineteenth century.109
The federal government did not devise Indian policy to simply control frontier expansion.
It was also a means for the United States to situate themselves on the global stage. As Sheehan
argues, the federal government was swept up in republican fervor, intent on educating the
Indians on how to achieve a higher stage of society through Enlightenment teachings and secular
education to become republican yeoman farmers. And acting in a benevolent manner proclaimed
to European nations that the United States was a nation worthy of assuming a role among the
great powers of Europe. In Among the Powers of the Earth, Eliga Gould argues that Americans
were still looking across the Atlantic as well as towards the American interior.110 A drive to be
accepted by European “treaty nations,” Gould argues, was a critical theme to the creation of a
more centralized American state that could “represent the ‘one people’ in the Declaration of
Independence” rather than the “looser association” of individual states.111 This desire to be
brought into the European family of nations, Gould argues, influenced the creation of a
constituted national government rather than a confederation of states, and proved influential in
the creation of a more benevolent federal Indian policy that embraced civilization and
acculturation.112 Rather than simply a localized or even national project, federal Indian policy
was a reflection of American cultural identity projected for the rest of the world to witness.
Gould incorporates the United States into an entangled world of international laws and treaties,
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one where federal Indian policy took center stage as a means for other treaty nations to judge the
United States.
This dissertation intertwines two ongoing historiographical fields; that of the Native
South and federal Indian policy. As illustrated by the recent historiography listed above,
historians for the past thirty years have considered federal Indian policy as part of larger studies
of Southern Indians, but the causes, consequences, and actions of federal leaders and Southern
Indians concerning the plan were not the central focus of their work. Rather, it was a smaller part
to a different historiographical question. Furthermore, the actions of Mississippi Indians, like the
Chickasaws, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are understudied. This
dissertation expands these discussions of the civilization plan and explores the reasons behind
why the Chickasaws adopted or rejected new cultural and economic practices proposed by the
plan in a changing American South.113 Differentiated actions and goals by Southern Indian
communities, federal government officials, and state leaders demonstrates a need to study the
civilization plan in the Native South as a tool of economic and cultural change. As this
dissertation will illustrate, the actions of Southern Indians closer to American settlements during
the era of the civilization plan were, at times, starkly different than the actions of the
Chickasaws. Actions by Chickasaw leadership, gendered labor changes, and Chickasaw country
itself illustrate a need to incorporate their actions into the more complete history of the Creeks
and Cherokees, and this dissertation will explore the reasons why and argue for greater
inclusivity of Southern Indian communities as a means to better interpret the history of the
American South.
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CHAPTER 3
“IMPARTED OUR KNOWLEDGE OF CULTIVATION AND THE ARTS TO THE
ABORIGINALS OF THE COUNTRY:” CREATING AND COMMUNICATING THE
CIVILIZATION PLAN
In 1789, Secretary of War Henry Knox wrote to George Washington proposing a new
federal policy with Indian communities. Knox proposed that, “instead of exterminating a part of
the human race by our modes of population” that Americans impart “our knowledge of
cultivation and the arts to the aboriginals of the country.”1 Knox’s proposition marked a
significant break for the new constitutional government from the Indian policies of the first
United States government under the Articles of Confederation. The latter had centered around
the concept that the American Revolution had not only thrown off British rule, but also had
reduced those Indian nations living within territories formerly claimed by Great Britain to the
status of "conquered people." To enforce this conquest, the nascent United States had engaged in
expensive and violent conflicts throughout the eastern woodlands, such as the Northwest Indian
War and border conflicts in Creek and Cherokee country, but the federal government could ill
afford to continue such a costly policy.2 Knox proposed that rather than fight the Indians, the
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United States endeavor to “civilize” them, which would achieve the dual goal of acquiring Indian
lands and undermining indigenous political sovereignty at a far cheaper price. For the next forty
years, this so-called “civilization plan” dominated federal policies in the Native South3 and
elsewhere, encouraging an economic shift among indigenous people that emphasized replacing
their hunting and subsistence farming economy with commercial agriculture, ranching, and
cottage industries, and although not spelled out in the plan, the concomitant goals of
transforming their social structure through republican ideals and Western-style patriarchy. Most
important, though, was the idea that through the civilization plan, Indian nations would be
absorbed into American society, hence divesting each Indian nation of their independent
sovereignty.
This chapter examines the origins and contours of America’s first cohesive Indian policy,
alternately known as the civilization plan, the plan for civilization, or civilization program. The
Chickasaws’ engagement with the plan illustrates that the Native South remained a contested
space well after the American Revolution since they ultimately incorporated this federal policy
into their evolving society in ways that made sense to them rather than simply capitulate to the
demands of American federal leaders. To understand how Chickasaws reinterpreted and
sometimes subverted federal policy to fit their own needs, the ideology behind the civilization
plan as a federal policy first must be understood. This chapter explains the motivations behind
the policy, both practical and ideological, and how the federal government first embarked on
what officials considered a benevolent gift to a uniform indigenous people hurtling towards
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extinction. Indigenous southerners were, of course, not a homogenous entity nor doomed to
vanish. These facts, however, did not stop federal leaders from making broad assumptions about
American Indians as “savage” neighbors in need of “civilized” guidance; nor did the fact that
Indians across the eastern Woodlands had been farmers for millennia and that many in the South
had already taken up ranching stop officials from assuming the necessity of American
intervention for Native homelands to reach their full productive potential.
The ideology behind the civilization plan originated from Enlightenment thinking by
federal elites such as George Washington, Henry Knox, Thomas Jefferson, and Patrick Henry.
The civilization plan actually originated from a diverse array of sources, but the ideological
bedrock of the plan was Scottish Enlightenment philosophies and a Eurocentric conception of
human differences which argued that different “stages of society” existed, and that Indians could
evolve from “savagery” into higher stages through the guidance and influence of EuroAmericans.4 For elites like Benjamin Rush, Jefferson, and Knox, American Indians occupied a
“middle position,” between that of Europeans and Africans, and only needed a push to transition
to civilized society, albeit at a lower rung that Euro-Americans. 5 In fact, Samuel Stanhope Smith,
a member of the American Philosophical Society and founder of Hampden-Sydney College in
Virginia, argued that, for those accustomed to a lower level of society, an intervention from a
benevolent society was needed to accelerate them to civilization.6 Historian Kathryn Braund
notes that intellectual elites reading James Adair’s History of the American Indians in lateeighteenth-century United States and England were “less interested in understanding arcane
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social and political structures” of Southern Indians but were instead focused on “influencing and
changing them or manipulating them to their own advantage.”7 For philanthropists and
Enlightenment thinkers in America, they believed that it was their responsibility to nudge
Southern Indians to this end.
The concept of social evolution originated in elite European circles prior to the United
States constitution and the civilization plan. Until the eighteenth century, however, Europeans
often ascribed a theory of degeneration founded on classical and biblical examples. For European
elites recently recovering texts from ancient Greece and Roman philosophers and educators, it
made sense to assume the intellectual superiority of these earlier European communities.8 With
the technological advances during the age of exploration, however, Europeans found avenues for
an economic boom and a population explosion through colonization in the Americas and Africa
and this shifted the European continent from the periphery of the world stage to the center.9
These changes also spawned a belief that, rather than deteriorating, societies were progressing
from savagery to a more civilized state. For Europeans and Euro-Americans, they argued for
their own cultural superiority. Social evolution, however, often viewed civilizations as
monolithic, progressing toward a Eurocentric conception of civilization of progress. For
Europeans, colonization meant interacting with communities and cultures far removed from their
own that did not align with “biblical chronologies.”10 As anthropologists R. Jon McGee and
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Richard Warms have stated, by the end of the eighteenth century “few Europeans doubted that
humankind was making progress, and that they were the most advanced of all people.”11
In the United States, similar arguments mirrored European ones as Federal elites in the
United States viewed social evolution as the means to acculturate Indian communities and fold
Indian country into geographic bounds of the United States. Social evolution theory argued for a
universal history of mankind where civilizations moved through similar stages of development,
with European concepts of agriculture and urbanization as the pinnacle.12 Writing to a colleague
in France, Thomas Jefferson iterated this ideology, arguing that “within a shade of the Indian,
you have seen our own race with the habits of the Indian.”13 For men like Jefferson, Indians
would be acculturated in order to “fit more snugly into the natural order” and advance to stages
of civilization similar to that of Europeans and Euro-Americans. 14 In 1824, Thomas Jefferson,
then eighty-one, defined his beliefs of the inevitable advancement of civilization on the
American frontier. Looking from the west coast to the east, Jefferson envisioned a world where
one first saw a savage other, “living under no law but that of nature, subsisting and covering
themselves with the flesh of wild beasts,” gradually transforming until reaching the “most
improved state in our seaport towns” on the Atlantic seaboard. 15 To federal elites, Indian
communities were still at a lower stage of social evolution, and civilization programs were meant
to elevate them. For men like Washington and Knox, this Indian policy was intended to not only
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acculturate Indian communities through a “civilizing” process, but also to bring organized
expansion to what these elites viewed as a violent and dysfunctional borderland overrun with
American settlers who did not fit an elite view of the American republic, or who historian David
Nichols so aptly calls “white savages.”16 In essence and, as part of their new “republican
experiment,” the civilization plan acted as a pragmatic action for expansion in a period of
desperation.
After the American Revolution, the Articles of the Confederation imposed restrictions on
the federal powers of the American national government and failed to enunciate a viable and
realistic plan for interacting with Indian communities. Fearful of a strong, centralized
government, rank and file Americans at the time were loath to give more power to the national
congress. The Confederated Congress of the United States attempted to direct indigenous
treaties, but it often ran into issues over jurisdiction and control. In the Articles of Confederation,
the national government negotiated relationships with Indians outside of the boundaries claimed
by states. But the boundaries of many states at this time often overlapped or extended far beyond
the reach of their settlements. Federal leaders soon found that they did not have the power to
enforce their demands when Native leaders balked at ceding their lands, nor did they have power
to influence the states. Restrictions imposed by the Articles of Confederation included
inhibitions on the right of the federal government to intercede in trade and land negotiations
between states and Indian communities that the states argued lived within the bounds of their
territory. States like Virginia and New York refused to recuse themselves from treaty
negotiations, which meant that the federal government often fought and compromised as much
with state leaders as with Indian headmen over land acquisitions and the expansion of American
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settlements.17 The feeble nature of the national government led to Indian negotiations with landhungry states, like Georgia and New York, while land speculators and white encroachment on
Indian land further fueled violence and tensions with eastern Woodland Indians.
One of the reasons for the friction on the frontier can be located in the narrative of a
“fictive conquest” held by American settlers seeking their livelihoods on the frontier. Many
Americans, especially war veterans and settlers eyeing Native lands, adhered to the story of a
fictive conquest wherein Indians were an “enemy race,” one that attacked them unprovoked
during the War for Independence and subsequently, along with the British, lost. In the 1780s,
federal and state governments, along with private land companies, treated with Indian leaders
over land cessions. As historian David Nichols’ notes, these negotiators, shared a “common
interest in Indian land and a smug triumphalism” that stemmed from the American
Revolution.”18 National leaders were unable to control their young frontiers people. For example,
when the Iroquois refuted the Treaty of Stanwix in 1784 that reset the boundary lines between
Indian country and the territorial United States, state officials, land speculators, and settlers
streamed into their countryside, attempting to preserve lands they considered rightfully theirs. 19
In the Ohio Valley during the 1780s, settler advancement increased with renewed vigor and the
belief that the new United States would protect these white frontier settlers.20
This assumption of conquest ignored the reality of ongoing Indian mastery of their
territory, and Indian communities often actively or passively resisted American advancements
into their homelands. Many Indian communities, especially in the South, were still powerful
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polities determined to treat with the United States on an equal footing. During the Revolution
and immediately thereafter, Cherokee and Iroquois country, especially, was ravaged by warfare,
but they were simply the exception that proved the rule.21 The Chickasaws, on the other hand,
merely saw the United States as a new ally to incorporate into their web of interdependent
communities. These examples illustrate that, for the first decade of the United States, Indian
resistance revealed the farcical nature of Americans’ imagined right to treat them as conquered
peoples.
Violence on the frontier, however, served a purpose for white American expansion.
While federal leaders condemned frontier violence and feared its destabilizing effects on the new
republic, frontier families and the informally sanctioned violence often did the dirty work in
advancing the frontier, often to the benefit of land speculators and companies that included elite
Americans like Washington and Knox.22 In the Ohio Valley, for example, land speculators like
the Ohio Company of Associates and the Scioto Company acted as “agents of national
expansion,” instigating, and profiting, from settler encroachment. 23 For the United States
government, and despite national rhetoric against frontier violence and the illegal taking of
Indian lands, nation building and settler colonialism went hand-in-hand. Even so, early leaders
such as George Washington preferred a more orderly acquisition of Indian lands.
Writing to then Virginia Governor Benjamin Harrison in 1784, George Washington
vented his frustrations concerning the weakness of the government with treaties and enforcing
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law and order on the frontier. “The disinclination of the individual States,” Washington wrote,
“to yield competent powers to Congress for the Federal Government-their unreasonable jealousy
of that body & of one another… will, if there is not a change in the system, be our downfall as a
Nation.”24 Washington need not look anywhere but the ongoing dysfunction of federal and state
Indian policy in the Native South to prove his point. State leaders, especially in Georgia and
North Carolina, took exception to what they saw as federal interference in state Indian affairs and
initiated several state-led treaties that were contested by Indians, the states, and the federal
government for decades and led to increased Native resistance in both Cherokee and Creek
country.25
Land speculation and encroachment by citizens of Georgia and North Carolina in
Cherokee country, and the near constant conflicts with the Native occupants, also alarmed
Federalists.26 The issues, however, were not because speculators and settlers desired Indian land,
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but because they were acting outside of the law and order that Federalist desperately wanted to
implement along the frontier. The actions by state governments and frontier families in the South
destabilized the region and undermined the attempts of the United States government to define
its influence over the frontier. Writing to Washington in 1789, Knox condemned the actions of
unruly frontier men and women, proclaiming that the “disgraceful violation of the treaty of
Hopewell, with the Cherokees, requires the serious consideration of Congress.”27 Furthermore,
Knox worried that continued frontier violence might encourage Cherokee towns to align with
Creek leader Alexander McGillivray and his proposed Southern Indian Confederacy. Knox
noted that the “Indians have no faith in such imbicile promises, and the lawless whites will
ridicule a government which shall, on paper only, make Indian Treaties and protect Indian
boundaries.”28 For many nationalists, like Knox and Washington, the creation of a strong federal
government, and with it a strengthened national Indian policy, was desperately needed.
Back in the federal capital, national leaders endorsed territorial expansion but expressed
the need to do so in an ordered and gradual manner that incorporated the frontier into a
diversified American economy. The fear of white encroachment, then, was not the fact that it
undercut indigenous sovereignty, but that it undermined their vision of the new nation. Writing
to Thomas Jefferson in 1786, John Jay argued that the expansion of the frontier through violence,
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encroachment, and land speculation would simply have white savages replace the present “tawny
ones.”29 Federalists were not averse to acquiring lands from Indian communities, but they were
concerned about the manner that the United States acquired lands on the frontier. They were also
concerned about rapid resettlement that could possibly shift the center of political power in
America from the coast to the west.30
On the frontier, local officials worried about the continued conflicts on the borders and in
Indian country. In the Native South, squatters continued to ignore treaties between the United
States and Indian communities, most notably with the Creeks and Cherokees, endangering
American settlements and instigating further bloodshed. Settlements and communications from
the new settlements in the Tennessee Valley illustrate the conflict on the frontier and the oftendichotomous reactions by American leaders to the violence. In 1793, Knox wrote to Governor
William Blount and complained that “violent and lawless inroads of several parties of whites”
were attacking “peaceable parts of the Cherokee Nation,” noting that these actions would prompt
Cherokee warriors to act violently towards American settlers. 31 Meanwhile, in 1792 ,
Representative Andrew Pickens of South Carolina demanded a preemptive strike on indigenous
communities and a “vigorous” military campaign in Creek country.32 Clearly, numerous
positions on Indian problems were voiced on the frontier and in the metropole, often
contradicting one another and complicating the narrative that the national government sought to
project of a unified United States.
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Formulating a uniform federal policy, then, was slow in the making. In the years after the
American Revolution, both Washington and Knox were frustrated by inaction concerning Indian
relations and the American frontier. In his Report to Congress in 1787, Knox argued for
immediate change for American frontier relations with Indian communities. Noting warfare in
the Northwest Territories, Shawnee and Chickamauga actions near American settlers in the
Tennessee Valley, and the lack of soldiers available to combat the constant brushfires in the Ohio
River Valley, Knox worried about a total collapse of the frontier. Frontier chaos threatened
federal acquisition of lands via treaty and deterred orderly land sales, which also threatened
federal revenue. In his report, Knox stated that the “whole western territory, is liable to be
wrested out of the hands of the Union, by lawless adventurers,” and that indigenous communities
did not distinguish these frontier men and women from the “regular authority of the United
States,” which prompted continued violent responses from pan-tribal groups intent on protecting
their political autonomy.33 The dire economic straits of the Confederated Congress, however,
combined with the disinterested nature of most states to enforce federal treaties with Indian
communities as well as the limited power of the national government created a lack of urgency to
fix the so-called “Indian problem” through any concerted national program. It was not until the
creation and ratification of the Constitution and the ascension of George Washington to the
position of President of the United States that any significant progress was made.
The signing and ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1789 provided the United States
with a government better suited to treat with Indians under one uniform ideology and granted the
federal government more oversight over domestic issues, including Indian relations. The
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document itself did not spell out a national Indian policy, but the commerce clause in the
Constitution outlined that the federal government held the right to “regulate commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”34 Placement of
Indian affairs in the newly formed War Department further granted Washington and his newly
appointed Secretary of War Henry Knox extensive influence in the creation of an Indian policy
focused on the acquisition of Indian lands through the assimilation of Indians into American
society. After lobbying to reform Indian relations with the Confederated Congress, Knox and
Washington now had the motives, means, and plan to implement their vision of federal Indian
policies and frontier expansion.
To this end, Knox and Washington sought an Indian policy that would accommodate U.S.
acquisitions of Indian lands but do so in an orderly and peaceful way. This became the
civilization plan. Federal elites believed that Indian communities, once they transformed their
economic practices through the plan, would no longer need their hunting grounds and would sell
them to the United States. Native nations throughout the eastern Woodlands were already under
intense pressures to diversify their economies and land-use practices.35 In the Native South,
violence and thefts with encroaching white settlers combined with the burgeoning cotton
economy to erode the territorial autonomy of Southern Indian communities and often forced
them to the bargaining table with the United States to cede more land. Furthermore, the decline
of the deerskin trade and the rise of the American Trade Factory system contributed to massive
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debts owed to the United States that Southern Indians could not pay except through the sale of
land.36 While the civilization plan was certainly benevolent compared to annihilation or forced
removal, it envisioned a dystopian future for indigenous communities that assimilated them into
the United States and reasserted the control of the majority of their lands to white settlers. As
historian Reginald Horsman has argued, the “rhetoric, and some of the objectives” of the
civilization plan “were humane, the reality was not.”37
War, however, was always an option. Violence was antithetical to an orderly frontier, and
it was also expensive both in manpower and money for the United States. Addressing ongoing
warfare with the Wabash in 1789, Knox estimated that the cost to continue the fight was 2,500
soldiers and $200,000 both numbers “far exceeding the ability of the United States.” 38 If the
United States instigated a war in the Native South, like Andrew Pickens requested in 1792, Knox
estimated the cost to be $1.5 million per annum with at least 3,500 enlisted men needed simply
to fight the Creeks.39 For Knox and Washington, these numbers blatantly illustrated the
pragmatism of civilization policies. Warfare in Indian country was ineffectual and expensive, an
action that would bankrupt the nation, poison its people, and provide a toxic look in from the
outside. Hiding in plain sight within Knox’s letters was an argument for a cheaper and more
orderly takeover of the Wabash country. Instead of violence, Knox encouraged slow and gradual
assumption of land through indebting indigenous peoples and transforming economic roles and
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argued that peaceful and deliberate American settlement would eventually force out Indian
communities and that they would sell their lands for “small considerations.”40
Washington’s and Knox’s plan pragmatically accomplished their goals of securing and
expanding the American frontiers at a lower cost of lives, money, and international prestige than
outright warfare. Presenting Knox’s letters to Congress in August 1789, Washington focused on
the Southern frontier, arguing that it “would be most expedient to terminate all differences in the
Southern district,” as a means to secure the safety of Americans while also protecting “those
Indian tribes whose happiness… so materially depends on the national justice and humanity of
the United States.”41 Washington, acting as a paternal figure and rejecting the reality of Southern
Indian political and military power in the region, implored the first Congress to adopt a federal
Indian policy that he envisioned as a means to bring order to the frontier while also gaining land
for the United States.
Enlightenment concepts shaped the civilization plan, but clearly what drove federal
policy was the acquisition of Indian land. For Federalists and Republican elites alike, the
cheapest and most effective means for the United States to acquire Indian land was through
purchase. Washington himself was notorious for his speculative land practices and his policies
played a pivotal role in the expansion of the United States into Indian country. As Colin
Calloway notes, the policies written by Knox, Washington, and Jefferson were rife with
“hypocrisy, arrogance, and deceit” in how they imagined transforming Indians and how they
assumed right to control indigenous lands.42 In the Southeast, Indian lands were communally
owned by the citizens of a tribe and no single individual had rights of alienation—lands could
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only be sold by the Indian town, community, or confederacy as a whole. Republican ideology
implied that land should be bought rather than seized; therefore, Knox and others hoped to
change Native ideas on land tenure. Once Indians embraced the republican concept of private
ownership and privatized their land, land speculators could purchase land from individuals who
would be more willing to sell to white Americans.43
Institutionalizing private property among indigenous nations was but one goal of the
civilization plan. Rather, it was imagined as an ambitious, top-down and ideological program
that encouraged the social evolution of Indians and their eventual acculturation and assimilation
in the United States as American citizens. In his annual address to congress on October 25, 1791,
Washington outlined the basic principles that he believed should govern federal Indian policy.44
He argued that the “most humane principles was a primary wish” in treating with Indian
communities and acquiring their lands, though he readily admitted the failures of the United
States in this regard.45 Due to these previous failures, Washington lobbied for the civilization
plan. He argued that “rational experiments should be made” to encourage Indian communities to
adopt the “blessings of civilization.”46 These “blessings” included the transformation of
indigenous economies from swidden and hoe farming and hunting into ranching, cottage
industries, and commercial crop production.47 Through treaties that often-involved land cessions,
the United States would provide tools, education, blacksmiths, and animals, like hogs and cattle,
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to ease the transition to a new economy. For federal leaders like Washington, this transformation
was a means to engineer social and cultural change in Indian country. The plan also advocated
abandoning communal ownership of land, fencing their fields, asserting a patriarchal family
structure, and relegating women to cottage roles, raising children, and cooking food.48 While this
was not always the civilization plan repeated in Indian country, federal elites lobbied for an
acculturative process that would transform indigenous peoples into Americans. In a letter to the
Delaware and Mohicans in 1808, Jefferson advised that they would “unite yourselves with us,
join in our Great Councils and form one people with us, and we shall all be Americans,”
transforming themselves culturally into Americans themselves.49
Such changes as outlined in the civilization plan also had consequences for Native gender
relations. In the Native South, gendered labor roles often assigned most agricultural roles to
women while men hunted for the commercial market and participated in warfare. As historian
Theda Perdue has demonstrated, the civilization plan required not only the ideological and
economic transformation of Indian communities, but also a restructuring of indigenous gender
roles, especially in the Native South.50 Agents on the ground illustrated a divergence from this
ideology and often relied on women farming and engaging in civilization programs to find
success. In Creek country, for example, Benjamin Hawkins understood that Creek women were
often critical to his success and they were the strongest advocates for civilization policies in their
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respective towns.51 But Washington’s republican beliefs were structured along the lines of
defining gendered roles, with men as landholding heads of household.52
Elites in the federal capital viewed land ownership as a responsibility for men and sought
to transform ownership from communal and feminine to individual and masculine. Subordinating
women under men in the Native South was a also means to eradicate the “corrupting power” of
Native women on land cessions and political negotiations. 53 For Southern Indians, matrilines
held usufruct rights to plots of land in their country, meaning they had the right to plant,
cultivate, and otherwise use the land. This does not mean, however, that the matrilines held
exclusive property rights and ownership to the land. Once a field was abandoned, ownership of
the land reverted to the town or nation.54 This communal ownership of land frustrated Americans
who coveted the land, as ownership of the land was distinctly tied to the political and territorial
autonomy of Indian communities in the Native South. In Chickasaw country, communal land
ownership also benefitted those invested in the new Southern economy built on commercial
crops and ranching. As will be discussed in later chapters, Chickasaw elites, like the Colberts,
Sealeys, and Loves, successfully fought and resisted American overtures to purchase land. For
Chickasaw elites, this was not simply a step to preserve the political wellbeing of their nation,
but an economically pragmatic action to preserve what historian Arrell Gibson refers to as taxfree landholdings.55
For the nascent federal government of the United States, the aim was to separate Indians
across the Eastern Woodlands from their lands and, in the South, to expand a new Southern
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economy built on the production of cotton. In 1793, the invention of the cotton gin by Eli
Whitney accelerated the American desire for land within the Native South. The invention
provided a way for slaves and yeomen farmers to remove seeds from cotton at an accelerated
rate, making cotton a highly profitable crop in the American South. As anthropologist Robbie
Ethridge has noted in Creek Country, the advent of this technology not only meant that Southern
Indians became unnecessary as trade partners in the eyes of Americans, but “had become
impediments to the system” of commercial agriculture that eclipsed the deerskin trade as the
dominant economy in the South.56 Promoters of the civilization plan, including many of the
political leaders of the United States, argued that the Indians would either assimilate or be
removed. These proposals for land acquisition, however, ignored the fact that, once Southern
Indians adopted new economic identities centered on commercial cotton production, ranching,
and yeoman farmsteads, they would use their land to further their own economic agendas. Lost
in the cacophony of the Enlightenment ideology framing civilization programs were Native
people themselves, who had their own plans and goals.
The era before the creation of the newly constituted federal government was a frustrated
mix of state, local, and national agendas and ideas of how to treat with Indians and how the
United States itself should be viewed and managed. While there were distinctly Enlightenment
principles and ideologies that the civilization plan embodied, the genesis of the plan was not one
of strength, but one of weakness. For most of the first two decades of its creation, the United
States was weak, broke, and internally divided over the direction and character of the nation.
Rather than a simple act of benevolence, the civilization plan was a pragmatic, and often
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desperate, means for the federal government to exert some influence over Indian relations and
frontier expansion.
The United States found themselves on unsteady domestic footing in the two decades
after the American Revolution, but Americans were also on shaky grounds on an international
level. The British government did not remove soldiers and forts from the Northwest Territory,
nor did they open the West Indies to American trade. Spaniards in the old Southwest closed off
the Mississippi River to trade, which complicated the economic relationship of western
frontiersmen with the global market. In addition, the Spanish and British often supported Indian
resistance to American expansion.57 As historian Kathleen DuVal has argued, the aftermath of
the American Revolution brought about a tumultuous uncertainty in the Native South, one that
possibly meant a return to the pre-Revolution status quo when indigenous communities and
European powers created interdependent alliances. Ongoing diffused power among a collection
of states, empires, and Indian communities in post-Revolution America was as plausible, if not
more so, as the creation of a strong federal United States government intent on eradicating
indigenous land claims east of the Mississippi. Many Southern Indians believed that “multiple
sovereignties,” both European and indigenous, would continue to vie for economic and political
opportunities through the creation of interdependent alliances and play-off politics that had
dominated the colonial era.58 Actions like the 1784 creation of the State of Franklin in defiance
of established states, as well as attempts by William Augustus Bowles to create a State of
Muscogee in 1799, and Kentucky and other western states courting the Spaniards in New
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Orleans and considering secession during the first decades of the United States created a fluid
southwestern frontier that frustrated federal leaders.59
Instigators and sponsors of the new Indian policies considered their actions from a global
scale as well as national, continental, and regional. American elites were not simply worried
about how disorderly expansion might affect the United States fragile economy, but also how
other countries viewed this expansion. After the American Revolution, federal leaders wished to
position the United States as “worthy” of becoming part of the larger global community of
European powers like France, Spain, Portugal, and England. With the advent of the
constitutional government replacing the Confederated Congress, the United States now had a
means to position itself as a unified nation state to the larger global community of nation states,
even if its unified front to European nations belied the internal tensions at home. Thus, the new
Indian policy of the civilization plan was not created in a vacuum, nor was it monitored simply
by Americans themselves. American leaders were well aware of this international attention and
fearful of pushback from the larger European community on their treatment of Indians. In 1783,
Washington confided to former Continental Army compatriot James Warren his hope that the
United States would become “one of the most respectable Nations upon Earth,” but worried that,
if they continued to abuse their position on the frontier, Americans “shall sink, in the eyes of
Europe, into contempt.”60 The act of shepherding Indian communities to an elevated stage in
society, national leaders argued, reflected well on the United States on the international stage.
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As historian Deborah Rosen notes, European leaders, for the first three quarters of a
century of its existence, were confounded by the United States—they recognized the
dichotomous nature of the new polity as both a unified nation and an interdependent community
of states. The United States did not fit into European models of nation states that required a
homogenous population with common origins.61 The United States domestic Indian policy
reflected this tension, with state and federal leaders often combating each other, as well as
frontier settlers, on the best means to deal with the so-called “Indian problem.” On an
international level, however, the United States wished to project a “collective identity”
concerning Indian relations, one that European nations found acceptable.62 This was a chance to
illustrate to other nations that republicanism reflected sound policy and that Americans would
not descend into violence and anarchy, becoming the villain of the story with indigenous
peoples.
Federal elites openly feared that American actions on the frontier might delegitimize their
standing to the European community or become what historian Eliga Gould terms a “treaty
nation” and on equal political and social footing with countries like France, Spain, and
England.63 One particular fear was that of creating a new “Black Legend,” a means for European
nations to villainize and denounce the United States and its government without a monarchy as
anarchic and chaotic, eroding what little influence and respect Americans had on an international
stage.64 For example, in a 1791 letter to General Anthony Wayne, then fighting Indians in the
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Ohio Valley, Secretary of War Henry Knox cautioned the general that the United States would
accept any reasonable treaty that led to peace with the pan-tribal confederacy. The United States,
Knox wrote, was “adverse in the extreme to an Indian War,” cautioning that the financial and
diplomatic actions of such a war would be catastrophic to the new nation. Knox noted that the
“favorable opinion and pity of the world is easily excited in the favor of the oppressed” and that
the “Indians are considered in a great degree of this description.” Knox warned Wayne that, if
the United States were complicit in the destruction of Indian communities the “disinterested part
of mankind… will be apt to class the effects of our Conduct and that of the Spaniards in Mexico
and Peru together.”65 Earlier in 1789, when communicating with Creek Indian Agent James
Seagrove about the increasing violence on the Georgia and Creek Indian border, Knox
remonstrated that unremitted violence against Southern Indians would be a “black cloud of
injustice and inhumanity” that would “impend over our national character.”66 Federalists, like
Washington and Knox, did not want war, as violence on the frontier only delegitimized their
position on the global stage.
Throughout the colonial era, and well into the colonization of Africa in the late
nineteenth century, European countries often excused their destruction and usurpation of
indigenous sovereignty because they brought their version of civilized life to indigenous
groups.67 In essence, the civilization plan would prove not only that the United States was a just
republic but also that its expansion plans were legitimate and proper in the eyes of European
observers. In 1792, Knox wrote to the Sachems of the Miami, disavowing their accusations that
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the United States was to deprive them of their land and “run them out of their country.”68
Instead, Knox argued that the United States only wished to impart them with “all the blessings of
civilized life.”69 The eventual surrender of land and acculturation by Indian communities like the
Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws was balanced with the tools and education
needed for economic transformation that the United States encouraged. In this top-down
idealization of the plan, benevolent assumption and assimilation was an ethnic genocide of which
the global community approved.
Eastern elites also believed that the civilization plan would help to control unruly
frontiersmen and thus expand republican values to the west. 70 Washington frequently voiced
frustration with the “Land Jobbers, Speculators, and Monopolisers [sic],” and “scatter’d [sic]
settlers” who inhabited the frontier, arguing that their actions and attitudes, especially towards
Indian communities, were “inconsistent with that wisdom and policy which our true interest
dictates, or that an enlightened People ought to adopt.”71 For Federalists, like Washington, the
“unrestrained conduct” on the western frontier was abhorrent, antithetical to the ideology of their
republican experiment, and endangered their position as an example on the global stage.72
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Often, federal agents derided lower class whites as lazy, ineffectual, uncivilized, and bad
influences on Indians. In the Native South, for example, Cherokee Indian Agent Silas Dinsmoor
pointed out specific white families to Cherokee Agent Return Meigs in 1802, in this case, noting
that respectable American families with republican values would act as good examples for the
Cherokees, but settlers like “Mr. Adams and his daughters do not qualify.”73 Dinsmoor noted
that Cherokee headman Doublehead conversely acted as an agent for civilization to this white
family, handing out wheels and cards, which they rejected. Ranting that the family was
“criminally lazy,” Dinsmoor attributed the success of civilization in the region to the Cherokees
in spite of American settlers on the frontier rather than because of them.74
Similar reactions to frontier settlers throughout the old Southwest were recorded by
travelers and traders. Traveling through the Cumberland region in Tennessee after leaving
Chickasaw country in 1797, English astronomer Francis Baily noted that the settlers were “living
in that state which characterizes the second class of settlers in America.”75 Baily’s journal entries
took an almost Knoxian turn concerning the settlers. Discouraged by the people he encountered,
he nevertheless argued that federal leaders “ought rather to anticipate what it will be, than to
dwell upon” the present circumstances of the settlements. Similar to Knox and Washington’s
view of the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Cherokees in the region, Baily stated that the “mild
government of the United States of America,” ought to give “free encouragement to the progress
of the arts of civilized life.” For federal leaders, the object of civilizing was not simply to
transform Indian communities into Americans, but to actively transform the western frontier,
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including both Indians and frontier settlers, into an image that suited their vision of republican
citizens.76
American frontier settlers, directly competing with Native people over land and
resources, had mixed opinions about the civilization plan. On the one hand, they understood any
Indian gain to be their loss. One settler in the Tennessee Valley, feeling hemmed in by the
Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws, and Spanish control of critical headwaters, argued that the
profits of the region “are nearly lost to the owners and the produce of one of the richest and
finest countries becomes of little or no use to society or commerce.”77 On the other hand, they
recognized the economic benefits to the plan. The settler continued that funds to support
“Agriculture and Civilization” that Southern Indians received should also be given to frontier
families for their economic development. In return, the Tennessee Valley would “greatly
improve the commercial intercourse of the United States.”78
Two means the federal government used to outline, and provide material for, civilization
programs into the Native South were the Trade and Intercourse Acts and treaties with individual
Indian communities. Introduced as federal law first in 1790, the Acts to Regulate Trade and
Intercourse With the Indian Tribes acted as legislative vessels for civilization programs and they
created of and outlined the duties of federally appointed Indian agents who were to reside with
their respective Indian communities. The first act, signed into law in July 1790, had little to do
with civilizing programs or the permanency of agents in the Native South and mostly defined the
role of trading licenses and territorial acquisition. The act, however, consolidated federal control
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over Indian land acquisition and outlined the legalities for traders in Indian country, detailing
that only land or trade licenses “under the authority of the United States” held any weight.79
The act was renewed in 1793 and further defined the prosecution of horse stealing,
violence, and unlawful settlement on Indian territory. This iteration of the Trade and Intercourse
Acts adopted much of the verbiage that Washington used to outline the civilization plan and
what he and Knox viewed were the primary roles of agents on the ground in Indian country. For
the Native South, the 1793 Act set aside $20,000 for tools for the civilization plan and the
“continuance of their friendship,” with the United States, as the federal government funneled
goods, livestock, and tools into the Native South as well as agents meant to educate Indian
communities in scientific agriculture, weaving, and other civilization programs.80 At first, federal
agents in Indian country were charged with specific diplomatic missions rather than taking
residence in Indian communities, but the roles of agents soon took on a permanent basis and
established permanent offices and homes in their assigned Indian nations.81 The 1793 Act,
granted the president power to appoint agents “to reside among the Indians, as he shall think
proper.”82 The duties of agents, as discussed in Chapter Five, were further defined in ensuing
trade and intercourse acts in 1796, 1799, and 1802, as the federal government refined and
specified their relations with Indian communities, the implementation of the civilization plan,
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and issues of territorial disputes.83 As we will see, agents were a mixed lot, with some acting
with Indian welfare in mind, others acting with self-aggrandizement as their primary interest,
while others simply sought a way out of their position entirely.
While trade factories themselves were not part of the civilization plan, the factories and
the factors running them worked in conjunction with the civilization plan on land acquisition. If
republican ideology implied that land was to be bought rather than seized, federal trade factories
provided an avenue for the federal government to acquire both influence and debt with Indian
communities and, thus, encourage land sales to cover this debt. Proposed by George Washington
at the end of the American Revolution, trade factories were meant by the federal government to
replace Spanish and British goods with American products, creating a sphere of influence and
credit that the federal government could exploit in land and treaty negotiations.84 Lawmakers did
not intend these factories to turn a profit; rather, they hoped that this system would “ensnare
Indian chiefs in a web of debt.” 85 The thinking was to use land as debt payments, thus making
Indians more willing to part with their lands.86 During Washington’s presidency, trade factories
at Tellico in Cherokee country and Fort Wilkinson in Creek country were founded. Jefferson
expanded on the trade factory system, founding over a dozen more factories, including one
located on Chickasaw Bluffs near present-day Memphis to serve the Chickasaws. Historian
David Nichols characterizes the trade factories as not simply a part of a benevolent program to
transform Indians, but rather they supplemented a “conquest on the cheap.”87 With the
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civilization plan and the trade factory system, the federal government produced a dual Indian
policy designed to gain land for the Americans’ new “empire of liberty.”88
The Trade and Intercourse Acts, however, were not meant simply to define relationships
between the federal government and Indian communities. Historian Francis Prucha argued that
the act itself was not technically aimed at Indians, but rather at white frontiersmen.89 In reality,
removing squatters was guaranteed in the treaties as a way to control squatting and land
speculation that deprived the federal government, and federal elites, from profiting from Indian
country. As historian Colin Calloway notes, these acts signed into law by Washington were
remarkably similar to the Proclamation Line of 1763 that Washington despised and fought over
in the American Revolution.90 The acts explicitly defined that the United States was lawfully
allowed to remove American settlers trespassing in Indian country, noting that the United States
army was well within its rights to “apprehend every person” that encroached on Indian
territory.91
Until 1834, with the realignment of Indian Affairs from the War Department, the Trade
and Intercourse Acts acted as a pillar of legislative authority for the actions of the civilization
plan, a means to funnel goods to Southern Indian communities to supplement their changes in
economic activities, defined Indian relations with the federal government as whole, and placed
the acquisition of Indian lands solely at the discretion of the federal government. Regulating
Indian trade and land cessions through the federal government, in theory, prevented constant
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backcountry violence, illegitimate trade, or the creation of rogue states or nations in land that the
United States claimed as rightfully theirs to purchase and govern. The physical action of
removing American settlers were often few and far between, however, as the federal government
often found themselves acting in bad faith towards Indian communities with whom they signed
treaties so as not commit violence against their own citizens. 92 Through the passage of laws
meant to define their actions in Indian country, the federal government illustrated once again that
its desire to civilize Indians went hand in hand with its desire to control and civilize the frontier
while extending their national borders. Their inefficacy in enforcing these acts illustrated not
only their weak commitment to the plan but the weakness of the federal government on the
frontier and their hesitancy to interfere with settler encroachment and violence that benefited
land speculators and others.
Treaties ratified by the newly constituted United States government worked in
conjunction with the Trade and Intercourse Acts to secure Indian land cessions while also
integrating civilization programs and tools for new economic ventures. Previously, at the
Hopewell negotiations in 1786-1787, the U.S. commissioners, Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew
Pickens, Joseph Martin, and Lachlan McIntosh supported compensating Cherokees for the loss
of land to encroaching whites, proposing to do so by “teaching them some useful branches of
mechanics.”93 The negotiators noted that some Cherokee and Chickasaw women were already
involved in spinning, weaving, and other cottage industries. But this did not dissuade them from
arguing that the best means to compensate the Cherokees for the loss of their land was through
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new tools and animals. Between 1789 and 1798, the United States senate approved a dozen
treaties with different Indian communities, often including wording that secured land cessions
while giving Indian communities new goods for economic programs. For example, the 1790
Treaty of New York signed between the United States and Creek headmen led by Alexander
McGillivray included terms outlining civilization plans in Creek country. In the treaty, the
United States promised to “furnish gratuitously the said nation with useful domestic animals, and
the implements of husbandry.”94 Ten months later, in the Treaty of Holston, the United States
wrote almost identical language to the Cherokees, promising agricultural tools, spinning wheels,
blacksmiths, and domestic animals to lead them “to a greater degree of civilization.”95 In 1795,
Chickasaw headmen, led by Piomingo and George Colbert, signed their own agreement for
annuities meant for agricultural tools, ranching, and cottage industries, though this treaty did not
include land cessions.96
For federal leaders, the Native South was prime ground to develop their civilization plan
for a variety of reasons, primarily due to the decline of the deerskin trade and due to the ongoing
warfare in the Ohio Valley and Old Northwest that discouraged uniform adoption of civilization
programs in the North. 97 In the South, the animosities between the Creeks and Georgians had
begun to subside by the mid-1790s with the death of Alexander McGillivray in 1793. In addition,
many Southern Indians, facing a faltering deerskin trade after the American Revolution, had
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already begun cattle and hog ranching and commercial farming at least a decade or so before the
United States sought to implement the civilization plan.98
While Jeffersonians and Federalists disagreed on almost every other facet of the federal
government, they were remarkable similar in their views on Indian policy.99 Historian Bernard
Sheehan argues that the civilization policy was decidedly Jeffersonian from the start, defining the
policy from terms Jefferson used in his Notes on the State of Virginia and from terms and views
that Jefferson himself endorsed. When Jefferson became president in 1801, his administration's
Indian policy took many of the tools and programs laid out by the Federalists and expanded
them, aggressively pursuing Indian land through the tools laid out by Washington and Knox.100
In particular, Jefferson extended the use of trade factories to define the role of the federal
government in Indian country.
Although the civilization plan fit neatly into economic changes already occurring across
the Native South, Southern Indians were not a unified entity, and each Indian nation responded
to the civilization plan in differing ways. Within each Southern Indian community, federal plans
encountered change, resistance, transformation, and acceptance as each town and confederacy
sought to harness the power of the new Southern economy and remain viable producers in the
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global market. In Creek and Cherokee country, for example, extreme pressures to cede land,
unimpeded settler intrusions, and border violence all worked to muddy and cloud the message of
the civilization plan. For the Cherokees, warfare from 1776 to 1794 had devastated their country,
population, and livelihood, causing them to feel as if they “had lost control of their destiny as a
people.”101 In Creek country, no such catastrophic defeat occurred in the decades prior to the
civilization plan, but constant border conflict and warfare during the 1790s shaped Creek
conceptions of federal programs.102
In Choctaw country, proximity to the burgeoning cotton colony in Natchez, Mississippi
often led to violence and theft and suspicions about US intentions and governance. In the
aftermath of the revolution, the Chickasaws witnessed firsthand the continued encroachment
occurring across the Southern countryside and worried that the frontier violence and settler
occupation occurring in Creek and Cherokee country would soon arrive in their country.
However, being buffered by Creek and Cherokee territory from squatters and land speculators,
and with settlements along the Mississippi truncated at Natchez, they did not get involved in
border skirmishes and were protected, for a while, from US pressures for land cessions. Hence,
their relations with the United States started on firmer footing than the Creeks, Cherokees, and
Choctaws.103 As early as the 1770s, the Chickasaws incorporated ranching and husbandry into
their economic practices. A mere two months after Washington proposed the civilization plan to
congress, and well over a decade before federal agents resided with the Chickasaws, federal
negotiators noted that the Chickasaws “cultivate the ground more than the other Indians, and
possess cattle, proportionally, in greater numbers.”104 As we will see, the Chickasaws, although
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quite aware of the hazards imbedded in the civilization plan, viewed it as an economic stimulus
package for changes already underway in Chickasaw country and cultivated a particularly
pragmatic relationship with the United States in order to implement the plan as they saw fit.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CREATION OF AN INTERIOR SOUTH: CHICKASAW ECOLOGY, LAND,
AND TREATIES, 1790-1815
The landscape of Chickasaw country played a pivotal role in how Chickasaws adopted
civilization programs and invested in a new Southern economy based on ranching, commercial
crops, and cottage industries. Their homeland, in parts of what are now the states of Mississippi,
Alabama, and Tennessee, was ecologically and environmentally well-suited to not only adopt,
but sustain a new economy built on ranching and commercial crops. While traveling through
Chickasaw country in 1805, the American physician Dr. Rush Nutt praised the ecology of the
region, stating that the “soil & climate here is well adapted to the raising of corn, wheat, rye,
barley, oats, buckwheat &c. cotton thrives here as well, as much as 1200 lbs per acre has been
raised.”1 Chickasaws, like many Southern Indians, recognized the chance to benefit from the new
Southern economy and acted on it. The ways that the Chickasaws successfully used their
territory provides historians a unique means to explore how a southern Indian community
selectively embraced the federal plan for civilization without the external pressures of constant
encroachment by western frontiers settlers.
The geopolitical location of Chickasaw country, hundreds of miles from major American
settlements, prevented violence, encroachment, and disruption by western frontier settlers. In this
“Interior South,” Chickasaw communities were not harassed by masses of American squatters

1

Jesse D. Jennings, "Nutt's Trip to the Chickasaw Country," The Journal of Mississippi History 9 (1947): 42.

80

until well after the foundational changes of the new Southern economy encouraged by the
civilization plan had already taken root. The Chickasaws’ fertile soil, geopolitical location,
successful alliance building, and distance from white encroachment in the Interior South allowed
them to slowly transition to new means of production on their own terms. Furthermore,
Chickasaw men took advantage of the proximity of their country to hunting grounds in the
Arkansas River Valley and exploited peaceful relations with the Quapaw to still profit from the
deerskin trade during the early nineteenth century. As a result, the civilization plan folded neatly
into already undergoing economic changes in no small part due to Chickasaw economic
connections in the west. Chickasaws took advantage of many of the economic and political
benefits of interacting with American federal agents and Indian policies while forestalling some
of the more negative aspects of contact, including attacks on their sovereignty and land through
settler colonialism.
Through developing the concept of the “Interior South,” this chapter adds to a growing
collection of ethnohistorical work that pushes back against a homogenous vision of how southern
Indians adapted to the new economy of the cotton South in the Antebellum Period.2 This chapter
illustrates how the Chickasaws used their physical location in land negotiations and cessions and
how they sometimes frustrated, sometimes placated, but always pragmatically approached treaty
negotiations. The fact that federal civilization programs were not intertwined with land cessions
proved important to the history of the Chickasaws. The Chickasaws experienced fewer acts of
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violence, illegal intrusions by squatters, poor land deals, and corrupt bargains than other
Southern Indian communities since they engaged in so few land deals before removal, which
also affected internal politics, leadership, and shifts in labor practices. While the Chickasaw
country’s location in the “Interior South” ultimately did not save them from the forced removal
or the creation of a racist ideology of an America built solely for free white men, it provided
them with a means to succeed for a period in a fraught and changing American South.

Figure 1. Chickasaw Country and subsequent land cessions. Published in James Barnett, Mississippi’s American
Indians, (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2012), 171.
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As illustrated in Figure 1, the Chickasaws laid claimed to territory spanning north
Mississippi, southwest Tennessee, and western Alabama that encompassed five physiographic
regions: the Tennessee River Hills, the Black Prairie, Pontotoc Ridge, the Flatwoods, and part of
the North Central Plateau. In the early eighteenth century, the Chickasaws towns were clustered
in a portion of the Black Prairie, in present-day Tupelo, Mississippi, living in townships only a
few miles distant from one another.3 The Black Prairie is a sickle-shaped physiographic province
running through present day northeastern Mississippi and central Alabama. This region as the
name implies is a prairie, or savannah-type region, composed of wide expanses of grasslands
interspersed with clumps of trees. The underlying soil is “composed of rich, thick black soil
generated from the underlying Selma chalk formation.” 4 Soils in the Black Prairie are
uncommonly rich and quite conducive to the cultivation of corn and cotton; and the grasslands
are excellent forage for free-ranging livestock. In fact, the Black Prairie, even today, is wellknown for its fertile soils.
Prior to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Chickasaws, like most
Southern Indians, practiced swidden and hoe agriculture. Chickasaw farmers—who, for the most
part, were women—individually placed seeds and intermixed squash, corn, and beans in the
same fields. This intercropping by Southern Indian women maintained decreased rainfall runoff
and protected the soil from the sun and erosion. The dense foliage of these fields also protected
the crops from pests like bugs, racoons, birds, and deer.5 By the eighteenth century, Southern
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Indians had incorporated several cultigens native to Europe and Africa, such as cowpeas (also
known as black-eyed peas), rice, watermelons, and peaches, into their diets and crop production.6
Peach trees, for example, were cultivated as early as the 1670s in the Native South, and British
trader Thomas Nairne observed in the early 1700s that peach and plum orchards surrounded
Chickasaws villages.7
Federal civilization policies, as discussed previously, were designed around ethnocentric
ideas of what was or was not "civilized."8 In this gaze, then, Indian farming practices fell outside
the category of civilized, and Euro-American observers often criticized these practices for Native
farmers, despite the fact that most frontier Euro-American farmers had adopted them as the best
methods given the conditions and available technologies of the time. In addition, a common
Euro-American justification for appropriating anyone's lands was that the owners were not using
the land to its full potential.9 British traders James Adair's and Thomas Nairne’s surveys during
the early and mid-eighteenth century, for example, sought to discount Chickasaw ownership of
land by deriding Chickasaw farming methods. Adair noted that the Chickasaws often had “pretty
good crops, owing to the richness of their soil.” Adair would rather attribute their success to the
soil rather than to Chickasaw farming methods, which he viewed as lazy and slothful.10
Traveling through Chickasaw country in the 1810s, Henry Ker observed that Chickasaw country
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itself was “rich and fertile,” but that the Chickasaws themselves “do not attend much to
agriculture,” or at least to what Ker thought was good agricultural practices. 11 Both white
American travelers and federal Indian agents viewed Southern Indian agriculture as wasteful and
indolent, especially with the advent of scientific agriculture and the use of steel plows and new
agrarian practices.12 In the early nineteenth century, American federal officials continued this
line of thought and argued that the soil and climate of Chickasaw country, rather than the work
of Chickasaw men and women, enabled the Chickasaws to “procure not only the necessities but
the comforts of life.”13
As American elites traveled through the Deep South, they “molded the southern frontier
in ways that advanced plantation slavery,” cotton, and ranching.14 White American traders
travelling through Chickasaw country in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
documented the soil composition and geographic landscape with an eye towards Eurocentric
development and cotton production. In the early eighteenth century, Nairne noted that the land
surrounding Chickasaw settlements was “not perfectly level, like ours in Carolina, but full of
gentle Ascents, which yet are not too steep for the plough.”15 In his trip through Chickasaw
country in 1805, Nutt consistently remarked that the soil is “dark and fertile,” and highly
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conducive to American-style agriculture.16 Nutt noted the good farmland near the North
Tennessee, Tallahtchee, Duck, and Yannabba Rivers in particular, stating that the soil was “fine,
dark & deep with a rich mould, clothed with black walnut, cherry, sugartree, maple, mulberry,
oak & hickory.”17 Chickasaw country, with the rich soils of the Black Prairie, was considered
among the best in the country for growing cotton. As traveler James Hall wrote in 1803, the “soil
and climate are both exceedingly favorable for that article,” and “the contemplative traveller’s
mind is merely fatigued with the beautiful prospects which are exhibited to the eye- plain beyond
plain, to which it can descry no limits, and soil of the first quality.”18 Similar to Creek Indian
Agent Benjamin Hawkins’ documentation of Creek country, or the surveying conducted by
George Washington in the Virginia frontier prior to the American Revolution that shaped his
federal Indian policies, these survey notes by travelers and traders created a backlog of vital data
for eventually dispossessing Chickasaws of their country by the United States. 19
Adair also noted that the communal fields of corn, pumpkins, squash, and beans for
Chickasaw towns, as for most Indian towns, were not fenced, which ran counter to Adair’s
European conceptions of property and field preparation. When Adair questioned why the fields
were not fenced, Chickasaw women responded dismissively. They considered building fences a
waste of time, a childish expense, as if “the crop would eat itself.”20 The fences that Adair
suggested were worm fences composed of saplings or small trees and stacked in panels, meeting
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at an angle, and zigzagging around the field. As anthropologist Robbie Ethridge has noted, these
types of fences successfully kept out livestock from fields, but were useless against deer,
racoons, and other wild animals. Instead, Chickasaws used alternative ways to defend their
crops-- children oftentimes stood as guards and lookouts around the fields.21 With the increasing
number of Chickasaw livestock in the late eighteenth century, however, Chickasaw women
found ways to keep these new animals away from their crops. They hobbled horses, for example,
with “tough young bark-ropes,” and confined their burgeoning herds of pigs in “convenient
penns [sic], from the time the provisions are planted, till they are gathered in.”22 In an interview
with minister Lyman Draper in 1841, former Chickasaw interpreter Malcolm McGee reminisced
that colonial-era Chickasaw women were legally allowed to kill any livestock that wandered into
the communal fields.23
Although some domesticated animals, such as the horse, were quickly adopted by
Southern Indians following their introduction by Europeans in the seventeenth century, Southern
Indians were slow to incorporate cattle into their livelihoods. Cattle were first mentioned in any
quantity in Chickasaw country around 1770 when British Indian Agent John McIntosh and
British trader James Colbert imported their presence from Mobile, but they were slowly
integrated into the Chickasaw economy.24 One reason why Southern Indians did not adopt cattle
as quickly as horses was probably due to the fact that cattle competed with deer for sustenance. 25
In the eighteenth century, Chickasaw men, like most Southern Indian men, participated in the
commercial deerskin trade, and they were highly successful. Interpreter Malcolm McGee noted
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that Chickasaw men were excellent hunters and often killed one hundred deer in the hunting
season that seasonally occurred in the fall and winter.26
The deerskin trade, however, declined by the end of the eighteenth century. The previous
century of overhunting had eradicated large herds of white-tailed deer and the arrival of cattle
further impinged on hunting grounds.27 Historian Kathryn Braund has estimated that, in the mideighteenth century, Southern Indians killed over one million deer each hunting season to satisfy
the global market, which was a significant factor in the decline of the deerskin trade.28 In
Chickasaw country, their large hunting grounds in present-day Tennessee were almost entirely
barren of deer by the first decade of the nineteenth century.29 And Chickasaw country was not
the only place where this occurred. For many Southern Indians, the decline in deer due to
overhunting upended previous cycles of labor as men traveled further, and for a longer period of
time, for a smaller number of deerskins.30 The decline of the deerskin trade often led to cycles of
debt and threatened a role that defined the gendered labor of men in the Native South.31 As will
be discussed late in this chapter, however, Chickasaw hunters still found success in the deerskin
trade in the early nineteenth century due to their proximity to Quapaw hunting grounds which
allowed them to slowly incorporate new labor roles, like ranching, rather than upend their
cultural identities. This meant that their economic shift was gradual as men incorporated cattle
and livestock into their labor roles.
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Southern Indians, like Southern frontier settlers, did not pasture their livestock, but
instead practiced free-range grazing, with herds allowed to traverse up to fifty miles during
foraging seasons.32 Free-range grazing for hogs and cattle did not require special technology and
very little maintenance was needed to ensure the livelihood of the herds, easing the transition for
Southern Indian men and women from the deerskin trade to livestock ownership.33 Instead, cattle
and hogs subsisted on river cane and wild grasses in the American South, and the heaviest
workloads for Southern Indian ranchers occurred during round-ups and drives to market.34
By the 1820s, Southern Indian men and women were significantly invested in ranching.
Because free-range grazing required limited labor to mind herds and little expenditure aside from
salt, cattle represented a link to the global market that eased Chickasaw economic transition from
the deerskin trade to the new Southern economy built on ranching and commercial crops.35 One
literate traveler through Creek country wrote that the “hunter, who still spends much of his time
in his favourite pursuit, is the possessor of perhaps several hundred head of cattle.”36 The Black
Prairie provided the best rangelands in the South, and some Chickasaws, like James Colbert,
found immense success in their use of Chickasaw country as cattle range. Chickasaw Agent
Robert Nicholas noted in 1821 that Colbert had “about 20 years since set out with a stock of 4
cows, he now has as he says some six to seven hundred costing him nothing but the trouble of
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herding them.”37 Ranching was not limited to only elite Chickasaws—the rank and file were just
as interested. Nutt, for example, observed in 1805 that ten Chickasaw families, had moved to the
“country laying in a N.W. direction from the Agency-house to the Chickasaw Bluff” called
Oaktockopullo which was “high broken pine land, very little fit for cultivation.” Nutt reported
that “the Indians have settled it for the benefit of range, as they have horses, cattle & hogs.”38
Free-range hogs made good use of the plentiful acorns and other fallen nut masts in the
patches of forest in the prairie and the larger expanses of forest on the edges of the prairie.39
James Adair complemented the quality of pork in Chickasaw country, while former Chickasaw
interpreter Malcolm McGee stated that pigs, poultry, and horses made up the entirety of livestock
in Chickasaw country until 1768.40 Traveling through the Native South in 1803, Reverend
Patrick Wilson also remarked on the quality of Chickasaw hogs: his party bought “the best cured
and sweetest bacon we found on the whole road.”41 When Indian Superintendent Thomas
McKenny surveyed the property of Chickasaw country in 1827, he estimated that even the rank
and file members of the community owned on average five pigs per household.42
Travelers through Chickasaw country described the forage and pastureland for
Chickasaw cattle and horses as fields of clover, rivercane, and what one traveler referred to as a
species of ryegrass.43 The ryegrass in Chickasaw country grew to between two and a half feet
and three and a half feet tall, while literate travelers through the Black Prairie described the
clover as “coarse and luxuriant” compared to other regions of the North America. In the mid-
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eighteenth century, Adair catalogued that hogs, in addition to eating the plentiful nuts, also fed
on the grapes of a “small vine” in Chickasaw country, a plant that historian Kathryn Braund has
argued was probably muscadine or fox grape.44 Cattle and other livestock also fed on peavine.
One traveler noted that peavine afforded “excellent nourishment to the cattle, when it abounds in
great quantities (as it does here): it fills the whole place to the height of four or five feet,
entwining itself round every substance it comes near.”45
The canebrakes, in particular, helped initiate and sustain Chickasaw ranching. In the
Native South, rivercane grew in the active floodplains for creeks and rivers and acted as both
forage for horses as well as material for crafts and housing for Southern Indians.46 By the end of
the eighteenth century, with cotton production, cottage industries, and ranching acting as primary
economic motivators, canebrakes took on two new means of economic solubility for the
Chickasaws. For one, Chickasaw women continued to weave cane baskets and other crafts,
selling them to travelers on the Natchez Trace and at the trade factory at the Chickasaw Bluffs.
Factors at Chickasaw Bluffs grudgingly accepted domestic goods of little use to them and of
little value on the market in order to continue to encourage Southern Indians to practice cottage
industries and embrace civilization programs. 47 Chickasaw men and women profited from this
niche market during their shift from deerskins to ranching and commercial crops, often selling
domestic goods for capital to purchase plows, spinning wheels, and livestock.48
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Second, canebrakes, as the large expanses of cane covering the active floodplains were
called, provided ample grazing for Chickasaw cattle, hogs, and horse herds throughout the year
since cane stays green even in the winter.49 The cane in the Chickasaw country grew as tall as
fifteen or sixteen feet, but on average it grew to ten or twelve feet in height and up to two inches
in diameter.50 When traveling through Chickasaw country, one traveler described one canebrake
as “an evergreen, and is perhaps the most nourishing food for cattle upon earth. No other milk or
butter has such flavour and richness as that which is produced from cows which feed upon
cane.”51 Horses thrived on the cane as well, with the same traveler noting that they fed upon it
“nearly as well as if they were fed upon corn,” and only needed a little salt and monitoring every
three or four days, as the richness of the cane could lead to colic.52
Foraging and free-range livestock permeated the Native South by the late eighteenth
century, as Southern Indian across the South adopted cattle and hogs. Ethridge, however, has
documented the ecological setbacks that affected ranching. The Creeks, as other Southern
Indians, were well into ranching by 1800. By the 1810s, however, Creek country was hit by what
Ethridge terms an “ecological wall,” leading to frustrations over the new economic system. 53 Soil
exhaustion, drought, and weed infestation were primary issues within Creek country during the
early nineteenth century.54 In addition, the rooting of the hog population severely disrupted forest
groundcover and succession. Canebrakes are hardy and can withstand tremendous environmental
problems, including drought and fire. Overgrazing, however, was a significant problem to which
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cane was susceptible. And with the massive influx of cattle Ethridge notes in Creek country,
overgrazing led to the depletion of cane for livestock. For example, the canebrakes around the
Upper Creek town of Tuckabatchee were depleted by 1797, leading to intense economic
frustration and resentment towards American farmers who allowed their animals to graze in
Creek lands and whom the Creeks blamed for the declining amount of cane.55
Depletion of cane in Creek country occurred as early as the 1790s, but Chickasaw
country, squarely in the Black Prairie, was not affected in the same manner. In 1830, after nearly
forty years of ranching, Chickasaw Agent John Allen reported that Chickasaw herds “subsist
well without any food from their owners, during the winter season or throughout the year.”56
When they signed a removal treaty in 1832, Levi Colbert wrote on behalf of the Chickasaws a
memorial that accounted for the loss of $100,000 worth of livestock left behind, a considerable
total for an Indian community smaller than 5,000 members.57 One reason for this difference is
that livestock on the prairie subsisted more on the grasses than on the canebrakes, and grasses
more easily rebound from overgrazing. Whereas in Creek country, which was not located in the
prairie, forage for cattle and horses was primarily the canebrakes, which were easily disrupted
through overgrazing.
Archeologist Jay Johnson notes that the Chickasaws, in the first half of the eighteenth
century, carved out a territorial claim significantly larger than their subsistence needs
warranted.58 This land in the Interior South provided Chickasaw acreage per capita throughout
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the Antebellum that was more than twice the amount of the Cherokees and four times that of the
Choctaws and, until after the Treaty of Fort Jackson in 1814, was hundreds of miles from major
American settlements.59 In other words, the Chickasaws had plenty of good range and
agricultural lands, much of which was far away from settler encroachment for the first few
decades of the civilization plan. Chickasaw country acted as a viable means for foraging and
grazing, probably tempering frustrations for Chickasaw men as they transitioned to a new
economy encouraged by federal leaders.

Figure 2 Chickasaw settlements near present-day Tupelo, Mississippi. Published in Wendy Cegielski and Brad R. Lieb,
"Hina' Falaa, "The Long Path": An Analysis of Chickasaw Settlement Using GIS in Northeast Mississippi, 1650-1840," Native
South 4, no. 1 (2011): 33-34.

Although the Chickasaws claimed a large territory in the eighteenth century, they lived in
nucleated communities in and around present-day Tupelo, Mississippi, a region to which they
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had migrated in the seventeenth century from the present-day Starkville, Mississippi, area.60 Like
most Southern Indian communities, Chickasaw towns were the political, cultural, and economic
epicenter of their communities, and they often acted independently of one another concerning
political and economic decisions.61 During the eighteenth century, Chickasaw townships
consisted of towns in what the French referred to as the Large and Small Prairies, with towns
often just a few miles distant from one another, as illustrated in Figure 2.62 Once in the Tupelo
region, however, their settlement patterns fluctuated over the next two hundred years. Using GIS
mapping, anthropologists Wendy Cegielski and Brad Lieb recreated Chickasaw migration and
settlement patterns from contact until removal in eight major time segments, denoting
migrations, contractions, and expansions due to political, military, cultural, and economic
pressures. 63 After the American Revolution and in the time period of interest to us, the towns
around present-day Tupelo were divided into four districts, Chokkilissa' (Old Town which was in
the Large Prairie), Chokka' Falaa' (Long Town which was in the Small Prairie), Chisha' Tálla'a'

Johnson, “The Chickasaws,” 94-95. In the past few years, archeologists from the University of Florida, led by
Charles Cobb, and the University of Mississippi, led by Edmond Boudreaux, have done extensive work in the
Starkville-Columbus region in Mississippi. Sponsored by the Chickasaw Nation, the two teams argue that the
Starkville Archeological Cluster was, in fact, the polity of Chicaza, the chiefly polity that eventually became the
Chickasaws. Robbie Ethridge, foreword to Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun: Hernando De Soto and the
South’s Ancient Chiefdoms Twentieth Anniversary Edition by Charles Hudson, (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 2018), xx-xi.
61
For more concerning religious ceremonies in Chickasaw townships, see Charles Hudson, The Southeastern
Indians, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 369-374. For more concerning the fluctuating number of
villages throughout the eighteenth century, see John Reed Swanton, Chickasaw Society and Religion (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 40-41. For a detailed overview of Southern Indian townships during the
eighteenth century, see Joshua Piker, Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in Colonial America, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press), 112-115.
62
For example, when the French, Iroquois, Illinois, and Miami attacked Ogoula Tchetoka in 1735, it took only
fifteen minutes for Chickasaw warriors to arrive from other villages. Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 4547. Cegielski and Lieb’s map, seen above, also illustrates the proximity of Chickasaw villages and towns to one
another, a factor that, combined with Chickasaw contraction into the fortified Big Town when confronted with
exterior threats and violence in the 1740s and 1750s that Cegielski and Lieb map, contributed to Chickasaw national
unity.
63
Because of the constant warfare of the prior three decades, by the 1750s, Chickasaw townships had consolidated
to a single fortified town, as their population dwindled to approximately 1,600. This was known as Big Town and
was in the Large Prairie. Atkinson, Splendid Land, 36-38; Cegielski and Lieb, "Hina' Falaa,” 34; DuVal,
Independence Lost, 14.
60

95

(Post Oak Grove on modern-day Coonewah Ridge), and Ayanaka' (on present-day Chiwapa
Creek).64 Within these four districts there were a total of six Chickasaw towns and multiple
"plantations," or large farmsteads, spread across Chiwepa, Coonewah, and Town Creeks.65 But
families were also beginning to move out of the towns and onto small, individual farmsteads. 66
In the Native South, the acreage needed for free-range grazing of livestock encouraged
the dispersing of Southern Indian settlements. Throughout the first decades of the nineteenth
century, many Chickasaw families had moved onto individual farmsteads and ranches in presentday Lee, Prentiss, Tishomingo, Itawamba, Monroe, Clay, Pontotoc, Union, Lafayette, Marshall,
Chickasaw, and Calhoun counties, “for the benefit of their stock.”67 Traveling through
Chickasaw country in 1805, Dr. Nutt detailed the extensive changes in settlement.68 In the Long
Town district, he reported a population of 471 persons in the region, but all “have removed out
of long-town,” settling throughout the region to better focus on “farming, manufacturing &
raising of stock.”69 In Pontatock, only eight families remained within the confines of the town,
while hundreds more “settled 50 or more miles round… throughout their country.”70 In other
townships, like Big Town and Post Oak Grove ("Chisahaliah" in Nutt), Nutt found less than ten,
and often as few as two, families living within the town proper; most people, most continued to
settle out.71 Overall, just 15 percent of families Nutt surveyed lived in towns; so by 1805, most
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Chickasaws lived on single, extended, or multiple family homesteads in the hinterlands.72
Situated in the Interior South and with few American intruders, Chickasaw ranchers could easily
move throughout the large expanse of territory claimed by the Chickasaws. In fact, families had
spread out so far and wide that the federal agents who came into Chickasaw country to
implement the civilization program during the first decade of the nineteenth century found it
necessary to purchase multiple horses to simply visit their charges. In August 1809, for example,
Chickasaw agent James Neelly purchased a sorrel horse for travel to Chickasaw settlements and
did so again in July of 1810.73 Chickasaw Agent James Robertson purchased a new horse in
1817 explicitly in order to “visit every family of the Indians [Chickasaws] almost individually
settled over a tract of country 150 miles square.”74
Federal Indian agents noticed early on the increased settling out practices of the
Chickasaws. In his travels through Chickasaw country in 1801, Creek Indian Agent Benjamin
Hawkins noted that the “Chickasaw are setting out from their old towns and fencing their
farms.”75 Hawkins counted nearly two hundred farms that had been fenced within the past two
years, approximately 20-25% of all families in the nation.76 Hawkins pointed to elite families of
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Chickasaws, like the Colberts and Sealeys, who had European ancestry as instigators of change.
Hawkins also stated that “George Colbert, who ranks high in the government of his nation… has
labored at the plough and hoe during the last season, and his example has stimulated others.”77
Despite this scattering of families across the countryside, Chickasaws preserved their
town identities. The American architects of the civilization plan promoted living on individual
farms and away from towns in order to restructure land ownership from communal to private.78
But town identity, familial lines, and communal land ownership persisted. Even in the dispersed
farmsteads, kin members resided in extended family dwellings or in mini settlements, and
members of the same town settled near one another throughout the early nineteenth century and
even after removal.79 In 1803, Chickasaw Agent Samuel Mitchell reported that families from
Long Town relocated together to be nearer the newly created Natchez Trace and Colbert’s Ferry
on the nearby Tennessee River to facilitate their economic enterprises such as running a ferry or
tavern as well as for ranching.80 When Nutt traveled through Chickasaw country in 1805, he
noted similar familial and town connections throughout the hinterlands. The settlement known as
Oaktokopullo consisted of ten families and was almost certainly an extended family homestead,
while near Pigeon Roost Creek, “many families of Indians have settled & are making good
improvements.”81 Although moving out of the nucleated towns and settling individual family
farmsteads squared with American aims in the civilization plan toward individual land holdings,
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the Chickasaws always kept land in communal holdings and retained their township and kinship
identities. Clearly these changing settlement patterns resulted largely from Chickasaw decisions
and agency, and not from external directives. Throughout the period of settling out, Chickasaws
combined their geopolitical location in the Interior South with familial and town responsibilities
and connections with their transition to a different economic lifestyle.
In fact, as I argue in this dissertation, the Chickasaws became the architects of the
civilization plan in Chickasaw country. For the Chickasaw, the Interior South defined their
relationship with the United States and their transition to the new Southern economy. Violence,
debt, and encroachment were tools that the federal government used to ensnare Southern Indians
in a web of debt that forced land cessions, undermined tribal sovereignty, and fueled infighting.
These tools, however, proved less effective in the more distant Interior South, paving the way for
a different Native response to the civilization plan. Chickasaw headmen, observing the
happenings in Creek and Cherokee country, looked to pragmatically counteract actions by the
United States to subvert their sovereign identity and take their land while still benefitting from
American friendship, partnership, and tools provided by the civilization plan.
The use of a longstanding peace with the United States helped in treaty negotiations and
land cessions. But Chickasaw peace with the Quapaw dating back to the mid-eighteenth century
was possibly just as important for their gradual adoption of new economic practices encouraged
by the civilization plan beginning in the 1790s. The four small Quapaw towns were located at the
confluence of the Mississippi and Arkansas rivers, so their territory bordered the western
boundaries of Chickasaw claims. Beginning in the 1750s and 1760s, Chickasaws ended decades
of near constant violence on their borders and secured peace with the Quapaw, Choctaws,
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Cherokees, and many other old native adversaries while also peacefully negotiating with the
Spanish and adopting a policy of neutrality during the American Revolution.82
The Chickasaws, since moving to the present-day Tupelo region in the seventeenth
century, had long recognized their critical position as the center of large southern trading
networks, and headman Paya Mataha deployed this geopolitical position in his peace talks to
create a web of political and economic interdependence with the Chickasaws, and the Interior
South, at the center.83 Ultimately, the outcome was more limited in its scope, but Paya Mataha
still made the Chickasaws power brokers controlling the region from present-day western
Alabama into the Arkansas River Valley. Prior to the American Revolution, Paya Mataha
fashioned himself as a headman invested in leading former French and Spanish-allied Indian
communities to trade deals with the British.84 After the creation of the United States, Chickasaw
country, located on the periphery of the Native South and the Arkansas River Valley, and within
an Interior South, was prime ground for the Chickasaws to act as middlemen for nearby
indigenous communities. These alliances, first built in the second half of the eighteenth century,
complimented later economic developments and Chickasaw adoption of civilization programs as
they negated exterior conflicts and promoted peaceful and pragmatic economic changes.
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Figure 3. The lower Mississippi River Valley, including the eastern section of the Arkansas River Valley, ca. 1790.
Published in Kathleen Duval, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 129.

For the Chickasaws, the Arkansas River Valley and its “native ground” dominated by the
Quapaw and Osage factored into their relations with the United States. 85 With their alliance with
the Quapaw, Chickasaw men secured access to hunting grounds hundreds of miles from
American farmers, as well as access to banned trade goods, such as alcohol, through trade with
the Quapaw (Figure 3). The Quapaw alliances provided Chickasaw men an avenue to still
succeed in their old economy of commercial deerskin hunting. This reduced the need for them to
engage in other activities like horse stealing, which could lead to violent reprisals from
Americans, and made them less reliant on the new economy proposed by the civilization plan. It
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also meant that Chickasaw hunters had less encounters with frontier Americans, which for the
Creek and Cherokees, especially, often ended in bloodshed. Compared to the Creeks, Choctaws,
and Cherokees, Chickasaw men rarely conducted horse raids, thefts, or killings of Americans. In
the first decade of the nineteenth century, Mississippi territorial governors praised Chickasaw
headmen for enforcing and keeping travel through Chickasaw country by white settlers a “clean
and white path,” where “defenseless travelers will find… safety and protection.”86 An alliance
with the Quapaw, then, acted as a western pressure valve, easing pressures emanating from the
ever-expanding American border to the east.
In the second half of the eighteenth century, Quapaw and Chickasaw negotiators opened
European and later American trade avenues to each other, the Chickasaws with British, and then
American, goods, while the Quapaw opened relations between the Chickasaw and the Spanish,
who still claimed the territory from what would become the Louisiana Purchase and parts of the
western Gulf region.87 Often, Chickasaw elites and traders traded goods to the Quapaw
themselves, causing Spanish merchants to complain about the trade as early as the 1790s.88
Some Quapaw families further solidified their alliance with the Chickasaws by settling in
Chickasaw country and intermarrying. Chickasaw hunters, meanwhile, joined bands of Quapaw
hunters in the Arkansas River Valley as a sign of solidarity against Osage intrusions from the
west.89 US officials, however, were uneasy about this alliance. In 1805, Indian Agent James
Wilkinson reported that two hundred Chickasaw warriors were on their way to Osage country,
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vowing “revenge for the loss of four Warriors Killed in a late attack on the Osages.”90 Wilkinson
fretted that Chickasaw military action in the Arkansas River Valley undermined American
influence in the region, arguing that the intrusion by the Chickasaws “may shake the confidence
of the Osages in us” and erode what little power the United States held in the Arkansas River
Valley.91 For the Chickasaws, their actions against the Osage, enemies of the Quapaw, secured
their place in the region. For the United States, Chickasaw actions complicated their Indian
policies.
Through their alliances with the Quapaw, Chickasaws created an avenue for themselves
to peacefully hunt in territory far away from American settlements, but still in proximity to
Chickasaw country, thereby maintaining a profitable skin trade as they adopted ranching and
commercial crop production.92 This partnership between the Quapaw and Chickasaws continued
into the 1820s.93 After hunts, Chickasaws often traded their goods with an American trade
factory located on Chickasaw Bluffs in present-day Memphis, Tennessee, that had opened in
1802. Previously, the Spanish had occupied the locale and gave permission for the British trading
firm Panton, Leslie, and Company, which operated out of Spanish-held Pensacola, Florida, to
have a trading post there from 1795-1799.94 In 1799, the US took over the post. By 1804,
however, federal agents noted that the “Chickasaws are in the habit of making their hunts West
of the Mississippi,” and proposed the idea of creating another trade factory across the river for
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the convenience of Chickasaw hunters in the Arkansas River Valley.95 After the Louisiana
Purchase, the US opened a trade factory in 1805 at the Arkansas Post, which was close to the
Quapaw towns in present-day southeast Arkansas and near the mouth of the Arkansas River. The
U.S. intended the new factory as a replacement for trade and influence of the Spanish
government as well as usurping a way to usurp influence from private American traders for the
Quapaw villages nearby. The first factor there, an American named John Treat, struggled to
control the trade against the competition from private American trading firms, including one led
by former Chickasaw Bluffs factor, Jacob Bright.
Even so, Chickasaw men knew that commercial hunting was limited, and many saw their
continued participation in the deerskin trade as short term and as a way to gradually transition to
the new economy and to help finance their new economic endeavors. In fact, records from the
Chickasaw Bluffs trade factory record that Chickasaw men frequently purchased tools for
agriculture and ranching in exchange for skins procured from western hunts.96 During the first
two decades of the nineteenth century, skins acquired during their hunts in the Arkansas River
Valley were exchanged at the trade factory on Chickasaw Bluffs to pay down their debts and
purchase new products like cotton cards, axes, and hoes. These purchases supported new
economic ventures among the Chickasaws, including commercial agriculture and cottage
industries.97
They also usurped, somewhat, the design of the trade factories to engineer Indian debt.
In 1809, for example, Chickasaw Bluffs reported the highest recorded deerskin sales out of all
fourteen trade factories throughout the South, with $12,070 worth of pelts. Six years later that
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number had nearly doubled to $23,812 worth of skins.98 The Chickasaws obviously were able to
remain financially solvent, which deprived the United States of the often used avenue of
Southern Indian indebtedness to press for land cessions. While the civilization plan encouraged
debt as well as deliberate acculturation and transition from a swidden and hoe agriculture and
hunting economy to one built on ranching and commercial crops, the proximity to the Arkansas
River Valley meant that Chickasaw economic development was not reliant on American gifts or
agent demands. Instead, the Interior South provided the Chickasaws a means to define their
economic changes.
Looking to the east, the Chickasaws used their geopolitical position and a longstanding
peace with the United States to their advantage in treaty negotiations and land cessions. Living in
present-day northern Mississippi, the Chickasaws had nearly three hundred miles, and the
entirety of Creek country, between them and most of the American population. To the south, it
was nearly another three hundred miles travel from Chickasaw townships to the American
settlements near Natchez, Mississippi.99 Essentially, the Interior South, not only offered a
western pressure valve, but also created a buffer zone between Chickasaws and the increased
pressure of American settlers. They did not suffer from an invasion of squatters and land
speculators eying their lands, or from US insistence on land cessions with the same intensity that
Creek and Cherokee headmen experienced in the first decades of the United States. For the
Creeks and Cherokees, whose borders abutted the American western border, constant American
encroachment on their lands was an issue for the entirety of the early national period.100 The
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United States kept an intense pressure on both the Creeks and Cherokees for land sales, and both
signed more treaties ceding lands to the United States before 1805 than the Chickasaws did
before removal.101 For the Creeks and Cherokees, tension, violence, and territorial challenges
along the frontier went hand in hand with attempts to implement the civilization plan. For
Chickasaws in the Interior South, the civilization plan was not synonymously linked with land
cessions.102
As larger waves of land-hungry American settlers invaded the lands of the Cherokees and
the Creeks, Chickasaw headmen set about to preserve their country, delaying for decades the
eventual invasion of American settlers. With the founding of the United States, land acquisition,
rather than trade or warfare, was the modus operandi of a new type of North American empire.103
Defining land claims and communicating those to the United States in a manner that American
officials understood was now a vital tool for Southern Indian leaders. Historian Claudio Saunt
notes that, by the 1790s, Creeks considered literacy as a “prerequisite” to lead due to the constant
encroachment of whites on their land and the need to engage in treaty negotiations with
Americans.104 By the 1820s, Native Southerners demanded land surveying courses in missionary
and federally funded schools in their country, which they saw as a means for further generations
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to fight back against American encroachment by defining their land titles in a manner that
Europeans respected and understood.105
Chickasaws, used this respite from speculators and squatters to establish territorial claims
with the United States, specifically using American-made maps and written documents. As
archeologist Gregory Waselkov states, drawing maps was always within the competence of
Southern Indians well before the civilization plan.106 In the colonial southeast, maps written by
Southern Indians defined landscape along with political and ethnological affiliations, and
Southern Indians were well versed in defining landscapes and conveying the topography of the
Native South to other Indians as well as to Europeans and Americans.107
Well before the civilization plan was implemented, in the 1786 Treaty of Hopewell, for
example, the first official meeting between Chickasaw leaders and the new United States, federal
negotiators Andrew Pickens, Benjamin Hawkins, and Joseph Martin presented Chickasaw
headman Piomingo with a map of Chickasaw country. Rather than accept the map immediately,
Piomingo requested that Congress approve and define Chickasaw country: “he wanted to know
his own.”108 This request by Piomingo was a demand that the Americans not only treat with the
Chickasaws, but specifically define and acknowledge their sovereign control of Chickasaw
country. In the decades following this talk, Chickasaw headmen demanded that American
officials continue to signify and approve their territorial autonomy by notarizing maps and
previous negotiations, or they threatened to walk away from treaty negotiations.

105

Christina Snyder, Great Crossings: Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in the Age of Jackson (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2017), 86-87.
106
Waselkov, "Indian Maps of the Colonial Southeast," in Powhatan's Mantle, ed. Gregory A. Waselkov, Wood,
and Hatley,435.
107
Waselkov, "Indian Maps of the Colonial Southeast," in Powhatan's Mantle, ed. Gregory A. Waselkov, Wood,
and Hatley,439-446.
108
“Hopewell Treaties Journal,” January 1786, ASPIA, 1:50-52.

107

For the next twenty years, Chickasaw headmen carried copies of Piomingo’s certified
map to any negotiation with federal representatives and required that it be ratified and recertified before any other business took place. “I have nothing to talk,” Piomingo stated at the
beginning of the 1792 council and peace treaty talks in Nashville, “I only wish to have
boundaries settled,” along with a new copy of his Hopewell map.109 Later that decade, Piomingo
received yet another notification from the United States confirming Chickasaw territory when the
Territorial Governor of Tennessee, William Blount, forwarded a certificate signed by President
George Washington “respecting the bonds of the Chickasaws Land” to Chickasaw Agent James
Robertson.110 In the 1801 treaty negotiations that led to the creation of a federal road through
Chickasaw country, American negotiators remarked that Chickasaw headmen “expressed a
strong desire that we should acknowledge” their previously ratified map and documentation of
territorial sovereignty.111
In 1805, a heated dispute between the Cherokees and Chickasaws occurred over the
selling of 2.25 million acres of land in present-day western Tennessee to the US—land claimed
by both Cherokees and Chickasaws. To resolve the dispute, Cherokee Agent Return Meigs
produced a copy of Piomingo’s 1792 map and the Hopewell Treaty with the Chickasaws.
According to Meigs, these documents “silenced” Cherokee headmen and they “never since
opened their mouths to me on the subject.”112 Although the Chickasaws were still forced to sell
their land north of the Tennessee River, they used the treaty negotiations and federal need and
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desire for Southern Indian land to assert territorial authority over the region and to collect the
revenues generated from the sale.
The continued expansion of the United States required the control roads into and passage
on the waterways through the Native South both for communication and the mobility of an evergrowing American and African slave population as well as for military purposes. As historian
Angela Pulley Hudson notes, former Southern Indian trade paths that served as arteries for the
deerskin and slave trade for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were now widened and
used to facilitate the creation of a South reliant on the transportation of slaves, cattle, and
cotton.113 As federal negotiators cleared paths for American traders and settlers traveling through
the Native South, issues occurred over who controlled the services and tolls along the roads.
Mobility and navigation through the Native South could be treacherous, but it was necessary in
order for the United States to connect its growing empire. Mail, settlers, vagabonds, goods, and
traders traversed the landscape, moving from Georgia to the Cumberland settlements in
Tennessee to the burgeoning cotton plantations in the nascent Mississippi Territory. Roads
previously used for packhorse trains, horse travel, and foot travel were widened to permit
wagons and other large conveyances.
In Chickasaw country, some arteries could sometimes be as narrow as fourteen inches,
while others could be several feet wide.114 Often, federal Indian agents or state governments
required passports for white American travelers travelling in the Native South, and travel was
restricted to the roads outlined by the Indian communities. In Creek country, headmen routinely
complained of travelers using unauthorized roads, and the roads soon became constant
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battlegrounds of sovereignty and the rights of Creek and American citizens on the use of the
roads themselves.115 For the Chickasaws, their position in the Interior South shaped any
negotiations with Americans over thoroughfares through Chickasaw country as well as the
ferries needed to transport goods across waterways.
In 1801, Chickasaw headmen signed the Chickasaw Bluffs Treaty permitting a federal
path between the Cumberland settlements in Tennessee to the new cotton plantations
surrounding the growing Mississippi town of Natchez. This roadway would become known as
the Natchez Trace (Figure 4) and is today a federal scenic highway. Federal negotiators were
quite surprised at the ease with which this was accomplished, noting that, once Chickasaw
headmen were assured that no land cessions would take place, they “yielded with alacrity, the
road through their country.”116 In fact, the Chickasaws saw this as an opportunity to control the
avenues that Americans traveled through their country.

115

Hudson, Creek Paths, 85-87.
“Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks Communicated to the House of Representatives,” February 9,
1802, ASPIA, 1:655.
116

110

Figure 4. The Natchez Trace. Published in Atkinson, "McGee Narrative," 38.

During negotiations over the Natchez Trace, Chickasaw headmen George Colbert and
Chinubbee demanded that all stands, taverns, or other platforms to profit on the road were to be
owned and operated only by Chickasaw families.117 The rates, fees, and services from the stands,
they dictated, would not fall to the federal or territorial governments of the United States.
Instead, they would be controlled, raised, or lowered at Chickasaw discretion. They demanded
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that any and all ferriage or river crossings would be the sole possession of the Chickasaws
themselves rather than owned, shared, or operated by American businessmen. 118
George Colbert acted as lead negotiator for the Chickasaws during the treaty process. At
the time of the negotiations, Colbert was the Tisho Minko, or assistant to the Minko- the primary
civil chief of the Chickasaws, selected by merit and familial connections to act as a mouthpiece
for the Chickasaws.119 As the 1801 Tisho Minko, Colbert often acted in the best interests of the
Chickasaws, dodging attempts by Americans to gain Chickasaw lands or subvert Chickasaw
economic authority in their country. Later, in the immediate period before the Treaty of 1805
negotiations, Return Meigs marveled at the tactics of Tisho Minko George Colbert, who Meigs’
believed was “maneuvering to raise the price” of Chickasaw land cessions. 120 Colbert also
profited from his position. He was instrumental in the surveying of the Natchez Trace and
recommended the eventual place for the ferry to General James Wilkinson. 121 Brothers George,
William, and Levi Colbert came to run the ferry and profited from the ferry crossing, integrating
it with their plantations, inns, and trading firm. George Colbert also convinced the United States
to supply him with “cabins for his own accommodations and that of travelers- to include a small
kitchen and small store house and stables, and to be pleased to put up a strong pen.”122 In this
way, and as will be discussed later, the brothers benefitted from many avenues in the new
Southern economy, taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the Interior South.
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In fact, the Colberts had long been promoting and benefiting from the new economy.
Prior to the 1801 treaty establishing the Natchez Trace, the Colberts had invested significant
effort in establishing ferries throughout Chickasaw country and had opposed sole-American
proprietorship of them. In April 1799, Mississippi Territorial Governor Winthrop Sargent wrote
to then-Secretary of War Timothy Pickering that a Mr. Stuart proposed the creation of a ferry
“over the Tennessee” and that the ferry may support the office of Chickasaw Indian Agent if
Stuart was allowed to build and control the ferry.123 The Colberts and other elites staunchly
opposed this arrangement. The Colberts, however, did sometimes involve themselves in
economic partnerships with Americans. For example, William Colbert and an American by the
name of John Gordon established a ferry crossing over Duck River in present-day Maury
County, Tennessee, which William eventually defaulted on in 1819.124
In January of 1800, Levi Colbert expressed interested in developing a ferry near the
confluence of Bear Creek and the Tennessee River, near the eventual location of Colbert’s Ferry
on the Natchez Trace. David Henley, writing to then-Secretary of War James McHenry noted
that Levi’s planned ferry “would be of great convenience and use,” especially for the
transportation of mail to Natchez.125 The Colberts and other elites profited from the
thoroughfares through Chickasaw country. Still, it is undeniable that one of the reasons for the
Colberts to negotiate for control of these ferries, and a reason Chickasaw elites agreed to the
federal road so quickly, dealt with Chickasaw political and territorial autonomy over the
region.126 Rather than allow federal agents and Americans the power and economic opportunities
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of public houses and ferries, the Colberts and other Chickasaw leaders pragmatically acted to
secure their families’, as well as the Chickasaws’, economic wellbeing.
Rates for Colbert's Ferry, and other businesses they owned, were set by the Colberts,
many times to the frustrations of federal agents. In 1806, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn
demanded to know the reasons for the costs of the ferriages, citing them as exorbitant. Levi and
George Colbert calmly replied that their ferry on the Tennessee was still far away from the
frontier of American settlements, and that business and transportation was harder and higher
priced than regions with multiple roads and canals.127 The Colberts argued that they made the
ferry itself “in compliance with the wishes of the United States” because Americans continued
their westward expansion and because the ferry across the Tennessee expedited mail and soldier
transport, and because it was a safe gateway to the west for traveling Americans. 128 Cherokee
agent Return Meigs also came to the defense of the Colberts, arguing that the rate of the ferry
was necessary in order to safely navigate the river and ensure the timely transport of mail. Meigs
also noted that the Colberts’ were “very generous to people in distress who pass” on their way
out of Chickasaws country, taking losses for those in dire need of help.129 Dearborn soon let the
matter drop, and the Colberts maintained control over ferriage rates.
Chickasaw elites often founded "stands" (inns or taverns), many of which became
lucrative places of business that benefitted Chickasaw elites as they diversified their business
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ventures. In addition to those founded by the Colberts, stands along the Trace also were founded
by Chickasaw elites Old Factor, Young Factor, and Toscomby, among others.130 Traveling
through on the Natchez Trace in 1821, Adam Hodgson noted that nearly a dozen travelers joined
him at one stand for the night with his host telling him that there “were not five nights in the
year, in which some travellers [sic] did not sleep there, and that seventy or eighty occasionally
called in a day.”131 Rank-and-file Chickasaws also profited from travel through Chickasaw
country. The Colberts hired Chickasaw men to act as guides and navigators at their ferry for the
treacherous crossing of almost a mile.132 In January of 1803, Chickasaw agent Samuel Mitchell
reported to Claiborne that families from Long Town were settling near Colbert’s Ferry “for the
purpose of furnishing travelers with corn and meat,” while other families settled “on the road
leading from Natchez to Nashville to supply travelers” and keep public houses and taverns.133
William, Levi, and George Colbert’s town affiliation was Long Town, so it made sense that
members of the town migrated and settled near their ferry and public houses. By 1805, travelers
noted that Bear Creek, located near Colbert’s Ferry on the Tennessee River, was home to a
“large settlement of Indians on both sides of this creek who have large stock of cattle … &
whose corn fields have the appearance of much labour being spent on them.”134 Connecting town
and kinship affiliation with economic opportunities, members of Long Town effectively used
longstanding settlement practices to advance their position in the new Southern economy.
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Even with the treaty establishing Chickasaw control over stands and travel
accommodations on the road to Natchez, state and federal leaders still sought to separate
Chickasaw elites from the lucrative business opportunities afforded with these stands. In July of
1803, with the impending Louisiana Purchase and the need to connect this territory with the east,
a somewhat panicked Secretary of War Henry Dearborn argued to Claiborne that it was of the
“highest importance” that stands be erected along the Natchez Trace throughout Choctaw and
Chickasaw country at thirty-mile intervals.135 Claiborne mirrored Dearborn’s concerns and
beliefs concerning the stands. By October 1803, he sent talks to the Chickasaws imploring them
to allow Americans control of the stands and travel accommodations. If that was not possible,
Claiborne proposed that “some industrious Chickasaws would take honest white men into
partnership and make the desired establishment.”136 However, the Interior South benefitted the
Chickasaws as Claiborne lacked the leverage via settler encroachment or debt to force the issue,
and Chickasaws retained their business ventures along the path.
Claiborne himself was an avid proponent of the civilization plan and many times
commented on the successes of the Chickasaws and their knowledge and skill in the new
Southern economy. Just a few months prior to his proposal, Claiborne noted that the Chickasaws
were negotiating how best to sell their cotton, a significant step in their transition to the new
Southern economy.137 But this praise evaporated once he saw the means to profit and assert
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American economic power within Chickasaw country. He openly questioned if the Chickasaws
could construct houses, clear fields, and raise corn, denigrating Chickasaw economic changes
and arguing that they would be overwhelmed with the influx of travelers.138 The next year,
Claiborne wrote that he held little hope for the stands, fearing that “houses under the care of
Indians alone will prove little benefit; the probability is that the supply of provisions will be
limitted [sic] and their accommodation for travelers very indifferent.”139 Claiborne, along with
many other American proponents of the civilization plan, imagined it as a means to an end to
procure lands and economic control from Southern Indians, and successes along these
thoroughfares by Chickasaws could derail this opportunity.
Claiborne’s complaints must have confused Chickasaw headmen on two accounts. First,
Chickasaw families were already settling closer to parts of the road surveyed and mapped. The
second reason concerns the construction of the Natchez Trace itself. While the Trace today is one
road running from Natchez to Nashville, the creation of the road in the early nineteenth century
consisted of connecting and widening some of the many former trade routes and hunting trails
through Choctaw and Chickasaw country.140 Surveyors did not complete marking out the road
until November 1803. When Claiborne challenged Chickasaw headmen on why they had not yet
created public houses and taverns, they simply replied that “many of our people would make
Settlements on the road to Supply travelers if we knew where it would run.”141
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The Interior South afforded Chickasaws the opportunity to control American movement
across their country. Slowing or stopping traffic through Chickasaw country was not an option
for the US, and federal negotiators understood the pathway to Mississippi Territory was vital to
the communication and security of their frontier, and quickly agreed to Chickasaw demands.
Until the 1820s, when the Jackson Military Road was constructed, the Natchez Trace was the
primary means for American travelers to pass through present-day Mississippi, and Chickasaw
headmen controlled a means to bottleneck and limit travel if they decided it was in their best
interests.142 The lack of sanctioned alternate routes through Chickasaw country for the first three
decades of migration to Mississippi Territory and the lack of other means for Americans to
navigate the Interior South, meant that the Chickasaws themselves exerted significant autonomy
in controlling migration through their nation
Because of a lack of alternative routes to Mississippi Territory, and the peaceful
relationship that Chickasaws maintained with Americans, territorial governors and federal agents
were often reluctant to request land cessions from the Chickasaws until after the War of 1812. In
fact, in 1803, Governor Claiborne told Chickasaw Agent Samuel Mitchell to exercise caution
when asking about land, noting that “it is not my wish that you should urge the sale of lands.”143
When approached for land cessions in January of 1805, Chickasaw headmen Chinnubbee,
Tishomingo (O’Koy), and George Colbert wrote to then Indian Agent James Robertson stating
that when federal negotiators “requested a road through our country…we granted that request,”
with the implication that any other cessions would not be needed for the foreseeable future.144
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For the Chickasaws, pragmatic negotiation tactics were closely intertwined to the Interior South
and foregrounded their dealings with American officials until after the War of 1812.
In 1814, however, things began to change. For one, following their defeat in the Red
Stick War, US commissioner Andrew Jackson forced Creek headmen to sign the Treaty of Fort
Jackson, ceding 23 million acres to the United States. The loss of land by the Creeks with the
Treaty of Fort Jackson included territory in present-day Alabama and southern Georgia, and it
eroded the buffer between the Chickasaws and American settlers. Soon after, hundreds more
settlers were crowding Chickasaw eastern borders and encroaching on Chickasaw lands.
Essentially, the Treaty of Fort Jackson marked the beginning of the end of the Interior South.
Even so, the influx of settlers and increasing pressure for land cessions from both federal and
state governments did not stop the Chickasaws from demanding market value for their land,
sending federal negotiators into conniptions, or forcing the federal government into concessions.
Headmen of the Chickasaws consistently frustrated and blocked federal land negotiations,
mentioning that they were not prepared to sell, and implied that land cessions endangered their
leadership positions within the Chickasaw nation.
The concept of the Interior South complicates the previous historiography of the early
nineteenth-century Native South. Most of that research has focused on the Cherokee and Creek
experience. In the case of the Chickasaws, though, rather than a constant battle for their political
autonomy during the era of the civilization plan, Chickasaws’ geographic location was a
significant factor and gave them time to gradually incorporate new avenues of economic success
and leverage in their dealings with the United States. A dual policy of neutrality with the United
States while cementing alliances in the west defined how they approached federal programs,
negotiations, and the new Southern economy, and was only possible due to their physical
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position within an Interior South. Navigating a unique indigenous space between the Arkansas
River Valley and the Native South, Chickasaws benefitted from both to advance themselves in
the new Southern economy and to do so gradually. Chickasaws used their land to instigate and
craft new economic endeavors and begin the development of a new cotton and ranching
economy before American policies encouraged them to do so. Their position within an Interior
South granted them the geographic tools necessary to alter their economy and the time to witness
change around them and react accordingly.
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CHAPTER 5
CHICKASAWS AND THE USE OF PRAGMATIC FRIENDSHIP DURING THE
CIVILIZATION PLAN
In 1811, Shawnee leader Tecumseh traveled through the Native South in an attempt to
rally Southern Indians to the pan-tribal alliance that he and his prophet brother, Tenskwatawa,
were forming in the Midwest.1 When Tecumseh arrived in Chickasaw country, he found the
general population of the Chickasaws uninterested in his proposal. War leader William Glover,
Minko Chinnubbee, and Tisho Minko George Colbert refused to give him a hearing. For the
Chickasaws, the pan-Indian movement of Tecumseh, and the subsequent Red Stick nativist
movement in Creek country, held little appeal.2 Instead, the Chickasaws “hoisted the white flag
in honour of the United States” and provided warriors and foodstuffs to the Americans
throughout the Red Stick War and the War of 1812, albeit at a significant profit for elite
Chickasaws.3 As the state of Tennessee mobilized for war against the Red Stick Creeks,
Chickasaw agent James Robertson reminded Tennessee governor John Sevier that there “are no
sections of the United States more unanimous in supporting the laws and government of the
United States than the Chickasaw people.”4 Previous historians remarked that the
implementation of the civilization plan in present-day Mississippi was remarkably peaceable
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compared to what happened in Cherokee and Creek country in present-day Georgia and
Alabama. In contrast to these other Native nations, these scholars argued, the Chickasaws acted
in a “loyal and friendly” manner to the United States. 5 But identifying Chickasaws as “loyal” to
the United States negates their agency in navigating the political realities of the antebellum South
and federal civilization programs. Chickasaws had their own reasons for cultivating and
maintaining friendly relationships with the United States throughout the pre-Removal period.
Chickasaw actions during the Red Stick War serve as just one example. Chickasaw families,
both rank and file and elites, profited from Andrew Jackson’s army traveling through their
country on the way to New Orleans, as Colbert’s Ferry provided passage for the army and
Chickasaw families from Long Town sold goods to soldiers nearby. They were also, by 1814,
profiting from new economic practices, including ranching and settling out, that civilization
programs encouraged.6
Chickasaws viewed alliance-building with the United States as a crucial means to
preserve political autonomy, acquire tools for economic change, deal with the potentially
wrenching changes that attended new economic practices, and staunch exterior violence and
encroachment. In other words, they cultivated a pragmatic friendship with the US. As early as
the 1780s, Chickasaw headmen including Piomingo, Chinnubbee, George Colbert, and
Tishomingo (O’Koy) all engaged in a pragmatic plan of peace with the United States and, by
extension, southern states and settlements. The Chickasaws’ position in the Interior South meant
that they observed the violence and encroachment on the Creek and Cherokee frontier before it
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became problematic in their own country and they pragmatically used their established peace
with the United States to secure their eastern borders and to selectively adopt economic changes
on their own terms.
This chapter extends the argument of geopolitical importance of the Interior South
established in Chapter Three, notably how Chickasaw created a sphere of interdependent peace
that eased Chickasaw economic changes during the early nineteenth century. Their distance from
white population centers and their pragmatic friendship with the United States worked in tandem
and defined the era of the civilization plan, and economic transition, for the Chickasaws.
Neutrality and peace with the United States was a conscientious tactic of passive resistance that
the Chickasaws wielded with great efficacy to maintain their political, territorial, and economic
autonomy and to force the United States to reckon with their needs and demands quickly and
decisively. Rather than respond to settler incursions with violence, they successfully petitioned
US leaders for the prosecution and conviction of Americans who violated their sovereignty or
misbehaved in their country. By projecting themselves as friendly neighbors to the United States
and their settlers, the Chickasaws prevented the growing American Republic from using
indigenous violence as an excuse for settler advancement. The result was that economic changes
were not intertwined with frustrations over settler encroachment, border violence, and theft like
they were for the Creeks and Cherokees. All of this made the Chickasaws more willing to
embrace these changes as economic opportunities rather than as forced cultural transformations.
In fact, by the early nineteenth century the Chickasaws had sought neutrality and peace
for almost forty years with Europeans and later Americans as well as with neighboring Indian
nations. Beginning in 1758 and 1759, Chickasaws ended decades of near constant conflict with
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the Choctaws and secured peace on their southern borders.7 With the departure of the French
after the Seven Years War, Chickasaw headman Paya Mataha pursued additional peace
negotiations with Native communities, like the Kaskaskias, Michigameas, Cherokees, and others,
previously at odds with the Chickasaws. As a young man, Paya Mataha had earned various war
titles, and eventually assumed the role of War Leader of the Chickasaws. 8 By the 1760s,
however, and after witnessing the effects of decades of conflict between the Chickasaw and the
French, Choctaws, and other Native communities, he moved from a decorated warrior to a
negotiator of peace.
Paya Mataha’s peace talks were a practical turn from war to neutrality. In the 1760s and
1770s, Paya Mataha concluded peace negotiations with the Catawba, Quapaw, Creek towns, and
Cherokees, adding them to the finalized peace treaty with the Choctaws in the 1750s. Often these
negotiations included the incentive of trade.9 In 1765, Paya Mataha concluded peace talks with
the Kaskaskias and Michigameas, former French allies in Illinois country, with the promise that
these tribes could then access British goods and trade.10 These peace negotiations established a
network of relations with Native communities, with the Chickasaws at the center. By forging
peaceful alliances with both Native and European powers, Paya Mataha emphasized the
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importance of the Chickasaws pivotal geographic location as a place to connect and negotiate
with disparate communities. He also set a precedent for American relations that continued for the
next half century of Chickasaw-American negotiations.
In Chickasaw country, like most Southern Indian communities, play-off politics with
rival European powers was essential to maintaining their territorial and political economy
throughout the colonial period. Historians long viewed eighteenth century Chickasaws as
complicit allies to the English, especially as Chickasaw warriors contributed to the burgeoning
Indian slave trade that propped up the South Carolina economy in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries. This argument, however, fails to recognize how the Chickasaws
manipulated European empires to suit their owns needs and ignores the overtures made by
towns in the Small Prairie to the French and later Spanish governors in Louisiana while towns in
the Large Prairie traded with the British and then United States.11 Decentralized power
distributed between semi-autonomous townships allowed the play-off system to flourish as
different communities of Chickasaws made alliances with different European powers. A
successful strategy for 150 years, play-off politics began to decline in utility after the French and
Indian War as one-by-one the European entities dropped from the scene and left the Southern
Indians standing face to face with only the Americans. At that point, decentralized political
power and internal tribal factionalism became a liability for Native communities throughout the
American South.
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125

During the American Revolution, British Indian Superintendent John Stuart considered
the Chickasaws loyal allies who were willing to act as auxiliaries and as guardians of the western
back country near the Mississippi, thereby preventing American and Spanish cooperation. This
thinking, however, considered the Chickasaws only as deferential to the British rather than a
politically autonomous community. Chickasaws were not active during the American
Revolution, preferring to stay within their country rather than act as auxiliary soldiers in what
they viewed as a civil war between Englishmen.12 Paya Mataha and other Chickasaw headmen
continued to state their loyalty to the British cause, all the while refusing to truly damage their
position in the eyes of American revolutionaries. In 1777, only forty Chickasaw warriors joined
Paya Mataha as he met with British officials in Mobile--the paucity of their representation
illustrates their decision to stay as neutral as possible in the war.13 In defense of their neutrality,
Chickasaw headmen deflected British accusations of betrayal, arguing that they did not enter into
the fight as they worried of “committing some fatal blunder by killing the King’s friends instead
of his enemies,” a deft maneuver that prevented their implicit involvement in a protracted
conflict that did little to benefit them.14
Chickasaws saw few reasons to confront the Americans. As far as the Chickasaws were
concerned, this was a civil war between loyalists and separatists, one that did not concern them
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and one that only hurt their economic markets. Compared to the Creeks, who continued to fight
with Loyalists and British cohorts until well after the fall of Pensacola to Spain in 1781, the
Chickasaws remained decidedly neutral during the conflict.15 Clearly, the Chickasaws viewed
their alliance with the British as important, but were by no means subservient to British wishes,
nor was the alliance important enough that they would risk their interdependent web of native
alliances in order to accede to British wishes.16
After the American Revolution, two European or European-descended powers remained
in the Native South: the United States and Spain. Neither the French nor the British retained a
strong foothold in the region, so the Chickasaws needed new alliances to secure trade goods and
maintain a position in the global economy. At first, Chickasaw headmen split into two factions:
Piomingo argued for creating close relations with the newly established United States, while
Wolf’s Friend and Minko Chinubbee favored building alliances with the Spanish in Louisiana. 17
Historian Colin Calloway has illustrated that Piomingo’s alliance with the United States was an
extension of the play-off politics used in the colonial era. He notes that affiliation with the
United States was one of the many alliance-building actions that the Chickasaws took to preserve
their interests.18 This factional split did not last long because the United States and the Spanish
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signed Pinckney’s Treaty in 1795, which negated Spanish influence in the South.19 As
anthropologist Emily Smithey notes, “the Chickasaws, now having only one foreign power to
contend with, ended factional splits and concentrated on working together to maintain their
national identity,” a coalescence made possible by the previous century of Chickasaw politics
and identity-formation.20
In From Chicaza to Chickasaw, anthropologist Robbie Ethridge argues that the process
of coalescence that took place in the Native South with the fall of the pre-colonial Mississippian
chiefdoms and the formation of the colonial coalescent societies was quite variable. The myriad
groups who came to form the Creek Confederacy in the seventeenth century, for example,
retained “some sense of separation, independence, and identity” when they coalesced. 21 The
Chickasaws, on the other hand, did not form out of a combining of numerous, previously
independent groups. Instead, they were mostly descendants from a single Mississippian polity—
that of Chicaza. They did, occasionally, admit people from other fallen chiefdoms, but, as far as
we can discern, they had mechanisms by which migrants were apparently absorbed into the
group as Chickasaws—the immigrants did not retain an ancient identity but became fully
Chickasaw. 22 In other words, the Chickasaws faced the Americans with more political unity than
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the Creeks, Cherokees, or Choctaws; and this could help account for the relatively few
occurrences of political factionalism.
Chickasaw relationships and actions during and immediately after the American
Revolution provided a blueprint for their relationships with the United States throughout the
early nineteenth century. Neutrality during the American Revolution, and in the decade after,
established a diplomatic narrative for relations with the United States. In Louisiana, prior to
Pinckney’s Treaty, Spanish colonial governors were well aware of Chickasaw attitudes towards
the Americans, noting as early as January 1783 that they “will never act against the
Americans.”23 Headman Wolf’s Friend, who first opposed negotiating with the United States and
instead encouraged closer alliances with the Spanish in Louisiana, still was “determined to be at
peace with the United States” rather than act in open conflict.24 Like Paya Mataha, Wolf’s Friend
“endeavoured to keep his Nation at peace with the whole world,” and treated with the United
States once Spain vacated their territorial claims in the region.25 Even staunch pro-Spanish
leaders, including Mingo Houma and Wolf’s Friend, traveled to American negotiations in 1792
in Nashville, Tennessee, though they deferred to Piomingo in the actual negotiations due to his
established relations with the United States.26
Realism and pragmatic peace influenced the next two decades of Chickasaw international
relations with the United States. This often meant disagreements with other Native nations,
creating what historian Kathleen DuVal termed a “paradox of independence,” especially at the
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turn of the century when pan-Indian alliances began taking shape in the Great Lakes region and
when Creek headman Alexander McGillivray’s made efforts to create a Southern Indian
Confederacy.27 Such pan-tribal confederacies were created to combat the American migration in,
and speculation over, Indian country. But Chickasaw headmen were hesitant to surrender their
own version of policy-making or involve themselves in war, arguing that peace with Native and
non-Native polities was their best path. At times, this policy of neutrality put the Chickasaws at
odds with other Southern Indian communities, and Upper Creek towns instigated a war with the
Chickasaws in the 1790s.28 But war leaders Paya Mataha, Piomingo, and William Glover were
mostly successful in their pragmatic peace with Native and non-Native communities. They
rejected war with the United States and instead argued that peaceful actions with both the
Americans and Native nations best suited their needs and wants. In fact, when Chickasaws
convened a war council concerning involvement in the Red Stick War in 1813, it was the first
they had assembled since 1798.29
The reasons for the Chickasaw refusal of to join a pan-tribal alliance against the
expanding United States was not out of deference to the United States, but instead a pragmatic
action that identified their interests over those of the Americans or of other Indian communities.
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In 1805, Dr. Rush Nutt wrote that the Chickasaws are “a proud, haughty, jealous people, not
most friendly to the whites. Their numbers being small, fear alone causes them to conduct
themselves in a more friendly manner.”30 There is some truth underlying Nutt’s statement. The
Chickasaws, numbering between 3,500 and 5,000 in the decades before forced Removal, were
smaller than other Indian nations in the Native South and thus could not muster a stout military
resistance to American expansion.31 Chickasaw headmen were realists and invested in a decadeslong plan that considered neutrality as their best weapon to forestall the tide of American settler
colonialism sweeping the South.
But headmen were acutely aware of how quickly their narrative of friendship with the
United States could change. Minko Chinnubbee, Tisho Minko George Colbert, district headman
Tishominogo (O’Koy), Charles’ Tom, and James Colbert stated in 1805 that violence in Creek
and Cherokee country caused “them to lose the best part of their [the Creeks’ and Cherokees’]
country… if they would have behaved well as we [have] done their country would have been
extensive.” In this way, the headmen not only recognized the perils of defying the US, but also
defined their relationship with the United States as wholly different from that of other Southern
Indians.32 Early and often in treaty negotiations with the United States, they stated that their
distance made them good friends with Americans, and federal leaders recognized this. During
the Treaty of Hopewell negotiations in 1786, for example, Knox noted that the “distance of this
nation from the frontier settlements being so great, is the principal reason that no complaints
have been made of the encroachment of the whites.”33 Chickasaw headmen agreed with this
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argument, noting in 1809 that “friends and brothers when too near to each other their friendship
is not so apt to continue, but when at a distance, friendship always remains firm and secure,” and
thus defined the peace as distinctly connected to geopolitical space and territorial autonomy.34
Clearly, the buffer zone between American settlers and Chickasaw settlements provided by the
Interior South shaped their relations with the United States.
By identifying themselves as committed to peaceful relationships with the United States,
the Chickasaws encouraged territorial governors and federal negotiators to respond in kind. The
governors, since they were not interested in Chickasaw lands at this time, knew that peace was
the better option. So, rather than ignore their demands, they usually appealed to federal officials
on behalf of the Chickasaws. Indeed, these officials consistently agreed that the Chickasaws
were “great friends” of the United States and repeated this statement until it was not only
reflected in trade and land negotiations, but in the public narrative. In the formative years of the
new American republic, George Washington met with dozens of official delegations of Indian
nations, entertaining them and encouraging peace between them and the United States.35 But
Washington held the Chickasaw delegations in distinctly high regard. He repeatedly stated that
he “love[d] the Chickasaws,” who illustrated the “strongest evidence” of friendship.36 To reward
their friendship, in 1794, per Washington’s direction, federal officials explicitly defined
Chickasaw boundaries and denounced land speculation in Chickasaw country. In 1795,
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Washington signed a contract ensuring a yearly annuity to the Chickasaws “as a mark of his
affection” to them.37
Territorial governors, likewise, thought highly of the Chickasaws. Mississippi territorial
governors Winthrop Sargent, W.C.C. Claiborne, and Robert Williams frequently referred to the
Chickasaws as a “worthy people warmly attached to the United States and more friendly to peace
and good order than any other tribe of Indians.” 38 By establishing themselves as “friends of the
United States” as frequently as they could, the Chickasaws developed and maintained an identity
designed to endear them to American leaders and thus help to protect their territorial and
political autonomy. W.C.C. Claiborne, for example, noted that the friendship of the Chickasaws
“and their fidelity to treaties, have made the nation very dear to me.”39
One particularly prominent territorial governor in early Chickasaw relations was William
Blount, the governor of the Territory of the United States South of the Ohio River that later
became the state of Tennessee. Blount’s appointment to this Southern District encompassed
territory in the Tennessee River Valley that the state of North Carolina previously claimed and
ceded to the United States, though the land was still contested space claimed by the Cherokees.40
Labeled the “Dirt King” by Creeks, Blount was also a notorious land speculator, and used his
power as governor to influence treaties with Southern Indians, much to their disadvantage and
much to his and his associates' advantage. 41 In 1793, Captain George Wellbank reported that,
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upon hearing of Blount’s appointment, General Andrew Pickens “told the Cherokees that a
worse man for them could not have been appointed,” and that Blount “loved Land & would
[take] all theirs.”42 Washington and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson were cognizant of this,
and appointed Blount in spite of any potential difficulties with the Cherokees and Creeks because
he was respected by the settlers in the Southern District.43 In a letter of support for Blount, North
Carolina Representative Hugh Williamson stated that he “knew no Man in whom they [frontier
settlers] could be so fully united.”44 The majority of Blount’s constituency lived on land either
recently bought, or still owned, by the Creeks and Cherokees, leading to constant violence on
their frontiers. Due to the ongoing conflicts in the Northwest Territories, the United States could
not muster soldiers to enforce territorial boundaries in the South or stop frontier violence, often
leaving the settlers to police themselves.45
Blount’s relationship with the Chickasaws, however, was unique. In a memorial from the
citizens of the Southern District in 1791, they noted that they lived in “perfect amity” with the
Chickasaws but argued that the “Creeks and Cherokees combined are the perpetrators” of
frontier violence.46 But Blount also leveraged friendship with the Chickasaws as a threat towards
other headmen in the Native South if they did not cede land or agree to negotiations. At a 1794
conference in Tellico with the Cherokees, for example, Blount stated that the Chickasaws were
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“great friends of the United States,” an example that Blount encouraged the Cherokees to mirror,
even while he pressed for land cessions.47 This was a benefit to the Chickasaws themselves, as
federal and state leaders listened to them concerning thefts, violence, and intrusion by white
Americans on their lands in order to preserve this pragmatic friendship.
Like Blount with the Cherokees in 1794, Mississippi Territorial governors sometimes
used Chickasaws as a means to accelerate economic change, peace negotiations, and trade deals
with other Indian communities. In a letter to Choctaw headman Frachimastubbee in 1799, for
example, Winthrop Sargent asked if the “Example of the Creeks and Chickasaws [would] induce
the Choctaws to Agriculture &c,” imploring the Choctaws to use the Chickasaws as an
example.48 After the appointment of Claiborne as Mississippi Territorial Governor, Chickasaw
headmen, including Minko Chinnubbee and war leader William Glover, penned a letter to
Choctaw headmen that encouraged their “Younger Brothers” to “take nothing” from, and report
all transgressions by, white Americans traveling through their country to “Governor Claiborne or
the agent of your Nation and you will thereby insure to your nations the friendship and affection
of the white people.”49 In the same letter, Chickasaw headmen also encouraged Choctaws to
attend negotiations “brought about by the White people” with the Osage in the Arkansas River
Valley.50 The Chickasaws did not trust the Osage, but they encouraged the Choctaws to “be of
the same minds” as the Chickasaws and enter into peace terms under good faith.51 This peace
may have been at the urging of the Americans, but Chickasaws benefitted from peace, especially
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for their young men hunting in the west, telling the Choctaws that the treaty allowed both nations
to “hunt and trade with safety.”52
Maintaining peace, however, was not easy. In the Native South, interaction with federal
leaders and agents were only a small portion of Southern Indian relations with white Americans.
Instead, Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, Seminoles, Catawbas, Chickasaws, and others all
encountered western frontiers settlers hungry for their lands and territorial and state governors
more attuned to the wants of their constituency than indigenous sovereignty and rights. For
western frontiers settlers moving into the Native South, their movement was simply a
continuation of the American Revolution and the promises of a mighty new empire of freedom.
For Southern Indians, the arrival of these colonists was a direct threat to their tribal sovereignty
and territorial integrity. Indigenous actions against these frontier families were a continuation of
ongoing conflicts with settlers dating to the colonial era, and they actively protected their land
and economic well-being by engaging in or disrupting the market economy and settler
encroachment on their land.53
Even though the Chickasaws were spatially distant from the burdensome influx of
American settlers into Indian territories for the first three decades of the civilization plan, they
still had to contend with intrusions, albeit at a smaller scale than the Cherokees and Creeks.
Throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Chickasaws insisted on the
removal of squatters as a prerequisite to their friendship with the United States. When
complaining about squatters, Chickasaw headmen frequently referred the agents to their duties as
outlined in the multiple Trade and Intercourse Acts, that “any improper conduct in the Indians, or
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the Citizens of the United States, or others relating to the Indians or their lands” should be
pursued and punished by the agents.54 Whereas the US government was extraordinarily lax in
policing squatters along the Cherokee, Creek, and even Choctaw borders, they surprisingly were
more diligent in the case of Chickasaw intrusions.
In 1808, Chickasaw headmen complained of American settlers, most notably around Elk
River in present day northern Alabama. By September of that year, the United States sent out
public notices, telling settlers intruding in Chickasaw country, and on land recently ceded to the
United States by the Chickasaws via treaty in 1805, to remove themselves and their livestock
immediately.55 In April of 1809, George Colbert and Tishomingo (O’Koy) complained to James
Robertson of continued intrusions of Americans in Chickasaw country. 56 Colbert and
Tishomingo previously sent their complaints to the President, but nothing was done and more
Americans were in the midst of settling in the region. In April 1809, federal agent Thomas
Freeman wrote on behalf of Colbert and Tishomingo (O’Koy) to Secretary of Treasury Albert
Gallatin with a report on the intruders and Chickasaw promises to “positively move them off by
force” if necessary.57 More unsettling, perhaps, to the United States than any violence or
violation of Chickasaw territory was Freeman’s report that the settlers were “selling the land to
each other,” directly subverting federal power as the sole purchaser and purveyor of Indian
land.58 Colbert and Tishomingo stated that they would forcibly remove the squatters, but do so in
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a “peaceable manly and decisive manner,” giving the Americans notice and allowing them to
remove on their own, thus, hopefully, preserving their peaceful relations with the United States.59
Within three months, Cherokee agent Return Meigs removed 294 families from the region,
noting the removal was completed “without any dispute or complaint,” by the squatters. 60 Meigs
not only removed the squatters, but burned their homes and farms and destroyed their livestock.
Squatters, however, did file grievances with President Monroe. The United States, they
argued, was “founded on the will of the people” and protected their intrusions onto Chickasaw
country.61 Signed by hundreds of the intruders, the petition argued for a right to the land, stating
that the land was unimproved when they arrived and that they improved the land as much, if not
more, than Chickasaw men and women. The petition that these white intruders signed argued
that they could remain until “the Chickasaws may feell [sic] a disposition to sell us their claime
[sic],” a blatant proclamation to advance American desires for Indian land.62 Their petition was
denied, due to the fact that their actions undermined federal authority with land purchases, and
the fact that the federal government was still reticent to challenge Chickasaw claims, especially
while Creek and Cherokee country stood between the Atlantic states and the Chickasaws.
In February 1810, Mississippi Territorial governor, David Holmes, hurriedly wrote to
Chickasaw agent, James Neelly, stating his intent to remove intruders in Chickasaw country and
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relaying to the Secretary of War the “urgency of this business.” 63 Holmes prioritized the removal
of squatters in Chickasaw country, stating that Neelly’s letter notifying him of the intruders six
weeks prior “never came to hand, otherwise the importance of the subject would have
commanded my immediate attention.”64 Holmes’ actions are a remarkable contrast to other
southern territorial governors at the time who normally either dismissed settler encroachments,
defended them due to border violence in an increasingly racial context, or demurred on sending
out militiamen or soldiers to remove settlers. Instead, Holmes immediately requisitioned a
Colonel Russell with “instructions to pass through the settlements of the intruders and order them
to remove immediately,” or they would be forcibly removed that spring.
While federal leaders desired an orderly expansion that would not tax federal coffers with
costly frontier warfare, western frontiers settlers aggressively, and often violently, pressed into
indigenous territory. This created a contentious situation between the federal government, white
settlers, and indigenous communities. These aggressive encroachments by Americans
encouraged violent responses by Southern Indians protecting their territorial autonomy and
property and created a contested narrative of violence that frontier settlers and land speculators
exploited, especially through print media. In the Tennessee Valley, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia, reporters filled newspapers with inflammatory content concerning the
depredations of Creek and Cherokee warriors, with one stating that Creeks held Americans
prisoner, and treated them “as slaves, sold from master to master at as high a price and in the
same manner as negroes are sold.”65 Frontier settlers united themselves under a mantle of
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whiteness while assigning the worst depredations or actions of violence to a savage and
indigenous other.66 Historian Angela Pulley Hudson has argued that newspapers in the American
South reflected a “widening rift” between national and southern interests.67 These newspapers
denied wrongdoing by settlers and governors, clamored for the federal government to remove
Southern Indians to make way for the development of cotton by white owners and black slaves,
and were often complicit with land speculation themselves. 68 Blaming conflicts on federal
agents, like Creek agent Benjamin Hawkins, along with Southern Indians, western frontiers
settlers and land speculators crafted a narrative of victimization that placed Southern Indians and
their defenders in a disparaging light. They also castigated the federal government for not doing
enough to protect their interests and, in some cases, they actively undermined the civilization
plan and the economic development of their indigenous neighbors. In other words, frontier
settlers manipulated border violence in order to encourage the eventual removal of Southern
Indians.
Chickasaw leaders, however, did not have to devote much of their attention to settler
incursions, given the geographic location of Chickasaw territory and the relative lack of settler
interest in lands this far west at the time. One exception was after the creation of the Natchez
Trace in the first decade of the 1800s, when Americans began travelling through Chickasaw
country in significant numbers. These white travelers, however, were merely passing through,
and were not there to squat on Chickasaw lands. Chickasaw headmen easily maintained peace
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along the road by discouraging their young warriors from violence.69 The Chickasaws
recognized that peace along the Natchez Trace was a factor in federal hesitancy to demand land
cessions from the Chickasaws, and they were keen to keep it. “The path to the Cumberland had
long been a white and peaceable” path due to the Chickasaws argued Claiborne in 1803, and
territorial governors were cautious to upset that balance, especially when the primary means for
migration to Natchez was through Chickasaw country.70
Curtailing the violence, however, came up against Native judicial principles. In the
Native South, clan vengeance and reciprocal violence was the law of the land, and it was
inextricably linked, as Ethridge has argued, to “principles of balance and purity.”71 Much like
gift giving was meant in a reciprocal manner, so was the killing or harming of another human, no
matter the cause or reason. As anthropologist Charles Hudson has noted, homicide or murder
was not the correct technical term when Southern Indians pursued satisfaction for a death. The
only thing that mattered was that a person had been killed. The slayer, and his or her clan, were
liable for the death and revenge was required for cosmological balance and for the soul of the
slain person to rest.72 Satisfaction in the Native South was meant to be one retaliation for a death
and not a cycle of violence. Living in Chickasaw country, British trade James Adair notes in his
History of the American Indians, that, once the “kindred duty of retaliation is justly executed,”
the death would be balanced, and the affair between the two clans would end.73 With the
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continual encroachment of Americans into Creek and Cherokee country, however, cycles of
violence occurred. Rules of revenge were meted out when a killing was committed. It was the
responsibility of clan members to enact justice by killing the killer, killing a member of the
killer’s clan, or through some other form of satisfaction such as payments.74 As white Americans
trespassed into Southern Indian country, they too were incorporated into this system of justice,
though this could lead to simmering feuds between white Americans and Southern Indians. In
Creek country, for example, Creek warriors sometimes killed Americans over land, livestock, or
resistance to white encroachment.75 But Americans responded in a reciprocal nature. As Ethridge
has argued, frontier settlers had a similar “blood for blood” concept of vengeance, though their
reasons were not necessarily cosmological.76
The Chickasaws, too, subscribed to blood revenge. Adair noted that Chickasaws during
the colonial era pursued satisfaction for the death of a kinsman “with such a fixt eagerness” that
they would travel up to a “thousand miles for the purpose of revenge.”77 Adair’s comments are
probably exaggerated, but the fact remained that the Chickasaws were intent on applying balance
to their cosmology concerning deaths of clan members. However, by the early 1800s, the
Chickasaws began to curb this legislative principle, at least on the international stage. 78 They
recognized the perils it held for potential endless cycles of violence between EuroAmericans and
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Chickasaw clans. Instead of Chickasaw warriors seeking revenge for a death at the hands of an
American, they handed the culprits over to their agent to seek justice in an American court of
law. The peaceful narrative they cultivated worked in their favor in this regard. Federal agents
noted that the Chickasaws’ “greatest boast is, ‘that they have never spilt the blood of a white
man,’” and headmen demanded that satisfaction be meted out as part of their reciprocal
friendship with the United States.79 Allowing convictions of Americans in American courts
required Chickasaws to acclimate themselves to a new version of satisfaction in international
matters, but American officials also inherited a tremendous responsibility to honor Chickasaw
friendship, and American officials often went to significant lengths to settle cases of Americanon-Chickasaw violence in order to preserve the alliance.
Such cases, though, were few and far between. Recorded murders of Chickasaws by
Americans during the era of the civilization plan are remarkably scant, especially given the
American violence along other Indian borders. In May 1793, two Chickasaw men and one
Cherokee man were assaulted and shot near William Blount's home in Nashville. The three men
were unarmed, looking for their horses, and “unsuspecting any injuries being offer’d them,”
when they were ambushed and shot at by three white men.80 The Cherokee man and one of the
Chickasaw men were unharmed but one of the Chickasaw men, John Morris, was hit and later
died from his injuries.81 Blount immediately wrote to then Secretary of War Henry Knox,
describing the account and informing the secretary of a $100 bounty he placed on the men who

79

Wilkinson, Hawkins, and Pickens to Dearborn, October 25, 1801, ASPIA, 1:651-652. In April 1780, some
Chickasaws were apparently part of a raid on a Tennessee Valley settlement of American settlers. The attack, incited
by British agents, resulted in the death of around a dozen men and women. In January 1781, a Chickasaw party
attacked a stockade on Freeland’s Station in the Tennessee Valley and killed one black man and one white man.
These, however, occurred before the end of the American Revolution and, according to Atkinson, were the last
attacks by the Chickasaws on these settlements, meaning that Chickasaw violence was minor, and all violence was
concluded before the end of the American Revolution. Atkinson, Splendid Land, 109-110.
80
William Blount to Henry Knox, May 24, 1793, The Territorial Papers of the United States, ed. Carter, 4: 261-262.
81
William Blount to Henry Knox, May 28, 1793, The Territorial Papers of the United States, ed. Carter, 4: 262-264.

143

shot Morris. Less than a week later, Blount again wrote to Knox, notifying him that two men,
Jacob Clement and Daniel Steckley, were apprehended and in his custody for the murder and
placed before the two justices of Knox County. The two were eventually released on alibis, but
warrants were issued for three other men, Davis Stockton, David Loveless, and Micajeh Carter.
Tennessee Valley residents also actively participated in looking for the murderers, and ten
Americans “immediately mounted on horses, and went in pursuit” of them.82
Per Blount’s orders, Morris was buried with military honors “due to a warrior of his
friendly nation,” in a burial ground in Nashville, with Blount himself flanking Morris’ brother as
“chief mourners.”83 During the funeral procession, Blount noted that the citizens of Nashville
and the “adjacent country” attended, and that he had “rarely seen more sorrow expressed at a
burial.”84 After the funeral, Blount actively worked to assure Morris’ family that satisfaction via
the Tennessee judiciary system would be meted out. The Tennessee governor worried that
Morris’ family might seek blood revenge, which would instigate a cycle of violence between the
Cumberland settlers and the Chickasaws. Instead, Morris and his kin permitted Blount to pursue
justice through the American system, with Morris himself stating before he died that he wished
that “no satisfaction should be taken for him… except on the person who injured him.” Two
other Chickasaws at the funeral, Bob and Tom Thompson, both agreed to not pursue vengeance
as well. The Chickasaws involved in the conflict purposefully gave the Americans a chance to
prosecute their citizens and restore cosmological balance, incorporating Blount into the shared
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responsibility of pursuing the killers.85 Whether or not the American culprits were apprehended
and convicted, however, remains unknown.
Another case occurred in August 1804, when Mississippi Territorial Governor W.C.C.
Claiborne sent a letter to the governor of Kentucky stating that a Chickasaw man was killed in
Eddyville, Kentucky, and demanded that the state find and apprehend the murderer.86 The letter
to the governor of Kentucky was sent the same day that Claiborne received notification of the
murder by Chickasaw agent Samuel Mitchell. Claiborne confidently stated that he believed that
the Chickasaws “will do no mischief,” meaning that they would not pursue clan vengeance if the
Americans illustrated their intent to prosecute the killer.87 Available records do not indicate if the
man was caught, but Claiborne made it a point to reach out to his fellow frontier governor to
address the concerns of the Chickasaws.88 Throughout the aftermath of both murders, the
narrative of Chickasaw friendship played a vital role in defining the actions and reactions from
the Cumberland and Mississippi citizenry and government.
Perhaps the most significant example of Chickasaws’ successfully petitioning American
response to frontier violence occurred in 1813 with the murder of Tuscauchukanubby by the
American settler, Samuel Tyner. The murder occurred while the federal government had
mobilized for the War of 1812, and they desperately needed access to the Natchez Trace.
Chickasaw agent James Robertson placed a $400 bounty on the murderer in order to expedite the
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process of apprehending him. Like the death of Morris in 1793, evidence suggests that kin of
Tuscauchukanubby willingly permitted American involvement rather than meting out
satisfaction on their own. Tyner was soon apprehended by American Pete Ragsdale who
delivered him to authorities in Nashville. There, Tyner was convicted for murder on June 21,
1814, and hanged.89 Tyner’s trial and subsequent execution was not simply a conviction, but a
conviction of a white man by a white jury of a murder of a Chickasaw—something quite unusual
for the time. Chickasaw Agent James Robertson paid for the travel of headman James Colbert to
Nashville so that Colbert could observe the conviction and summary execution of Tyner,
possibly acting as a proxy for the nation to observe that satisfaction by another means was
carried out.90
Tyner’s execution, as well as Morris’ memorial and prosecution of multiple suspects, are
exceptional in the Native South during the era of the civilization plan. In Creek country, Creek
Indian Agent Benjamin Hawkins consistently sparred with Georgia governors, the state
legislature, and courts in order to find any satisfaction for assaults on Creeks or compensation for
continuous encroachment on Creek lands by frontiersmen.91 In fact, agent Hawkins argued that
the reason for the persistent resistance to civilization plan policies in Creek country occurred
because of constant encroachment by frontiers settlers and because white criminals were not
punished by state authorities in Georgia or Tennessee. 92 This lack of oversight by state officials
propelled Creek warriors to seek justice through revenge and retaliation, which more often than
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not played into the hands of federal and state officials looking for reasons to exploit, indebt, and
force Southern Indians to cede land.93
Similar to the Creeks, the Cherokees experienced the reluctance and sluggishness of
American courts to prosecute frontier settlers for violence and murders of Cherokee citizens. 94
For example, in 1812, Cherokee agent Return Meigs lamented the fact that Southern Indians
were not allowed to testify in court in the American South, where a “white man can kill an
Indian in the presences of 100 Indians and the testimony of these hundred Indians… amounts to
nothing.”95 Frustrated, Meigs argued that the judges themselves were “just and liberal” but a
“jury impaneled in the frontier Counties dare not bring a Verdict to take the life of a citizen for
Killing an Indian.”96 In 1813, Meigs prosecuted four white Americans in state courts for the
deaths of Cherokees and all four were let go without punishment.97
With "crying blood" not revenged through the American law and court system, Indian
men and women employed their own legislative principle. The blood-for-blood judicial process
on the frontier led to constant cycles of revenge and retaliation on both sides.98 This increased
violence was an integral reason why Indian Agents like Silas Dinsmoor, Return Meigs, and
Benjamin Hawkins pushed the Creeks and Cherokees to create national governments that
included national police forces who could arrest horse rustlers and violent offenders.99 In
contrast, the lack of violence on the Chickasaw frontier allowed Chickasaw headmen to rebuff
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such suggestions and advances by their agents to implement a national police force or a Western
legal code in their nation. In 1816, for example, when their new agent, William Cocke, suggested
the nation adopt an American-style penal system and legal code, James Colbert and Tishomingo
(O’Koy) were two of many Chickasaw elites who refused to listen to Cocke’s proposal, which
infuriated the agent. 100 Another time, Cocke demanded that Chickasaw Thomas Love be
compensated for the murder of one of his slaves. Tishomingo (O’Koy) merely shrugged off the
demand, stating that the murderer was kin of Love, and therefore the murder was an internal
familial matter rather than a national one.101
Ownership of enslaved Africans now began to complicate conceptions of satisfaction and
justice. When Chickasaws altered their economic practices to include commercial crops,
ranching, farming, and cottage industries, slave labor and chattel slavery became a more
common practice. By the 1820s, Chickasaw families frequently used slaves in their new
economic activities. Black slaves gave Chickasaw men and women a means to transition
gendered labor roles slowly, and they imported black slaves in significant numbers before
removal. Slaves were integrated into the judicial worldview of the Chickasaws as property and
culprits of damaged or stolen property were expected to repay or compensate the owners. A
slave's murder, then, was usually not compensated by blood. In his same letter noting that the
killer of Love’s slave had not made restitution for the murder, Cocke mentioned that Young
Factor murdered a slave through brutally whipping him. When Cocke challenged Young Factor
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on his death, the Chickasaw slave owner simply responded that the slave “belonged to him,” a
reaction similar to an American slave owner.102
What records do not illustrate is if Chickasaw men and women happily or grudgingly
approved of the use of American judicial systems to prosecute white Americans who murdered
Chickasaws. Taking the power of vengeance and satisfaction from clans actively took power
from women in charge of matrilines. Some Chickasaws, like Morris’ family in 1793, willingly
relinquished clan satisfaction due to the efforts of state leaders to prosecute the killers of their
family members. Others, like Pashamastubbee in 1816, profited by arresting and transporting
Americans who murdered other Americans in Chickasaw country to jails in the Tennessee
Valley and Mississippi. But satisfaction for deaths through investigations that did not
immediately lead to a conviction and death, like a warrior killed in Eddyville in 1804, may have
worried some Chickasaws and their view of cosmological balancing. Possibly, one of the only
reasons that Chickasaws accepted American judicial practices was because federal and state
leaders often aggressively, and successfully, prosecuted Americans who killed Chickasaws.
Other than violent encounters ending in injury or murder, horse stealing proved to be a
particularly vexing problem along the Indian borders with Americans. Horses, a necessity for
travel and transport in Indian country, were quite valuable. Horses changed hands numerous
times, both legally and illegally, and also involved thieves on both sides of the borders. For
territorial leaders, the theft of horses by white settlers and Southern Indians was a constant
source of frustration throughout the first three decades of the civilization plan. In 1792, Blount
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told Secretary of War Henry Knox that horse stealing was a subject of almost continual
complaint by his constituents, noting that all he could do was “give passports to the Sufferers to
go into the nation in Search of their horses.”103 Indian constituents likewise complained
continuously about horse stealing. In Creek Country, Ethridge argued that stealing horses was a
significant portion of the frontier exchange system, leading to instability and disorderliness, but
both white Americans and Creeks insisted that the “benefits of blurred ownership outweighed the
costs.”104 In Tennessee, Blount noted that a black market of livestock often occurred through
these thefts and white settlers and Southern Indians worked in “combination” to smuggle horses
“to north or South Carolina or Georgia and in a Short time to the principle towns on the Sea
board for sale so as to effectually prevent a recovery.”105
Neighbors of the Chickasaws to the south, the Choctaws sometimes conducted horse
raids against Americans, targeting plantations and settlements in the growing Natchez district in
present-day southern Mississippi, though not nearly with the same virulence as the border thefts
that the Creeks and Cherokees experienced. Due to the explosive growth of cotton, Natchez grew
from a small British settlement during the eighteenth century into an expansive plantation
economy during the antebellum era, growing from a population of around 500 whites and 200
slaves in 1774 to 1,619 whites and 498 slaves in 1784 to 5,318 whites and 2,110 slaves in
1796.106 In first decade of the nineteenth century, Choctaws continued a significant urban
presence in Natchez, trading firewood, foodstuffs, horses, and hides to settlers in town, and often
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camping as close as six miles away from Natchez itself. 107 But Natchez citizens occasionally
came into conflict with Choctaw men and women in town, leading to the death of at least one
Choctaw man in 1803.108 Aspiring American planters settled near rivers and creeks, often
settling in, or nearby, Choctaw country and disrupting Choctaw settlements or hunting
grounds.109 While encroachments in Choctaw country did not reach the same consistent violence
that occurred in Creek and Cherokee country, Choctaw warriors engaged in horse and cattle
stealing. In 1801, Claiborne told Secretary of State James Madison that the Choctaws, due to
their “contiguity to this settlement,” often committed “partial Depredations upon the Cattle &c of
the Inhabitants” of the Natchez district, and he voiced concern about disputes due to their
proximity.110
Livestock proved especially vexing to maintaining order. Throughout the colonial era and
into the early nineteenth century, European settlers used cattle, pigs, and other domesticated
animals as a vanguard of settler encroachment by allowing these beasts to wander over
indigenous hunting grounds and farmlands, thereby disrupting Native subsistence practices. The
disruptions caused by these animals often attracted the ire of indigenous communities, which
could lead to violence and indemnification for loss of property.111 Southern white farmers let
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their cattle wander into Native country, destroying farms and actively eating the forage needed
for deer and the growing Native populations of cattle, hogs, and horses. As early as the 1786
talks at Hopewell, Piomingo noted that “there are a great many” settlers on Chickasaw land “who
have numerous stocks of cattle and horses… they are not of any advantage to us.”112 In the first
decade of the 1800s, Tishomingo announced that a Lieutenant John Campbell arrived in their
country with “between forty and fifty head of kattle [sic], and dry goods and trading with the
Indians, to the injury of George and Levi Colbert,” and demanded their removal.113 Possible
encroachment, like that of Campbell, was not simply a worry for Chickasaw headmen over
territorial autonomy, but it worried rank and file Chickasaws as they began ranching cattle of
their own. Further settlement by white Americans meant less grazing land for their animals, and
a better chance of theft, especially as most Southern Indians and white frontiers settlers did not
brand their livestock.114
Chickasaws, however, are noticeably absent from American records concerning the theft
of American livestock. Instead, Chickasaw agents only report two horse thefts by Indians in
Chickasaw country. The first occurred in 1808 when Mississippi territorial governor Robert
Williams wrote to then Chickasaw Agent Thomas Wright that a Mr. Davis Thompson lost two
horses in Chickasaw country and blamed the theft on the Chickasaws. Williams himself was
dismissive of the case and did nothing to pressure Wright to prosecute possible Chickasaw
thieves. More importantly, there is no record of punishment of Chickasaws for the theft or
monetary compensation taken from annuities. The second came from James Robertson in 1814
and concerned Cherokee horse thieves in Chickasaw country, noting that the Chickasaws
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themselves “can be no more firm in their friendship” with the United States.115 The dismissive
tone of Williams’ letter and Robertson’s affirmation of friendship illustrates that the Chickasaw
position as friends to the United States held real-world implications when it came to borderland
and frontier violence and theft. Rather than immediately move to prosecute the Chickasaws or to
assume payment for the property stolen from their annual annuities, Mississippi territorial
governors and federal agents willingly considered Chickasaw innocence.
Most compensation to Americans for thefts by Southern Indians was paid out of Indian
annuities. As discussed in Chapter Two, treaties and land cessions often came with annuities
which were yearly stipends of goods and cash to Indian communities most commonly in
exchange for land cessions. This treaty system replaced the previous system of reciprocity during
the era of play-off politics, where European colonies and empires exchanged gifts for military
alliances, trade deals, and land with Southern Indians. 116 Annuities from the United States in
exchange for land also went hand in hand with the civilization plan, often with part of the
annuity stipend paid for via goods and services necessary for the economic changes designated in
the plan such as spinning wheels, looms, cotton seed, and so on.117 For the Chickasaws, very
little of their annuity went to settling debts and thefts with Americans, and instead went to
supporting their economic endeavors, including the raising and breeding of enormous horse and
cattle herds. In 1795, Piomingo, George Colbert, and other Chickasaw headmen traveled to
Philadelphia to treat with the federal government. Interested in providing tools needed to
implement the civilization plan, Secretary of War Timothy Pickering agreed to a payment of
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$3,000 for the Chickasaws. This money was to be distributed as an annuity and was affirmed by
congress in 1799, and again in 1835 and continued until 1903.118 In Creek country, by contrast,
Ethridge notes that a significant amount of annuities went to replacing horses stolen by young
Creek men.119 This meant that Chickasaw headmen allocated more specie to spend on economic
development. For example, the annuity payment of 1820 amounted to $31,175 distributed to
Chickasaw families.120 The annuity payments in 1831 detail exact amounts distributed to each
family, with an average of $3.75-3.96 distributed per Chickasaw in a household, an influx of
cash for economic programs that was not the norm in the American South.121
Maintaining peaceful relationships with Americans also meant that Chickasaw headmen
relied on their agents to prosecute Americans who stole property from Chickasaws. In 1790,
Piomingo noted the thefts of three horses to James Robertson, stating that the horses were stolen
by “your people,” ascribing responsibility to Robertson to retrieve the animals.122 Fourteen years
later, Agent Samuel Mitchell borrowed $50 from Jonathan Robertson for the sole purpose of
immediately paying Chickasaw Tishamastubby for a stolen horse.123 Until removal, Chickasaw
headmen successfully pressured their agents to go to extreme lengths to apprehend Americans
who stole Chickasaw property, including guns, slaves, and horses. In one particular example in
the summer of 1812, Chickasaw Agent James Neelly sent John C. Smith and Kilpatrick Carter to
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Hancock County, Georgia, nearly four hundred miles from the heart of Chickasaw country, to
retrieve slaves stolen from two Chickasaws.124
The livestock stealing and settler intrusions remained relatively minor until 1814, when
the Treaty of Fort Jackson opened up 23 million acres of prime cotton country in present-day
Georgia and Alabama and closed the gap between American settler advances and the
Chickasaws themselves .This treaty, as noted, marked the beginning of the end of the Interior
South and it held deleterious consequences for the Chickasaws and their effort to retain political
and territorial autonomy. Between 1810 and 1827, Alabama territory went from a population of
10,000 Americans to over 120,000 with approximately 50,000 slaves. 125 Previously, federal
soldiers and agents enforced Chickasaw territorial sovereignty due to their friendly relationship
with the United States and the simple fact that they were not yet in the direct path of white settler
advancement. By the mid-1820s, however, land-hungry American settlers shifted their eyes
towards Chickasaw country and viewed northern Mississippi as the next inevitable advancement
of white America. Agents continued to remove squatters from Chickasaw country, but often
more with an eye towards sales rather than maintaining the sovereignty of the Chickasaws.
However, even with the closing of the Interior South, the US continued their pragmatic
friendship with the Chickasaws, removing intruders and prosecuting crimes against Chickasaw
men and women. It is likely that federal enforcement of Chickasaw territorial autonomy by
removing squatters fell in line with the federal ideology of an orderly frontier. As historians of
settler colonialism note, the state, settlers, and indigenous communities often created a fluid
dynamic, often working with one another to advance their own agenda. For example, , historian
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Gregory Evans Dowd has argued that federal leaders and landowners in present-day Michigan
worked in conjunction with Indian communities to remove and undermine intruders because they
wanted to purchase the land themselves.126 After the Treaty of Fort Jackson, squatters were
settling in Chickasaw country in great numbers, and Chickasaw headmen once again
complained to their agents about them. In 1814, headmen George Colbert, Chinnubee,
Appasantubbee, and Tishomingo (O’Koy) noted settler encroachment by Cumberland settlers on
Chickasaw lands to the Secretary of War. In their letter, they said that the encroachment on
Chickasaw lands meant greater conflict as well as “false accusations against us of things that we
are not guilty.”127 Chickasaw agents paid for advertising requiring any squatters on Chickasaw
lands to remove themselves immediately, often with no real change.128 Intruders continued to
settle on Chickasaw land, agitating Chickasaws and threatening the peaceful relations they
cultivated with the United States, Mississippi Territory, and settlers in the Tennessee Valley. The
primary conflict in the region with the Chickasaws seems to concern poaching cattle owned by
the Colbert family that sometimes grazed nearby. In April 1816, Tishomingo (O’Koy),
Appcountubby, and William Colbert informed Chickasaw agent William Cocke that American
intruders were “daily killing” the cattle of George Colbert and that they should take “no excuse
from the agent” and demanded he immediately drive off the intruders.129
Chickasaws were still invested in directly asking the federal government for aid rather
than instigating violence with settlers themselves, noting that “it is the Express wish… that our
agent if he wishes to do his duty and the Nation Justice, that he will in ten days” drive out the
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intruders.130 But when their appeals to their agent resulted in delays and less-than-firm responses,
Chickasaw headman Tishomingo (O’Koy) broke from friendly terms and threatened violence if
the squatters were not immediately removed, stating that “if blood should be spilt, it will not be
our fault.”131 Less than three months later, a squad of militiamen led by Captain John Allen were
“engaged in removing intruders off Chickasaw Lands” per orders from Chickasaw agent William
Cocke.132 Chickasaw threat of violence shocked their agents into action.
Intruder removal continued well into the 1830s in Chickasaw country, and federal
soldiers often worked in conjunction with Chickasaw agents and sub-agents to remove them. In
Creek country, Ethridge has argued that Benjamin Hawkins found it difficult to secure funds to
send out military detachments to remove squatters. Military posts were not well supplied by the
United States, and Hawkins was not allocated enough funds to supply the expeditions himself.
The lack of removal, even though the United States stipulated in treaties their responsibility in
removing squatters, led to simmering resentments in Creek country over the border violence and
deteriorating relationships with the United States, frustration that Hawkins posited as the primary
reason Creeks opposed civilization policies.133
In Chickasaw country, however, there does not seem to be a lack of funds or Americans
invested in removing squatters, nor a lack of agency in Chickasaws’ demanding the removal and
prosecution of intruders. Well after 1814, territorial governors supplied soldiers to assist in
removal, and Chickasaw agents willingly paid for soldiers and militiamen to remove squatters. In
1826, for example, Chickasaw agent Benjamin Smith paid for at least three expeditions to
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remove squatters. These expeditions, led by sub agent John B. Duncan and Captain’s James
Benham and John W. Byrn, traversed the “whole extent of Chickasaw country,” removing
settlers near Chickasaw Bluffs in the north and south to the Tombigbee River, destroying dozens
of settlements.134 In 1829, Smith paid a Joel Winston and a party of ten men $320.25 for a twoweek expedition to turn away intruders.135 For those arrested, they were treated as criminals,
with one expedition purchasing three pairs of handcuffs.136 As late as September 1830, agents
instructed these removal parties to not only remove intruders, but to solicit testimonies to convict
them “as directed by the Intercourse Act of 1802,” a direct assertion of Chickasaw territorial
autonomy.137
Then, in September 1830, Chickasaw agent Benjamin Reynolds received notice from
Secretary of War John Eaton to continue to remove squatters in Chickasaw country, explicitly
stating to turn over squatters to federal marshals for prosecution.138 As late as 1833, agents
printed hundreds of pamphlets, posted ads in newspapers, and sent out notifications demanding
that squatters remove themselves from Chickasaw country and for others to stay out.139 These
ads, however, were released simultaneously with advertisements and notices of the sale of public
lands in Chickasaw country, as the United States sought to profit from eventual Chickasaw
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removal. Rather than enforcing Chickasaw sovereignty to reciprocate friendship, they now did so
to keep the land pristine for their gain.140
Prosecuting other crimes also continued past 1814, again, in large part as US efforts to
place law and order on an unruly frontier. For example, agent Benjamin Smith sent G.W. Long
to acquire a Chickasaw horse stolen by an American and again in 1827 sub-agent John Duncan
recovered and returned horses and a rifle stolen “from an Indian, traveling to the Chickasaw
Council House” and subsequently removed the intruders from Chickasaw county. 141 Chickasaws
also actively worked to arrest violent and unruly Americans passing through their country. In
1816, for example, Pashamustubbee passed along information on the murder of a James W.
Silvester to agent William Cocke, and then assisted in arresting James Richey for the murder and
transporting Richey out of Chickasaw country.142
Throughout the duration of the civilization plan, Chickasaws also prosecuted Americans
who stole goods and livestock from them. As sub-agent from June 1829 to March 1835, John L.
Allen accompanied Chickasaws who sued for their stolen property in state and county courts. In
1829, Allen accompanied Chickasaw Chewetubby to Fayette County, Tennessee, and requested a
judicial order of ne-exiat on Alexander Porter for stealing a slave of Chewetubby. Less than a
year later, Allen was back in Tennessee prosecuting Porter once again in conjunction with a suit
filed by Chickasaw Ischautubby.143 In 1831, Allen was again used to help prosecute and pursue
men stealing from Chickasaws, this time apprehending a William Barns who “had been arrested
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by the Indians for stealing horses,” and traveling to McNairy County, Tennessee, to escort
witnesses against William Buckwerth who “was charged with stealing horses from the
Chickasaw Indians.”144 Even after signing removal treaties, Chickasaws actively and
successfully pursued prosecution of white Americans who stole their goods. In August 1834, two
Chickasaw warriors and sub-agent Allen tracked down Austin Tilly and a Mr. Self for stealing
two horses of Chickasaw Banatubby. Allen then transferred Tilly to Franklin County, Alabama,
where he was committed for the thefts.145
By the late 1820s and early 1830s, when these latter actions took place, it was often after
or during the years when the state of Mississippi actively subverted Chickasaw political
autonomy by placing Chickasaw country under state law.146 But Chickasaws still found means to
use state courts to retain political power and property. In 1831, for example, Chickasaw Emubee
filed a lawsuit in Athens, Mississippi, claiming that former sub-agent John B. Duncan
fraudulently sold the ten slaves owned by Emubbee, swindling the Chickasaw and retaining the
profits. Duncan believed his gambit successful due to the fact that any complaint by the
Chickasaw man would have to be filed in Mississippi court, a system of law quite different from
Chickasaw judicial systems. But previous actions by Chickasaws in the Tennessee court system
proved beneficial, especially in their use of agents and sub-agents to assist them, or as proxies, in
their process of retaining their property. Sub-agent Allen “interfered” on behalf of Emubbee in
the lawsuit and the case was subsequently won by the Chickasaw man. 147
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Chickasaw peaceful overtures with the United States benefitted them greatly concerning
criminal activities and intruder removal for the first three decades of the civilization plan. Until
the Treaty of Fort Jackson, Chickasaw country was not in the direct path of American settlement
and was, therefore, not a priority for western frontier settlers or the federal government. Instead,
peaceful neutrality and friendship with the United States was a tool for the Chickasaws in a
changing and chaotic Native South and vital to their adoption of civilization programs. When
Chickasaws did encounter settlers encroaching on their land, they were proactive and successful
in removing the intruders, often with the help of their agents and federal soldiers. The fact that
settler encroachment, and the inherent violence and theft that came with it, was rare in
Chickasaw country meant that economic changes occurred in an environment that the
Chickasaws themselves controlled. In a tumultuous American South, the lack of constant
encroachment, violence, and indebtedness meant that the majority of Chickasaws had no need to
view the new economy with contempt or distrust.
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CHAPTER 6
WHOSE CIVILIZATION PLAN WAS IT? CHICKASAW MANIPULATION OF
FEDERAL AGENTS IN THE EARLY NINETEENT CENTURY
On November 8, 1817, federal Indian agent for the Chickasaws William Cocke cheerfully
wrote to acting Secretary of War George Graham that the “Indians are now convinced that the
measures I have taken … [are] to better their condition by every means in my power” and “are
willing to ascribe all that is due to my advise [sic] and admonitions.”1 With this letter, Cocke
hoped to convince his superiors in Washington, D.C. not only that the Chickasaws were
receptive to the changes promoted by the civilization plan, but that he was the driving force
behind this transformation. Cocke’s footing as a leader in Chickasaw country, however, was
precarious and he was not the engine of change that he described to Graham.
Appointed as Chickasaw agent on September 28, 1814, Cocke arrived at the Agency on
December 9 of that year. He was the seventh full-time federal agent appointed to the Chickasaws
in less than two decades, with none of the previous agents residing in Chickasaw country for
more than five years. Because of this constant turnover, federal agents in Chickasaw country
navigated a perilous position with their Indian charges, one in which their influence and power
was not well established through years of closely interacting and working with the Chickasaws.
This lack of stability and experience opened an opportunity for Chickasaw headmen to
manipulate their agents as well as the federal officials who backed them. Combined with their
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pragmatic friendship with the United States and their geopolitical location in the Interior South,
the power that the Chickasaws exerted over their agents allowed them to direct and manage the
implementation of the civilization plan and economic changes in their country. This influence is
perhaps best explained by Cocke himself who, in 1816, wrote to the Secretary of War that “I
have at all times understood I held my appointment during the pleasure of the President of the
United States; recent proceedings seem to show it may depend on the Chickasaws.”2
Chickasaws questioned the authority of federal Indian agents in their country and
challenged the top-down federal ideology of the civilization plan, in effect putting into question
whose civilization plan it was. Because of their small size and political organization, Chickasaw
leadership presented a unified front to American federal agents who, in other circumstances,
frequently exploited factionalism within Southern Indian communities to benefit the goals of the
United States, especially to acquire land. Rather Chickasaw leaders exploited the fractures in the
agent program to benefit Chickasaw goals. As illustrated in Table 1, fourteen agents were
assigned to Chickasaw country between 1792 and 1839, with each residing there for an average
of less than four years and none serving longer than nine. This revolving door of agents diluted
federal authority in the region and provided Chickasaw leadership with greater domestic power
over the implementation of cultural and economic changes encouraged by the civilization plan.
Furthermore, replacement agents often took time to arrive in Chickasaw country. Between 1797
and 1837, Chickasaws were without any agent in their country for at least sixteen months and
with sub-agents acting as emergency agents for another thirty-two months.3 Federal agents to the
Chickasaws abandoned their post for a variety of reasons, which resulted in inconsistent
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messaging and a loss of continuity in enforcing civilization policies and federal land acquisition
by the agents, a discontinuity that Chickasaw headmen exploited.4
Table 1: List of Chickasaw Agents, 1792-1839. Information cited from Records of the Old Southwest in the National Archives:
Abstracts of Records of the Chickasaw Indian Agency and Related Documents, 1794-1840, comp. James R. Atkinson, (Chickasaw
Nation, 1997), 12-13.

Name

Date Appointed

Date Resigned

1. James Robertson

May 16, 1792

June 14, 1797

2. Samuel Mitchell

August 15, 1797

September 30, 1801

3. William Hill

Early 1806

Committed Suicide Prior to
Assuming the Position of Agent

4. Thomas Wright

May 27, 1806

September 26, 1808

5. James Neelly

August 9, 1809

July 23, 1812

6. James Robertson

June 4, 1812

Died on September 1, 1814

7. William Cocke

September 8, 1814

June 15, 1818

8. Henry Sherburne

November 27, 1817

April 1820

9. William Vans (Acting
Agent)

April 29, 1820

September 22, 1820

10. Robert C. Nicholas

September 17, 1820

September 22, 1822

11. Reodolphus Malbone
(Acting Agent)

September 20, 1822

January 11, 1824

12. Benjamin F. Smith

October 1, 1823

December 16, 1829

13. John L. Allen (Acting
Agent)

June 12, 1829

March 31, 1830

14. Benjamin Reynolds

February 22, 1830

March 3, 1839

4
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This chapter chronicles how Chickasaws leaders manipulated their federal agents and
shaped their roles in Chickasaw country on matters that included land cessions, trade,
agricultural programs, and annuity payments. Rather than submit to federal plans, Chickasaw
headmen carefully crafted and supported Chickasaw-centric civilization policies. Using their
longstanding claim of friendship with the United States, Chickasaws subverted the power of
federal agents on ground by closely integrating these agents and other federal employees into
their own vision of a changing American South. For the first twenty-five years of the civilization
plan, headmen often won contests of influence with federal agents over economic and political
change. Many times, they successfully blamed agents for problems in Chickasaw country and
forced their cooperation or removal.
The political structure of Chickasaw leadership before forced removal included town,
district, and national councils.5 During the colonial period, a duality of leadership roles occurred
along the lines of white/peace and red/war moieties. Each moiety drew a civil (or peace)
headman and a war leader from the top-ranking clan of their division.6 These moieties were part
of deep cultural structures that defined Chickasaw society and had complimentary social and
political roles. This duality ascribed decision-making processes to civil/peace headmen in times
of peace and to war leaders during periods of conflict.7 European trade and competition,
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however, transformed moiety roles from one of complementarity to ones of competition, as both
moieties vied for European trade and participated in war and diplomacy.8
British trader Thomas Nairne noted in the early eighteenth century that the moieties
themselves were ranked and that the peace/white moiety was higher ranked.9 The principal
civil/peace chief, or Minko, of the Chickasaws was a hereditary title passed down matrilines
from uncle to nephew in the highest-ranking clan, the Minko clan, from the white/peace towns in
the Small Prairie.10 By the nineteenth century this duality was somewhat muted, but Minkos
were still usually drawn from specific clans and not limited to only matters of peace. War chiefs,
whose office usually came from extraordinary exploits in war, continued into the nineteenth
century, but again, they did not limit themselves to only matters of war.
The Chickasaws had four Minkos, Taski Etoka, Chunnubbee, Chehopistee, and
Ishtehotopa, for the duration of the civilization plan. Taski Etoka was Minko for the first few
years of the civilization plan before his brother, Chinubbee, assumed the title in the mid-1790s
until his death in 1818. After Chinubbee’s death, his nephew, Chehopistee, took on the role but
died shortly after he succeeded his uncle. In 1820, Ishtehotopa assumed the role of Minko a
position he would not relinquish until his death in Indian Territory after forced Removal.11 By
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the second half of the eighteenth century, English traders and agents often referred to this
position as a “king,” though they acknowledged that the Minko required consensus rather than
coercion to make decisions. This nomenclature of “king” for Minkos continued throughout the
civilization plan as Americans often referred to Chinubbee and Ishteohotopa as the “king” of the
Chickasaws.12 In 1805, Dr. Rush Nutt stated that the Minko “is merely nominal, having no
coercive powers, his language is rather persuasive than otherwise, & he is reverenced more like a
father than a king.”13 In fact, the Minko could be considered only first among equals, as they lead
within the context of a larger body politic—the town and national councils—a group of headmen
from each town. In addition, any adult man who showed good leadership skills, good decisionmaking skills, and wise advice, could rise in prestige and influence, overshadowing even the
Minko. For Chickasaws, like most Southern Indians, power was through persuasion and not
coercion, and this facet of leadership remained consistent during the era of the civilization plan.14
The national council that the Minko oversaw focused on international policy and issues
that concerned the Chickasaws as a whole, like interacting with the United States and its federal
agents, and left most day-to-day governance to town and district councils and clan leadership.
The national council would meet at an appointed house, discuss concerns, and come to a
consensus over how best to approach any issues.15 The council itself consisted of the Minko, the
Tisho Minko (or assistant Minko), war leaders, and ranked men who were chosen by members of
their town or district.16 Members of the national council were charged with gauging the interests
of the Chickasaw rank and file. In 1775, British trader James Adair noted that, in Chickasaw
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councils, “their voices, to a man, have due weight in every public affair, as it concerns their
welfare alike.”17 This persisted well into the era of the civilization plan. One observer noted that,
when the national council met to discuss pertinent matters that concerned the entire nation, the
Minko would then choose a member of the council with the “best Oratorical abilities to deliver
the voice of the nation” to the rank-and-file Chickasaws who gained a “knowledge of the
situation of the nation & mode in which business has been done.”18 In 1805, trader John Forbes
noted that the sale of land to cancel trade debts required the “universal consent of the nation,”
which often required the majority of the Chickasaws to be present at negotiations.19
Other positions for the Chickasaw national council included the war chief and Tisho
Minko. During the early eighteenth century, Thomas Nairne noted that war chiefs “carry all the
sway” in Chickasaw country due to the economic prospects of militarized slaving and near
constant warfare with the French and their indigenous neighbors. 20 By the era of the civilization
plan and interaction with American federal agents, however, the pragmatic friendship of the
Chickasaws with the United States and surrounding indigenous communities meant that the role
of the war chief—at that time, William Glover--was not as prominent as prior holders of his
office.21 Instead, more influence went to the office of the Tisho Minko. The Tisho Minko, or
assistant to the Minko, was the principal advisor to the Minko as well as the voice and lead
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spokesperson for the Chickasaws when they communicated with foreign nations.22 H.B.
Cushman described the Tisho Minko as a wise counselor and brave warrior. When referring to
O’Koy, also known as Tishomingo, who served as Tisho Minko for Minkos Chinubbee and
Ishtehotopa, Cushman stated that his influence was so great that other members of the national
council “unanimously acquiesced to his propositions, but invariably with the reiterated
exclamation, ‘That’s just what I thought! That’s just what I thought!’ while the king [Minko]
said but little, but generally adopted the suggestions.”23
European and Euro-American negotiators often misconstrued the leadership structures in
Chickasaw country, much to the consternation of later ethnohistorians.24 Often, European leaders
viewed whoever met with them as the principal headman.25 In interviews during the 1840s,
former Chickasaw interpreter Malcolm McGee had to remind interviewers that former Tisho
Minko George Colbert, who served as Tisho Minko in the years before O’Koy (Tishomingo),
was “never Head Chief, but appt. [appointed] by the King [Minko Chinubbee] to act as principal
chief in all matters with the U.S. Government.”26
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As Chickasaws settled out from their nucleated towns for ranching and commercial
crops, they divided into four districts, appointed district councils, and a leader that represented
the district in national councils.27 When Nutt traveled through Chickasaw country in 1805, the
districts were Pontotoc (formerly Ayanaka'), Chishata-liah (Post Oak Grove), Long Town, and
Big Town, with district councils overseen respectively by leaders William McGillivray, O’Koy
(Tishomingo), Miskemattauha, and Tuckkaapoi.28 District leaders spoke on behalf of their
districts in the national council and often were significantly involved in treaty negotiations and
with federal agents. While agents noted the division of the Chickasaws into districts, they often
did so in the context of annuity dispersal. In 1820, agent Henry Sherburne outlined the
responsibilities of district headmen concerning annuities. According to Sherburne, Chickasaws
“appoint their chiefs, who by order of Council authorize four of them to place the Nation in four
Divisions.” These district leaders would then conduct a census and relay the number for
distributing annuities.29
Town leadership retained importance as one of three tiers of leadership-town, district, and
national- in Chickasaw country. Chickasaws retained town and clan identity even as they settled
out. Prior to the civilization plan and the subsequent dispersal of the population out of nucleated
towns and into farmsteads, Chickasaw town councils were the foundation of political
organization, with towns of the white moiety living in the Small prairie and towns from the red
moiety lived in the Large Prairie. When Chickasaws were still involved in playoff politics
between the Spanish and the United States, they often did so as townships. For example, when
Minko Taski Etoka arrived at Mobile in 1784 to negotiate with the Spanish, he did so with
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members of all six current Chickasaw towns, who acted as representatives of their towns’
councils in the larger negotiations.30 Even as Chickasaws settled further throughout districts to
ranch and farm, town identity remained important. For example, during the Red Stick War and
the War of 1812, hundreds of Chickasaw warriors fought with the United States, but they
identified head warriors of each town to act as leaders of the expedition.31
What is probable, however, is that the loss of playoff politics and the need to present a
unified national government to the United States in its attempts to gain land in the Native South,
meant that the national council gained influence in Chickasaw country. In 1820, then-agent
Henry Sherburne noted that there “is no such thing as a Distinction of Tribes known among
them, & they Denominate themselves as the ‘Chickasaw Nation of Indians.’”32 For the
Chickasaws, a semblance of unity existed prior to the era of the civilization plan due to their
small size, proximity of townships before settling out, their coordinated responses to exterior
violence, and the means that they incorporated other tribal communities into their towns.33
Sociologist Duane Champagne has noted that Chickasaw communities often congregated across
town lines for larger annual ceremonies, like the Green Corn celebration, rather than individual
celebrations and ceremonies for singular towns or districts. 34 Chickasaw “nationalism,” however,
was firmly rooted in local and kin identities. Early and mid-eighteenth century Chickasaw towns
illustrated remarkable unity concerning military attacks on them by the French and their
indigenous allies but Champagne has argued that this unity was not solely because of exterior
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violence that compacted settlements. Instead, Chickasaw unity may have come from what he
terms their “national religious ceremonies, national chiefs, and national military leaders, which
were an essential part” of Chickasaw moieties and clan structure.35
The evolution of Chickasaw leadership, and the role of the national council, was not due
solely to outside pressures and influences, rather, they were often voluntary changes to fit the
evolving American South and their own settlement and economic practices.36 As historian Greg
O’Brien has argued concerning the Choctaws, the basis and means for political and elite
authority changed over the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, especially as new tools and
skills were required in negotiations with the Americans, but “Choctaw culture as a whole seemed
to be little affected.”37 In Chickasaw country, McGee noted specifically that George Colbert’s
“knowledge of English” was an effective tool for him while he was Tisho Minko and that this
skill “better fitted him for such services than the others.”38 But Chickasaw political structures,
clan lineages, town identity, and persuasion rather than coercion persisted. When men with
European or white American familial ties took on leadership roles, like Samuel Sealey, William
McGillivray, and the Colberts, they did so within existing Chickasaw political structures.
Champagne has argued that Chickasaw men with European heritage were reluctant to enact
sweeping changes similar to the Cherokees in the 1820s, as a fractured Chickasaw political
structure would have invited American intrigue and undercut their own economic prospects. 39
Rather than subvert Chickasaw leadership structures, these headmen acted as representative
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leaders of the Chickasaws and did so effectively, especially when facing the enormous
challenges of an increasingly invasive, and powerful, United States.
The relationship between federal agents and Indian leaders varied across the South.
Agents in the Native South enforced federal laws, including the different Trade and Intercourse
Acts, promoted civilization programs, and negotiated treaties. Agents acted as mouthpieces for
the federal government, diplomats and cultural negotiators expected to further the civilization
and land policies of the United States while also protecting Indian land from American squatters
and other encroachments.40 In an 1802 letter to then-Choctaw agent Silas Dinsmoor, Secretary of
War Henry Dearborn detailed many of the responsibilities of federal agents, including their roles
with the civilization plan in Indian country. Agents were to introduce the “Arts of husbandry,
and domestic manufactures, as a means of producing, and diffusing the blessings attached to a
well regulated civil Society.” These included educating Indian communities on plow-based
agriculture rather than swidden and hoe agriculture that defined previous centuries of Southern
Farming. Women should learn spinning and weaving, and Dearborn stated that Dinsmoor should
find American women “should be employed in teaching the females spinning and weaving, and
other household Arts.”41 Historian David Nichols aptly refers to the charge of these agents
during the civilization plan as “secular missionaries.”42 Federal agents, however, often operated
from a position of limited power and influence. Hundreds of miles from major American
settlements and towns, agents, and their agencies, were a small international outpost in the
middle of Indian country. What limited power they did have, however, revolved around their
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diplomatic link between the Native community they resided in and the federal government they
represented.43 Essentially, agents were a communications link, a central figure in negotiations,
land cessions, and promoting the goals of the United States in a manner that satisfied their Indian
community.
Within this role lay responsibilities that included licensing and approving traders and
merchants in Indian country as well as distributing the annuities paid out for land cessions and
treaties. Annuities and licenses were two of the more powerful sources of influence that agents
retained in the Native South. For trader licenses, agents could form lines of patronage and
economic influence in the growing American South, earning the trust and gratitude of influential
members of a burgeoning Southern elite. Annuities, however, could be delayed or withheld from
Southern Indians, often as a means to accelerate negotiations for land cessions or turn
negotiations in the favor of the United States. It is no wonder, then, that Chickasaw elites
targeted trade licensing and annuity distribution as means to undercut their agents.
When George Washington first considered the roles of agents in Indian country, he
argued they should not be directly involved in trade or purchasing of land, but rather they should
be paid a “fixed, and ample Salary allowed them as full compensation for their troubles.” 44 This
salary, in theory, was intended to discourage agents from profiting from their position through
patronage in trade or as land speculators. The first Trade and Intercourse Act in 1790 clearly
outlined depredations by white Americans in Indian country, both as illegitimate trades and
squatters, and the punishments for such actions. It also defined the federal government as the
only purveyor and purchaser of Indian land. The second Trade and Intercourse Act, passed in
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1793, strengthened the power of the federal government in Indian country to enforce the Acts,
created specific funding for civilization programs, and established that the President provide
“temporary agents, to reside among the Indians” as a means to enforce the Trade and Intercourse
Acts and advance civilization programs.45 When agents arrived in the Native South, they, and
every other member of the Agency, were required to take an oath that explicitly stated that they
would “promote as far as in [their] power the execution” of the most recent Trade and
Intercourse Acts.46
In some cases, agents successfully pursued and enacted the program as explicated in the
treaties. Most agents, however, were heavily involved in land speculation or underhanded deals
with traders and licensing, and therefore compromised any moral high ground they were
supposed to retain. In canvassing Southern Indian agents over the first decades of the United
States, one can see that many, if not most, of them were heavily involved in land speculation or
oftentimes acting as factors for land speculators. 47 Well-funded land speculators oftentimes
financed frontier squatter movement onto Indian lands, and then argued, as in Tennessee and
Georgia where land speculators controlled state legislatures, that once squatters had settled on
Indian lands, it was nearly impossible to uproot them. The only recourse, in their reasoning, was
to treat for a land cession.48 In the South, governors like William Blount of Tennessee and David
Mitchell and George Troup of Georgia held significant familial and political ties with land
speculation groups or encouraged or even sponsored squatters to apply pressure on Southern
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Indians to cede lands.49 Even in the Interior South, issues over land speculation and trader
licensing occurred. Issues over patronage and close familial connections with other western
frontier settlers created a major point of contention between Chickasaws and their agents.
As much as federal leaders in Philadelphia and Washington believed in a top-down, and
cohesive, federal policy, implementing the civilization plan in the Native South took time and
did not follow a single procedure. It is important, once again, to note that Native communities
were not monolithic, nor did all federal agents fit into the mold of what American elites wanted.
The agents responsible for representing the federal government did not always share the federal
vision for the plan, nor were they always effective in their roles. As a result, the civilization plan
arrived in Indian country in fits and starts. Although the federal government adopted the
civilization plan in 1790, Federal Indian agent Silas Dinsmoor did not arrive in Cherokee country
until 1794, and Benjamin Hawkins did not arrive in Creek country until 1796.50 The first agents
appeared in Chickasaw country in 1792, but did not live in residence for nearly another decade.
Agents appointed to the Chickasaws came from a variety of states, as close as presentday Tennessee and Mississippi to as far away as Rhode Island, all carrying with them different
political opinions and ideologies of what civilization meant and the place of Indian communities
in the growing United States. To make sense of the civilization plan in Chickasaw country, it is
impossible not to consider the impact of federal agents and how Chickasaw leadership responded
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to their demands and suggestions. When agents arrived in Chickasaw country during the first two
decades of the civilization plan, they realized their ideology did not often fit the reality on the
ground and that they lacked the power to bend the Chickasaws to their will. These agents soon
understood the need to negotiate with Chickasaw headmen and to navigate a different political
world than what they probably had imagined. Chickasaws early on identified traits that they
found agreeable in Indian agents. For example, Chickasaws argued that the enforcement of the
Intercourse Acts be first and foremost, and they used these acts to determine when agents acted
poorly, thereby subverting this American tool for expansion to fit their own needs. If agents did
not fall in line with Chickasaw demands, headmen lobbied the federal government to remove
them and to appoint ones that did, thus successfully manipulating the system for almost twenty
years. Their success was undoubtedly due to the interconnected factors of their geographic
position in the South and the pragmatic friendship between the US and the Chickasaws.
The first Chickasaw agent, James Robertson, acted more as an intermediary in
negotiations and political relations between the Chickasaws and the federal government than as a
lead instigator of the civilization plan. A celebrated frontiersman and one of the founders of the
settlement of French Lick, present-day Nashville, he was appointed by Tennessee governor
William Blount, on May 16, 1792, served until 1797, and resumed the role in 1812 until his
death on September 1, 1814.51 Robertson acted as a peace broker between American settlers in
the Tennessee Valley and Chickasaws who, although not living there in any numbers, claimed
the land. For the Americans, Robertson’s influence and role as peacekeeper was obvious:
violence with the Creeks and Cherokees constantly threatened American settlers invading the
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Tennessee Valley, and friendship with the Chickasaws lent their settlements a degree of
legitimacy as well as a friendly neighbor. As one early historian stated, without the mutually
beneficial relationship between Robertson and the Chickasaws, the white American settlements
in the Tennessee Valley might have been “extirpated by the Creeks and Cherokees.”52
Chickasaw headmen exploited their familiar relationship with Robertson to deepen their
friendship with the United States, to separate themselves from other Southern Indian
communities, and to create an inroad for trade in tools and weapons. During the 1790s,
Chickasaw towns were at war with Upper Creek towns led by Tuckabatchee headman Mad
Dog.53 Robertson was source for weapons and supplies needed to fight the war as well as a
gateway for the Chickasaws to travel to Philadelphia and Washington DC for negotiations. In a
letter to Robertson in 1793, Piomingo labeled Robertson his “dear old friend” and stated that he
planned to stay at his house on the way to the federal capital that year.54 The letter arrived via
Robertson’s son, Randolph, who recently delivered goods to Chickasaw country for his father.
The letter also warned Robertson of continued depredations by Creeks and Cherokees in the
region.55
As agent, Robertson often furnished Chickasaw headmen with gifts and supplies for new
economic activities. In 1793, for example, he offered headman Piomingo axes, hand saws, nails,
and hoes as well as fifteen bushels of salt which was scarce in Chickasaw country due to open
conflict with the Creeks.56 Without the salt, Piomingo stated that he would have been “obliged to
a kill a number of their cattle, and have much of each spoiled,” a severe loss to their developing
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ranching economy.57 Robertson, however, declined to live within the nation itself, which limited
his influence on the day-to- day direction of economic changes. In lieu of living among the
Chickasaws, Robertson made frequent trips to Chickasaw country and wrote letters of
introduction for them as they traveled for negotiations with state and federal leaders. But he
remained in his home on Richland Creek, southwest of Nashville, which became the de facto
Chickasaw Agency during his first appointment.58 This arrangement suited the Chickasaws who
preferred their American friends from a distance, but undermined Robertson’s ability to
implement fully federal policy.
For Indian agents to have influence at the local level, residency and longevity of their
tenures were key. As agents in the Native South took on a more proactive role in Southern Indian
communities, living hundreds of miles away, like Robertson, was detrimental to their jobs. By
1797, Southern Indian Superintendent and Creek agent Benjamin Hawkins demanded that
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Robertson either move into Chickasaw country or resign. Unwilling to move at the time,
Robertson stepped down from his position as agent. Due to his living situation, Robertson was
not the omnipresent agent that Benjamin Hawkins became for the Creeks or Return Meigs for the
Cherokees, both of whom established their homes in Indian country.
Following Robertson's resignation, Samuel Mitchell, who was also agent to the
Choctaws, replaced Robertson on August 15, 1797. However, he maintained residency in
Choctaw country until 1801. Mitchell was adverse to moving to Chickasaw country and even
declined the move at first, much to the consternation of Mississippi Territorial governor
Winthrop Sargent.59 Mitchell’s decision not to go at first may be due to the fact that the position
of Chickasaw agent was with a smaller Indian community, diminishing his role and making him
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more expendable, or due to Chickasaw country’s distance from the American settlements in
Natchez. Mitchell was also invested in businesses in Mississippi Territory.60 What finally
persuaded Mitchell to accept the role of Chickasaw agent was the appointment of agent John
McKee as a joint Choctaw agent in early 1799. A personal dispute with McKee finally prompted
Mitchell to relinquish his role among the Choctaws and request a transfer to Chickasaw country
where he would serve solely as their agent.61
When Mitchell relocated to Chickasaw country in 1801, it marked the first moment that a
federal agent lived among the Chickasaws, a full twelve years after the adoption of the
civilization plan by Washington and Knox. As an agent living in Chickasaw country, Mitchell’s
roles and responsibilities differed greatly from Robertson’s. After his relocation, Mitchell
commissioned the construction of the first Chickasaw Agency in Chickasaw country near
present-day Houlka, Mississippi. Agencies in the Native South served as meeting places for
Southern Indians and federal negotiators, but they were also models for the civilization plan and
hence tools for agents in the Native South to influence and direct economic changes and
encourage the civilization plan. Creek Agent Benjamin Hawkins, for example, frequently invited
his charges to see his demonstration gardens, fields, and livestock practices in the hopes that they
would follow his example.62 As agent to the Chickasaws, Mitchell followed this example and
hired weaving instructors, blacksmiths, and handymen to construct plows, looms, and cotton
spinning wheels, and instruct the Chickasaws on how to use them. With the establishment of the
Agency, Mitchell involved himself in the everyday economic activities of the Chickasaws and
provided them with tools and instructions in line with the goals of the civilization plan.
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Following the example set by Hawkins in Creek country, the Chickasaw Agency included an
active farm maintained by the agent, which was intended to teach Chickasaw men and women
how to plow, weave, and participate in other cottage and commercial crop activities.
Mitchell believed that he gained the trust of the Chickasaws “more and more as they
progress in Civilization and the acquirement of property.”63 Chickasaws were happy to work
with an agent who supplied them with material they required in the changing economy and
actively coordinated with him to deliver goods in a timely fashion. In 1803, for example, Levi
Colbert advanced Mitchell $68.50 to pay handyman Ezekiel Hide for cotton spinning wheels he
created for Chickasaw families.64 As agent, Mitchell also worked to keep unlicensed traders and
alcohol out of the country, and coordinated with headmen to demand satisfaction from the
Delawares over the death of Chickasaw John Frazier.65 But the Chickasaws quickly soured on
Mitchell when he acted against their territorial interests in land cession negotiations with the
United States.
While the Interior South protected the Chickasaws from major encroachment and
demands for land cessions in the first twenty-five years of the civilization plan, this did not
exclude them entirely from treaty negotiations. In July 1805, the United States began treaty
negotiations with the Chickasaws intent on procuring lands in present-day Tennessee and
Alabama. As in previous treaties with Southern Indians, the United States sought to cancel trade
debt in exchange for land cessions. Chickasaw debts to American trade factories were minimal,
and the demand for their land from Southern frontier settlers mitigated by their distance and
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pragmatic peace, but federal agents found a means to force the Chickasaws to the negotiating
table. Mitchell and Cherokee Agent Return Meigs produced records of Chickasaw debt totaling
more than $20,000 to private traders, including the British firm Panton, Leslie, and Company,
which had offices in Mobile, Alabama and Pensacola, Florida.66 Federal negotiators, led by
former Chickasaw agent James Robertson, requested the Chickasaws treat with them and cede
four million acres in exchange for the United States assuming their debts with these private
traders. Robertson argued that the land the United States requested, territory north of the
Tennessee River, was no longer useful for the Chickasaws as it was far from their primary
settlements in present-day northern Mississippi and because the deer population in the region
was disappearing rapidly.67
As Tisho Minko, George Colbert was one of the lead negotiators for the Chickasaws.
Prior to the treaty, Cherokee agent Return Meigs marveled at Colbert’s oratory skills and his
stubbornness over land cessions. In January 1805, Minko Chinubbee, George Colbert, O’Koy
(Tishomingo) and Charles Town stated that they were not willing to sell lands and when they
were, “we can tell you.”68 Meigs identified Colbert as the “soul of their [the Chickasaw’s]
political movements.”69 During the 1805 Treaty negotiations, however, Colbert was not the only
impactful leader. District headman O’Koy (Tishomingo) shared some of the Tisho Minko duties
with Colbert throughout the negotiations. Historian Daniel Flaherty has argued that O’Koy and
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George Colbert worked in a complimentary fashion.70 After the terms were set, O’Koy
(Tishomingo) “shook hands with General Robertson, & the treaty was to be made out & signed”
the next day. But before the treaty was signed, O’Koy delivered a talk to the rank-and-file
Chickasaws and apprised them of the negotiations in order to receive their “mutual consent” to
cede lands and pay their trade debts.71 For O’Koy (Tishomingo), these actions and
responsibilities as a communicator and orator for the Chickasaws prepared him for his later role
of Tisho Minko.
Chickasaw headmen signed off on a treaty, but ceded only 2.25 million acres in exchange
for a lump sum greater than the federal negotiators hoped to pay.72 After the cancellation of their
debts to private traders, the Chickasaws did not agree to more land cessions until 1816. In the
aftermath of the treaty, frustrations escalated between Chickasaw headmen and their agent.
Rather than remain impartial, Mitchell celebrated the land cession and he hosted a ball for the
commissioners of the treaty and other dignitaries in the region that included former Vice
President Aaron Burr.73 While the Chickasaws ceded less land than the US demanded, and
received a higher price for their land, this was still a negotiation that they did not desire, one that
their agent now celebrated. Soon after, Chinubbee, Tishomingo (O'Koy), and George Colbert
wrote to the Secretary of War and demanded Mitchell’s removal. As a federal agent, one of
Mitchell’s roles was to encourage dependence on the United States and secure land cessions, but
these were by no means the goals of Chickasaw headmen. Federal officials were hesitant to
anger the Chickasaws due to their pragmatic peace with the Americans and their willingness to
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open their country to settlers traveling to Mississippi Territory via the Natchez Trace in an 1801
treaty. Rather than compound the situation, federal officials listened to Chickasaw complaints
and abruptly removed Mitchell as agent in 1806. 74
Mitchell might have been a scapegoat for Chickasaw headmen. The land cession in the
Treaty of 1805 was the first significant action to threaten the territorial and political autonomy of
the Chickasaws, and it threatened to destabilize Chickasaw unity. In 1807, then-Chickasaw agent
Thomas Wright noted that there was a “want of confidence, that the Chickasaws manifest
towards their Chiefs” following the land cession.75 Although O’Koy (Tishomingo)
communicated the treaty, and the reasons why it was completed, Chickasaw rank-and-file were
still frustrated with the loss of their old hunting grounds and exhibited that disaffection towards
their headmen. In turn, the headman deflected blame to their agent. Although the Chickasaws
had tolerated Mitchell as long as he provided them with goods for their new economic programs,
once he used his position to facilitate land cessions all bets were off. Concerned about their own
leadership positions, Chickasaw headmen used Mitchell’s duplicity as a cover for their own
actions and forced his removal to protect their own power.
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Mitchell was the first agent that Chickasaw headmen took an active role in removing, but
he would not be the last. In early 1806, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn appointed William Hill
to the position, only for Hill to commit suicide before he left for Chickasaw country.76 Dearborn
then appointed Thomas Wright to the position on May 27, 1806. Wright served only two years,
until his death on September 26, 1808. As agent, Wright was paid a rate of $1,000 a year and
$365 for subsistence, receiving the pay raise that Mitchell had previously requested.77 During
Wright’s tenure, he saw to the completion of the improvements on the Agency house and
complex.78
One objective that Wright failed to complete was a change in annuity distribution. For the
first two decades of the nineteenth century, federal agents disliked the manner of distributing
annuities, in the form of goods instead of cash, to the Chickasaws. Goods were delivered to the
trade factory at Chickasaw Bluffs, nearly one hundred miles from the agency, and the transport
of these goods to Chickasaw settlements and the agency was long, tedious, cumbersome, and
expensive. Often, the cost in transportation exceeded $300, which came from the agency’s
budget, and agents were desperate to lower the costs. 79 In 1803, Mitchell noted with relief that
the Chickasaws agreed to receive annuities once every two years, stating it would both be a
“savings to the government” and allow them more time with their crops.80 Even so, in 1807,
Wright voiced his displeasure, arguing that he was “well satisfied… to change the mode of
giving out the Annuity.”81 Wright, well aware that O’Koy (Tishomingo), George Colbert, and
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Chinubbee had facilitated the removal of Mitchell was hesitant to immediately confront
Chickasaw leadership during his first year on the job. Instead of addressing the Chickasaws
directly, Wright appealed to the War Department and asked that each district leader assume
responsibility for the transport of their own portion of the annuity goods. Such action, he
reasoned, would save the agency the cost of transport as well as the time and expense of
maintaining Chickasaw families while they waited for the goods to arrive at the agency. Wright
avoided confronting the Chickasaws on annuities, which was probably wise for his position as
agent. Instead, Wright meekly stated that he had yet to come up with any plan “likely to
succeed” in satisfying them.82
After Wright’s death in 1808, the position of agent in Chickasaw country remained
vacant for almost a full year. During this period, Thomas McCoy, a weaver hired by Mitchell,
and Malcolm McGee, a white man married to a Chickasaw woman, ran the Agency in an
unofficial capacity.83 This, however, meant a lack of influence from an appointed representative
of the federal government on economic changes in Chickasaw country as well as a delay in the
1808 and 1809 annuities. Eventually former Chickasaw agent Robertson and Tennessee Senator
Daniel Smith endorsed David Hogg, a factor at the Chickasaw Bluffs trading house, as the new
agent for the Chickasaws.84 While Hogg was known to the Chickasaws, Chickasaw headmen
suggested an alternative. Writing a month after Robertson and Smith recommended Hogg,
Chickasaw headmen illustrated their influence in appointing and deposing agents when they
endorsed “an old Gentleman of our acquaintance,” Tennessee lawyer James Neelly, as their next
agent.85 Chinubbee, George Colbert, and O’Koy (Tishomingo), the very headmen involved in
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removing Mitchell from power, were once again active with appointing Neelly, and with similar
reasons: protecting the economic and political autonomy provided them by the Interior South.
After hearing the argument of the Chickasaw headmen, Robertson changed his mind, endorsed
Neelly, and even handed him his commission in August 1809.86
Known more to historians as a companion of famed explorer Meriwether Lewis on his
trip to Nashville in 1809 that ended with Lewis’ suicide, Neelly seems to have no prior familial
or trade relations with the Chickasaws.87 Almost immediately, Neelly procured the 1808 and
1809 annuities from the trade factory at Chickasaw Bluffs, which “very well pleased” his new
hosts.88 Neelly also continued the importation of goods for the civilization plan into Chickasaw
country. From November 1811 to July 1812, he signed off on the construction of at least thirty
plows, 146 cotton spinning wheels, and four looms and imported at least 1,923 pounds of iron
for tools.89 Timely delivery of annuities and the delivery of tools for new economic practices
meant that the Chickasaws did not find much conflict with Neelly. In fact, the only recorded
issue with Neelly occurred with interpreter Malcolm McGee, who had “been giving proofs of
disaffection to the government.”90 But Chickasaw headmen did not follow up with complaints to
the federal government, so Neelly remained secure in his position as agent.
The primary reason, however, that Chickasaw headmen argued Neelly, then 68, was best
suited as their next agent because he was “not so fond of Speculation.” Moreover, they preferred
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an older man as agent because "young men in the heat of youth" would be inclined to abuse the
authority of a younger man.91 In their letter to Secretary of War Henry Dearborn that endorsed
Neelly, Chickasaw headmen noted that it “may be too forward” to recommend Neelly over
Robertson and Smith’s endorsement of Hogg, but that they acted in the best interest of their
nation.92 The preference for Neelly by Chickasaw headmen was rooted in their fear of
speculators in their country, and this fear is easily understood. Looking to the east, Chickasaws
viewed the disruption and destruction wrought on Cherokees and Creeks due to crooked land
deals and speculative practices of elite Americans. As early as their 1792 treaty negotiations with
the United States, Chickasaw leaders consciously decried land hungry speculators masquerading
as agents. In a conference with Cherokee headmen, Creek headmen, and Secretary of War Henry
Knox, Chinubbee condemned the speculative practices of southern Indian agents, demanding
that Knox “Tell General Washington, that the Carolina people ought not to be appointed to hold
talks with the Indians, as they always ask for land.” Chinubbee continued, “we desire a person to
be appointed by [Washington] who will not ask for our lands, but do justice, both to the white
and red people.”93 Chinubbee’s talk outlined that the Chickasaws demanded that their agents
enforce the Trade and Intercourse Acts as well as their territorial autonomy, and that they would
take a proactive role to see that this request was honored.
The Chickasaws apparently made the right choice in Neelly since the new agent declined
to speculate in Chickasaw land and instead actively defended it. This was probably not what the
United States desired, but the Interior South was not yet in the crosshairs of immediate and
overwhelming American expansion. For Chickasaw headmen, however, this was a welcome
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feature, especially after the breach of trust with Mitchell. The development of cotton production
in the Natchez region attracted ever larger groups of white settlers who passed through
Chickasaw country in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, and Neelly used his power
as agent to protect Chickasaw land holdings against this influx. Chickasaw headmen discouraged
violence by their warriors and successfully maintained a peaceable path with American settlers
passing through their country. Most likely consulting with Chickasaw headmen, Neelly not only
notified then Mississippi Territorial governor David Holmes about squatters, but he also warned
travelers passing through Chickasaw country to only use the Natchez Trace when traversing the
country. The safety of American travelers, the agent noted, would not be enforced by his office if
they traveled on any other road or path.94 Neelly’s letters concerned Holmes, who protested that
the notifications to travelers implied that the Chickasaws “may punish with impunity any person
who shall depart from the public trace.”95 Moreover, Neelly aggressively secured the return of
goods and enslaved peoples owned by the Chickasaws stolen by white Americans, and hired men
to travel for weeks at a time to return stolen property to Chickasaw country.96
Chickasaw leaders deemed Neelly “trustworthy and fair,” and were satisfied with the
agent, as he proactively defended their territorial autonomy and imported a significant amount of
goods for ranching and commercial crop production during his period as agent.97 However, when
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the Red Stick War broke out in 1812, the federal government reappointed James Robertson as
agent.98 Robertson, a man with considerable military experience, was appointed to encourage the
Chickasaws to participate in the war effort against the Red Stick nativists in Creek country or
stay out of the conflict entirely. Even though they liked and trusted Neelly, when Robertson was
reappointed, George Colbert wrote to him that the Chickasaws were “overjoyed” with his
confirmation since he had been “the life of the nation” during his previous tenure as agent.99 The
Chickasaws may even have influenced his reappointment. When Robertson reassumed the role,
then Tennessee Governor John Sevier mentioned that his “friends” secured his position as agent,
and it is possible that Chickasaw leaders counted among these supporters.100
With the onset of the Red Stick War, George Colbert resigned from his position as Tisho
Minko and principal negotiator with the United States in order to join his brother, William
Colbert, as leaders for military expeditions against Red Stick Creeks, as well as to maintain and
oversee his many business ventures.101 While he remained involved in Chickasaw negotiations, it
is possible that Colbert slowly removed himself from the position of Tisho Minko. As early as
1804, Dr. Nutt noted that Colbert “declined sitting in council,” and mistakenly stated that O’Koy
(Tishomingo) was, at that time, the “speaker of the nation.”102 As illustrated with the Treaty of
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1805, district headman O’Koy had previously shared some responsibilities of the office with
Colbert. Now, he assumed the role of chief advisor to Minko Chinubbee and was heretofore
known as Tishomingo. The transition of Colbert to Tishomingo (O’Koy) for the role of assistant
to the Minko, and the expansion of the role due to negotiations with the United States, illustrates
the smooth transitions in office that the Chickasaws maintained as they encountered new exterior
challenges in the nineteenth century.103
Once at the Agency, Robertson asserted that no community, white or Indian, was more
loyal to the United States than the Chickasaws during the Red Stick War and the War of 1812.
While this assertion ascribes loyalty rather than pragmatism to Chickasaw headmen, they
benefitted from this assumption with an exponential increase in goods meant for new economic
programs. In reality, Robertson was in poor position to do anything that might upset the
Chickasaws. The nativist uprising in Creek country and the actions by the British in the Gulf
South during the War of 1812 alarmed white settlers throughout the American South, and the
United States needed to keep communications and travel open across Chickasaw country.104
Despite the war efforts, or perhaps because of the necessity to maintain Chickasaw alliance,
Robertson managed to promote the civilization plan. From 1812-1814, Robertson oversaw the
importation of well over 8,000 pounds of iron and steel into the Chickasaw Agency “for the
purpose of making farming utensils for the use of the Indians with a view to stimulate them to
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industry.”105 This was a massive increase to the influx of iron and steel to the agency compared
to the tenures of Mitchell, Wright, and Neelly.
Due to pleurisy or neuralgia, James Robertson died while still agent on September 1,
1814. After Robertson’s death, Chickasaw headmen, including district headman Apassantubby,
Minko Chinubbee, and George and James Colbert, wrote to the Secretary of War and defined the
qualities they expected in their next agent. Specifically, the Chickasaws requested the federal
government send a an agent “bred and born in the northern States an intelligent man that will
strictly observe the business of his Duty who is honest in principle doing what is Right between
the government of the United States and the nation.”106 The request for an agent from the north
reflected Chinubbee’s argument against Carolinians as agents in the 1790s. Chickasaws
postulated that northern agents would not have familial or financial connections to land
speculators in the American South. Chickasaw headmen tied their desire for an agent from the
north to settler encroachments from the Tennessee Valley, which “gives uneasiness to the nation
together with false accusations against us of things that we are not guilty.”107 The letter also
rejected any white American already working at the Agency as a possible new or temporary
agent. Instead, the Chickasaws insisted that the United States forward “instructions that you
should think proper for us to Receive” to the Chickasaws themselves. 108 Keeping in mind their
victory in appointing Neelly, a man they supported because he was not interested in land
speculation, headmen insisted that federal agents work with them to protect Chickasaw political
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autonomy and territorial integrity. Failure to do so, Chickasaw headmen warned, risked the
Chickasaws’ willingness to cooperate with them.
Chickasaw lobbying, however, was not successful this time. The end of the War of 1812
and the Treaty of Fort Jackson signified the beginning of the end to the Interior South and the
bargaining chip that gave Chickasaws, and Chickasaw headmen, considerable control of their
relationships with their agents. The Creeks suffered terribly in their defeat in the Red Stick War,
and lost 23 million acres of land, opening the way for increased migration of American settlers
into territory abutting Chickasaw country.109 The foundation of Mississippi and Alabama as
states in 1817 and 1819 respectively left the Chickasaws surrounded by a growing white
population and undermined their influence on agents in their country. New state governments
furthered their own agendas and handicapped Chickasaw political influence in the region. White
settlers, meanwhile, extended commercial crop production and ranching in present-day northern
Mississippi and western Alabama.
Instead of a man from the northern states, President James Madison replaced Robertson
with William Cocke on September 28, 1814. Born in Virginia in 1748, Cocke was one of the
founding members of the failed State of Franklin, one of the first two senators from the state of
Tennessee, a former circuit judge in the newly formed state of Tennessee, and served as a soldier
under Andrew Jackson in the Red Stick War. As a legislator, he counted Thomas Jefferson and
William Blount among his allies and he had acted in the interests of western frontier families
since the American Revolution. A man known for being “emotional, passionate, quick tempered,
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intolerant… he loved his friends and hated his enemies and quarreled with both.” 110 Cocke
resembled another Tennessee politician: Andrew Jackson. Appointed on September 28, 1814 and
assuming his post on December 9 of that year, Cocke oversaw the Chickasaw Agency in the
years after the Red Stick War and the War of 1812.
Despite their inability to manipulate the federal government into choosing an agent from
a northern state, perhaps no agent illustrates the influence of Chickasaw headmen on the position
of federal agent after the War of 1812 more than Cocke. As their agent, Cocke provided a
paradoxical illustration of both the qualities that Chickasaw headmen requested and those they
abhorred in agents. Cocke encouraged the economic changes occurring in the Chickasaw
economy by requesting that the number of blacksmiths be doubled or even tripled to create
“useful articles of husbandry, as many of them seem to incline [sic] to become farmers.”111 Yet
he also tried to dictate new rules to the Chickasaws, against which they chafed. In 1815, for
example, Cocke informed district headmen that they were now responsible for delivering the
annuities to their districts from the trade factory at Chickasaw Bluffs. District headmen balked at
this direction. Annuity distribution was the responsibility of the agent and Cocke did not
reimburse district headmen for the transport of the annuities. In addition, Cocke used his role in
licensing traders for his own purposes. The Trade and Intercourse Acts established that trading
licenses were issued, rescinded, and monitored by federal agents and superintendents living in
Indian country.112 For example, Mississippi Territorial Governor David Holmes forwarded James
Neelly forms for three new trader licenses in August 1811. These forms would then be registered
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with the name of the newly licensed trader in Chickasaw country.113 Trader licenses, however,
meant agents, rather than Chickasaws, controlled who influenced trade relationships in their
country as well as which white Americans could live in Chickasaw country.
When Cocke assumed the role of Chickasaw Agent, he had just completed a term as a
representative in Mississippi. 114 As Chickasaw agent, Cocke used trader licenses to gain
patronage and political influence from white Americans in the South. For example, in October
1815, Judge James Overton recommended a young Mr. Gilchrist to Cocke as a potential trader in
Chickasaw country, noting the agent’s “pleasure in encouraging merit in youth,” and interest in
supporting new American endeavors in Indian country.115 While it is unclear if Gilchrist received
a license, American traders meant more Chickasaw money and goods funneled out of their
country and a chance for federal leaders to indebt them. Cocke’s corruption also reared its head
when white Americans illegally settled on Chickasaw land. Even though he sent out notices for
squatters to remove and sent sub-agents to forcibly remove those who did not, Cocke was, in
fact, in favor of Americans squatting on Chickasaw land.116 Doing so, he argued, accelerated
land cessions, to the benefit of the United States and their burgeoning cotton production in the
South and much to the consternation of Chickasaw leaders. In 1816, Chickasaw leaders accused
Cocke of allowing squatters to remain because they were related to him by marriage, a clear case
of nepotism that concerned Chickasaw headmen as a loophole rife for exploitation by their agent
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and a prime example of why the Chickasaws desired an agent from a state further from their
country.117
Due to Cocke’s corruption, Chickasaw headmen were proactive and undermined his
influence, especially in trade. In January 1816, William and Levi Colbert notified Cocke that
Martin Colbert, the son of Levi Colbert, and John Pitchlynn, an elite Choctaw, planned to
operate as merchants in Chickasaw country.118 Essentially, the Colberts argued that all trade
going into Chickasaw country should go through them rather than American traders.119 While the
Colberts and Pitchlynn expected to profit from their trading venture, one of the primary benefits
they outlined in their letter to Cocke was the continued absence of alcohol in Chickasaw country.
Alcohol had been a continuous problem for Southeastern Indian leaders since its introduction in
the seventeenth century, and Indian leaders across the Native South, as well as elsewhere, they
had argued for its ban for almost 200 years at this point. The British and later Americans banned
the sale of it to Indians, but an unregulated, illegal market flourished throughout this time. The
letter by the Colberts specifically argued that unregulated trade with Americans would lead to
Chickasaw hunters and farmers selling their goods for alcohol and indebting the nation. The
Chickasaws previously outlawed alcohol sales in their nation because, as the Colberts noted, it
was the “means of many good men to loose [sic] their lives,” by overdrinking or killing one
another in a drunken state.120
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The letter co-written by William Colbert is tragic in and of itself due to his own personal
struggles with alcohol. William Mizle, a Chickasaw who operated a trading post near Holly
Springs, noted that William “was a great drinker and, [once] having run out of whiskey, walked
to Mizle’s post at the holly springs and bought seven kegs of whiskey; Colbert then started home
and, just after arriving there, drank the last of the seventh keg, having consumed three days upon
the trip.” At times, William’s alcoholism led to shirking responsibility in economic endeavors
that included defaulting on a partnership with American John Gordon for a ferry crossing on the
Duck River.121 As Chickasaw interpreter Malcolm McGee later recalled, William was “honest,
brave, & respected” but his drinking “lessened the respect entertained for him.”122 Clearly, the
primary issue that the Colberts were concerned about was not drunkenness per se, but the
subsequent violence and indebtedness of the Chickasaw nation to American traders and
government, especially to those traders who did not have Chickasaw interests in mind.123
The attempts by Chickasaw headmen to undermine agent influence and control trade in
their country complicated the four-year tenure of Cocke as agent. After two decades of
civilization programs, Trade and Intercourse Acts, and settler encroachment, Chickasaw
headmen were cognizant of what they desired from their agents and challenged them when they
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did not acquiesce to their demands. In the summer of 1816, for example, the Chickasaws sent a
deputation to Washington to note their “want of confidence” in Cocke.124 After the meeting,
Secretary of War William Crawford noted that the Chickasaws were invested in participating in
the new economy but were all “united in ascribing the little progress which had been made by
them in the arts of husbandry to their incapacity to obtain ploughs, and the other necessary
instruments and utensils,” a dearth of tools that the Chickasaws blamed on Cocke. 125 For these
headmen, Cocke failed to supplement Chickasaw economic changes and, therefore, failed their
tests of what they demanded of their agent.
Land cessions were also a mounting issue, one that headmen connected to ongoing
concerns with trade. Cocke’s tenure as agent, and his direct involvement in settler advancement,
represented a shift in American ideology towards the Chickasaws and the end of the Interior
South. Frontier expansion via the land forcefully taken from the Creeks during the Treaty of Fort
Jackson meant a collapsing buffer zone between the Interior South and the flood of new
American settlers and led to the first land cession by the Chickasaws in over a decade. In
summer 1816, federal negotiators General David Meriwether, Jesse Franklin, and Andrew
Jackson met with twenty-one Chickasaw leaders including Minko Chinubbee, Tishomingo
(O’Koy), and all four of the Colbert brothers at the home of George Colbert in present day
Tupelo, Mississippi. Signed on September 20, 1816, the treaty ceded approximately six million
acres of Chickasaw country to the United States.126
Because the negotiations were held at George Colbert’s house in the middle of
Chickasaw country, a significant portion of the citizenry were present throughout the
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negotiations. Federal negotiators mentioned that “much difficulty was encountered in negotiation
with the Chickasaws; the conference being held with the whole nation, every individual had to be
consulted; and the chiefs, together with the agent, seemed more anxious to maintain their
popularity than to promote the views of Government.”127 Similar to the 1805 treaty negotiations,
when Tishomingo (O’Koy) communicated the details of the treaty to the Chickasaw populace,
leaders were required to consider their input or endanger their authority at home. Ultimately,
however, despite these checks designed to forestall a coerced agreement, the Chickasaw
headmen buckled to American pressure and agreed to cede approximately six million acres of
their land in present-day western Tennessee and northern Alabama in exchange for a $12,000
annuity for the next ten years.128
The loss of land in the Treaty of 1816 was problematic for the Chickasaws and their
headmen, as more white Americans surrounded them. But Chickasaw leadership also won a
political and economic victory with the treaty. Article Seven of the finalized Treaty of 1816 read
that the “chiefs and warriors of the Chickasaw nation have found, from experience, that the
crowd of pedlars who are constantly traversing their nation from one end to the other is of a
serious disadvantage to the nation,” and that “serious misunderstandings and disputes frequently
take place.”129 The treaty reiterated, almost word for word, an editorial written by William and
James Colbert in the Nashville Whig, a month before they opened treaty negotiations with the
United States. In this letter, the Colberts noted the friendliness of their nation towards the
Americans but asserted that the “horde of straggling pedlars that have so long infested our
nation,” posed a danger to this peace. Private trades and speculators, the Colberts wrote, preyed
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upon the “ignorant and unwary of our nation,” leading to violence and indebtedness that the
Chickasaws hoped to avoid.130
Article Seven of the treaty disparaged American traders in Chickasaw country, but it also
stated that “no more licenses shall be granted by the agent of the Chickasaws to entitle any
person or persons to trade or traffic merchandise in said nation.”131 Chickasaw headmen, like
Tishomingo and the Colbert brothers, openly defied the position on trade that Cocke himself
espoused to the federal government and succeeded in subverting his power as agent. No longer
would trade in Chickasaw country be regulated by their Indian agent. Cocke responded almost
immediately to these new regulations. He argued that the power to regulate trade lay exclusively
with the United States’ Congress and accused James and William Colbert and their
“confederates, being desirous of engrossing all the trade of this nation, demanded that I should
drive all the traders trading under regular licenses out of the nation.” 132 After the Treaty of 1816,
however, Chickasaws themselves would conduct and control trade in their country, denying
power assumed by federal agents in Chickasaw country. Faced with the inevitability of a land
cession, Chickasaw headmen involved in the 1816 negotiations managed to acquire at least this
concession on trade.
By September of 1816, it is quite possible that Cocke had lost most, if not all, of his
influence in Chickasaw country. For example, Cocke stated that Tishomingo (O’Koy) and
Young Factor ignored his edicts to them on judicial and economic issues.133 On July 19, 1817,
James Colbert followed up on previous complaints to the Secretary of War and demanded the
removal of Cocke and asked him to send “another agent as soon as he should receive the
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declaration of our Nation to that effect.”134 He also accused Cocke of neglecting his duties as
their agent and of denying them the use of necessary tools for cloth-making such as cards,
spinning wheels, and looms constructed for them by blacksmiths at the Chickasaw Agency.135
Instead, Colbert insisted that Cocke used the blacksmith for his own benefit and profit,
entertaining and catering to American settlers and their horses when they stopped at the
Chickasaw Agency on the way to Natchez. While James Colbert penned the letter, all four
district leaders, Tishomingo (O’Koy), and Chinubbee signed or marked the letter, illustrating the
unified purpose of Chickasaw leadership.136 The Department of War responded to these demands
and Cocke was relieved of his position.137
For Chickasaw leadership, it is highly probable that they used Cocke as a scapegoat that
cemented their political authority to rank and file Chickasaws and the United States. Similar to
Mitchell after the Treaty of 1805, Cocke was relieved of his duties after treaty negotiations that
saw the cession of Chickasaw land to the United States. In addition, the complaints levied by
James Colbert and the national council about Cocke abusing agency material meant the United
States lost an authoritative voice in negotiations with the Chickasaws, and it gave the headmen

134

Chickasaw Nation, July 10, 1817, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Microcopy 271, roll 2, NARA.
Chickasaw Nation, July 10, 1817, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Microcopy 271, roll 2, NARA.
136
Chickasaw Nation, July 10, 1817, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Microcopy 271, roll 2, NARA.
137
Cocke’s letter on November 8, 1817, which he wrote prior to his removal, downplayed, his previously
contentious relationships with the Chickasaws, as well as an ongoing feud with Tishomingo (O’Koy) and James
Colbert. In particular, Cocke minimized the problems laid out by Colbert concerning his use of the blacksmith shop
by noting that the work the blacksmith did outside of creating tools for the Chickasaws was for farrier work on mail
carriers’ and agents’ horses. Cocke also did not address the ongoing tensions and frustrations that the Chickasaws
voiced to the Secretary of War, a questionable choice for a man who understood the influence the Chickasaws held
in retaining agents. Less than three weeks after Cocke wrote his letter on November 8, 1817, noting that the
Chickasaws were content and confident in his leadership, Calhoun appointed Henry Sherburne to replace him. The
federal government, again, in 1818 had reason to appease the Chickasaws when federal negotiators, including
Andrew Jackson, were in Nashville once again attempting to negotiate with the Chickasaws for land cessions.
Jackson noted the positive results of the Cocke firing from earlier in 1818, stating that the Chickasaws were “made
friendly disposed by the change of their agent,” which led to increased talks and eventually the Treaty of 1818
ceding large tracts of land in present-day Tennessee and western Kentucky to the United States. Andrew Jackson to
Secretary of War, December 1, 1817, ASPIA, 2: 172-173; Barnett, 178-79.
135

202

further precedent to press for Cocke’s eventual removal. In the end, Cocke’s loss of authority did
not stop the loss of millions of acres and the collapse of the Interior South. The Treaty of Fort
Jackson precipitated forced land cessions with the Creeks, Cherokees, and Chickasaws, which
left the Tennessee Valley and most of present-day Alabama open to American settlers. But the
shaky ground that Cocke occupied in Chickasaw country secured the Colberts and other elite
Chickasaws the means to secure trade rights for their country if nothing else.
Chickasaw demands to “manage their own trade” prompted Indian Superintendent
Thomas McKinney to move material from the Chickasaw Bluffs Trade Factory to the factory on
the Arkansas River in 1818 and close the Chickasaw Bluffs Factory in 1819.138 In the years after
the Treaty of 1816, Chickasaw agents complained about the new trade agreements. They argued
that these arrangements impinged on their power to direct change in Chickasaw country, and
they blamed the Colberts for blacklisting their efforts to choose traders. In 1822, then-Chickasaw
agent Robert Nicholas acted as if he spoke for an aggrieved Chickasaw nation when he relayed
to Secretary of War John C. Calhoun that Levi and Martin Colbert created “commercial
arrangements the welfare of this nation is ever made to give way,” and that “the Chiefs lean upon
[Levi and Martin] & suffer themselves to be lead” by them.139 After he was rebuffed by
Chickasaw headmen for further land cessions in 1827, federal negotiator John Coffee
complained about the “few half-breed, who enjoy the monopoly” of trade, griping that their
influence was for their benefit and not that of the Chickasaws. 140 But Coffee left empty-handed
from the negotiations, notably because of a “resolution of the chiefs that no person, except one of
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their own blood, shall offer for sale any merchandise within the limits of the nations,” which had
resulted in a lack of debt to Americans or American businesses that frustrated attempts to force
land cessions. 141 Over a decade after Colbert and Pitchlynn first proposed that Chickasaw
merchants, and not white Americans, controlled trade, it remained the law of the land.
After the dismissal of Cocke, Chickasaw headmen finally received the “agent from the
northern states” they requested in 1814. Hailing from Rhode Island, Henry Sherburne was
appointed in November 1817 and arrived at the agency on June 20, 1818. Sherburne was
apparently an agent the Chickasaws could support—Chickasaw leaders made no complaints
about abandonment, embezzling money, or mishandling annuities. Sherburne’s residency as
agent, however, lasted only twenty-nine months due to an illness that eventually forced him to
leave the position. When he left, Sherburne believed that the Chickasaws were “tranquil and
contented” with his residency and argued that the next agent should be a “prudent, discreet man,”
to retain Chickasaw friendship.142
Sherburne’s tenure as agent is representative of the problems prevalent with a constant
turnover of agents, even after the decline of the Interior South. After Sherburne fell ill early in
1820, he found it harder to conduct his role as agent throughout Chickasaw country. On April 3,
he wrote that, though his health had somewhat improved, it was “not so much as to warrant me
in going out of the house,” and he planned to leave the agency for medical care in Natchez once
the new sub-agent, William Vans, arrived in Chickasaw country.143 Vans, appointed as sub-agent
on December 22, 1819, had yet to arrive in Chickasaw country by early April, and this worried
Sherburne who stated that it was “absolutely necessary that some gentleman should soon be
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appointed to take care of the agency.”144 Fearful that Vans would not arrive before he left,
Sherburne appointed Chickasaw James Colbert as a proxy agent. Before Colbert could assume
the role of agent, however, Vans arrived and assumed the position of acting agent.145As
Chickasaw interpreter for most of the decade during and following the War of 1812, James
Colbert was intimately familiar with the Agency throughout Sherburne’s tenure. When he
appointed Colbert as proxy agent, Sherburne noted that Colbert was “well acquainted in the
nation, & very extensive connexions of great influence” and he concluded that he was a “very
suitable person for the business.”146
While James Colbert never officially assumed the role of agent, it is important to
consider how Colbert may have acted as agent. As a Chickasaw elite, Colbert’s political
authority and economic prospects remained tied to the Chickasaws rather than American
expansionary or civilizing plans. Because Sherburne was assigned to bed rest for months, it is
possible that Colbert already handled some of the duties of agent before Sherburne wrote his
note, similar to how McCoy and McGee managed the Agency after the death of Thomas Wright.
As interpreter, Colbert was familiar with the agency, the goals of the agents themselves, and their
roles in civilization policy and treaty negotiations. As a letter writer for Chickasaw headmen
during Cocke’s tenure, Colbert used this knowledge to present damning evidence to the
Secretary of War that Cocke did not fulfill his duties as their agent and asserted Chickasaw
agency over economic changes. If it were not for Van arriving mere weeks after Sherburne
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notified the federal government of the severity of his illness, Colbert would have served as proxy
agent, a symbol of Chickasaw influence in the changing American South.
After Sherburne, the War Department appointed Kentuckian Robert Nicholas, who
arrived in Chickasaw country on September 17, 1820. Nicholas frequently ran into problems
with the distribution of annuities and bumbled with civilization programs. As agent, he
encouraged sheepherding for the Chickasaws, a laborious form of animal husbandry with an
animal that did poorly in the hot and humid South; the experiment did not yield viable results.147
Late with annuity payments in 1821, Levi Colbert accused Nicholas of incompetence, and
Secretary of War Calhoun sent Choctaw sub-agent Eden Breshears to investigate.148 In his short
tenure, Sherburne misfiled $40,830.94 in funds and his financial mismanagement led to a delay
for the 1822 Chickasaw annuity until 1830.149 Due to his bungling, and the subsequent reports to
the War Department by Chickasaw headmen, the Secretary of War fired Nicholas in 1822, a
mere twenty-four months into his assignment as agent.150
Arriving at the agency on January 11, 1824, Benjamin Smith was the longest tenured
agent in Chickasaw country during the civilization plan, on the books as agent until December
16, 1829.151 Smith, although appointed at a time of waning Chickasaw power and influence with
the federal government, was not uniformly successful in asserting US authority. For example,
Smith actively invested in schools for the Chickasaws, but relented to Chickasaw control over
them. He established the Charity Hall mission school in his first year and the Caney Creek
Mission later in his tenure. By 1825, Superintendent of the Indian Affairs Thomas McKenney
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noted that the Chickasaws “have given one year’s annuity, accounting to upwards of thirty
thousand dollars,” towards a school system. With the Chickasaws committed to education, Stuart
was advanced $2,650 in 1826 for “erecting buildings for schools in the Chickasaw Nation.” 152
He also completed and extended the Monroe school complex and expanded to schools near
Tockshish and present-day Holly Springs.
Smith approved the construction of the schools, but he understood the power of
Chickasaw headmen in defining the curriculum and participants in their new schools, especially
as the majority of funds came from Chickasaw annuities. 153 Simply put, Chickasaw headmen
controlled the purse strings for these new schools and were not shy about defunding the school if
they found reason to do so. As historian Barbara Krauthamer argues, Chickasaws and missionary
school teachers did not clash over religious beliefs, but on beliefs about slavery which “did not
accord with the missionaries’ vision of a Christian society.”154 In 1824, Agent Benjamin Smith
visited the Monroe Mission, and noted the progress of Chickasaw education under Reverend
Thomas Stuart.155 Smith, however, cautioned the Monroe Mission School that their Sunday
School for slaves “may excite a feeling on the part of the Indians against the school that would
be injurious to the institutions.”156 Exerting their power and sovereignty in how they approached
civilization policies and who communicated them in their nation, Chickasaws removed students
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and bankrupted schools that did not align with their economic and cultural beliefs, forcing agents
and school administrators alike to cater to Chickasaw demands. 157
While Smith respected Chickasaw control of schools, he found other ways to alienate
Chickasaw headmen. Due to the old Agency house falling apart, Smith moved the Agency to the
south bank of the Tennessee River in present-day Colbert County, Alabama.158 The move of the
agency, and blacksmith shop with it, angered Chickasaws who viewed moving the Agency away
from the majority of Chickasaw settlements to a location closer to their territorial border with the
United States as an affront to their economic needs and their influence over the Agency itself.
Writing to President John Quincy Adams, Minko Ishtehotopa proclaimed they were now
“destitute” of an agent and blacksmith, limiting their control of new economic changes.159 The
move of the Agency and blacksmith shop so angered Ishtehotopa, Levi Colbert, and other
Chickasaw elites, that, three years later, when Superintendent of Indian Affairs Thomas
McKinney arrived in Chickasaw country in 1827 to discuss possible removal west, he actively
avoided Smith for fear it would ruin the talks.160 In 1828, Z.W. Smith, an elected member of the
Mississippi legislation, reported that Smith was not only “unpopular among the Indians but very
much disliked by them,” so much so that Smith sent a sub-agent, John Duncan, to deliver
annuities to the Chickasaws.161 Similar to Cocke in 1817, Smith lost significant influence within
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Chickasaw country and this threatened treaty negotiations as the United States invaded the
Interior South.
Smith underwent three investigations during his tenure at the agency, all three due to his
conflicts with Chickasaw headmen, but as testament to the Chickasaws waning influence in
Washington, he retained his position as agent, even as he slowly removed himself from the dayto-day activities.162 By 1828, Smith lost interest in his position at the agency, and instead, spent
an increasing amount of time on his plantation near Port Gibson. He also purchased $20,000
worth of land in Louisiana, and frequently spent three or four months away from the Chickasaws
tending to his new land.163 A year later, in 1829, Smith abandoned his position as agent
altogether, leaving the agency in the hands of sub-agent John Allen.164
Although Chickasaw influence with the US was declining at this time, agent turnover due
to other reasons during the 1820s allowed for some exertion of Chickasaw will. As discussed in
chapter four, Chickasaws intent on protecting their property used sub-agents as proxies in
American courts to sue for damages well into the 1820s and 1830s. Chickasaw leadership
successfully pressured agents and sub-agents well into the 1820s to prosecute squatters and
recover stolen Chickasaw property. Another example is that Levi Colbert expelled blacksmith
James Watkins from Chickasaw country in 1828.165 But Smith’s long tenure reflected the loss of
power by Chickasaw elites to undermine and supplant their agent.166
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The civilization plan in Chickasaw country illustrates the differentiation of power and
influence that federal Indian agents held in the Native South. Chickasaws attempted, many times
successfully, to mold the agents into tools for their own conceptions of economic, cultural, and
political change, especially in the first few decades of the civilization plan. In their fight to
maintain tribal sovereignty while undergoing economic change, Chickasaw headmen and elites
manipulated the constant turnover of federal agents in order to best suit their purposes. When
successful, Chickasaw headmen influenced the longevity and actions of agents in their midst,
accruing local power during the early national period that affected how they maintained their
sovereign identity. By the 1820s, however, Chickasaws were dealing with increased exterior
encroachment of their land as Americans continued their push to the interior of the continent. As
this chapter illustrates, the Chickasaws continued to act peacefully with Americans and
interacted with the federal government to address grievances. But with the admittance of more
western states to the union came increased racial ideologies of Southern Indians by white
Americans, a federal embrace of nationalist expansionism, and a growing call to forcefully
remove rather than integrate Southern Indian communities.
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CHAPTER 7
‘VERGING FAST TOWARDS THE STATE OF FARMERS’: CHICKASAWS AND
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE CIVILIZATION PLAN ERA
Joseph Bullen, a Presbyterian minister from the New York Missionary Society,
proselytized in Chickasaw country between 1799 and 1803. Bullen’s mission was to transform
Chickasaw cultural and spiritual practices through Christian conversion and Euro-American
education. Although, for the most part, Chickasaws ignored his ministerial work, they were
interested in learning about new economic opportunities. When Bullen first arrived, he noted that
the majority of Chickasaw men still hunted for the commercial deerskin trade, with the
agricultural labor “done by the women.”1 But Chickasaw elites, specifically George and Levi
Colbert, actively queried the missionary on ranching and commercial crops. They told Bullen
that they wished to “make corn, cotton, cattle, hogs” and to encourage other Chickasaws to
invest in the economic changes already ongoing in their communities.2 Frustrated with his
inability to win Christian converts, Bullen abandoned his mission after only a few years.3
Chickasaw economic change, however, continued.
This chapter examines the extent of Chickasaw economic changes in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth century through a detailed analysis of United States Department of Treasury
documents. These documents quantify the extent and successes of this economic transformation
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and provide explicit numbers for tools and goods that the civilization plan imported into
Chickasaw country. The records also detail the kinds of tools imported, the stipends for
American instructors employed at the Chickasaw Agency, the financing by the US to construct
new tools and educate Chickasaw men and women in skills such as weaving, spinning, and
plow-based agriculture, among other things. These records also reveal the slow pace of the
transition. Because of their pragmatic friendship with the US and their geographic location the
Chickasaws avoided for decades the exterior pressures faced by other Southern Indians such as
the Creeks and Cherokees. Rather, the Chickasaws had a twenty-year-plus window with
significantly less encroachment, border violence, or the steady presence of a strong agent in
which to make these transitions on their own terms. Finally, this chapter explores the use of
enslaved labor in Chickasaw country as a non-gendered labor source that underwrote the
economic expansions the Chickasaws underwent in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries.
Economic activities supported by the civilization plan were not wholly new. In fact, in
the colonial period Chickasaw families had incorporated some European cultigens and animals
into their subsistence practices long before the civilization plan. Hogs, peach and plum trees,
poultry, and horses were all incorporated in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.4
Husbandry, especially, was already a burgeoning part of new Southern Indian economic
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practices. In fact, Chickasaws were already renowned horsemen and women and bred the famous
Chickasaw horses, which were in demand across the South. In addition to horses, Chickasaw
men and women bred pigs and fowl, sometimes in great numbers. Ranching was well underway
throughout the Native South before the implementation of the civilization plan, and Indian men
and women were already eager participants. In Creek country, for example, Agent Benjamin
Hawkins noted in 1801 that ranching and the raising of stock “is more relished by the Creeks
than any part of the plan devised for their civilization. They are now eagerly acquiring cattle, by
every means in their power.”5
By the late eighteenth century, the Chickasaws, although still engaged in the commercial
deerskin trade, were taking more and more to ranching. Chickasaw country, as we have seen,
was perfect for ranching and husbandry. The Black Prairie, and the surrounding physiographic
regions, provided grasslands for large herds of Chickasaw horses, cattle, and hogs for the entirety
of the civilization plan. In the 1760s, for example, British traders James McIntosh and James
Colbert both maintained large settlements in Chickasaw country that included cattle and cotton.6
In 1790, less than a year after George Washington proposed the civilization plan to Congress,
and well before agents were commissioned for the Chickasaws, American Major John Doughty
traveled through Chickasaw country. Doughty noted that the men managed to attend to both
enterprises by seasonally alternating the tasks. He noted that many Chickasaw men “compleated
[sic] their Winters Hunt & returned” to their homes by April in order to attend their cattle and
horse herds.7 Doughty also reported that many families were now “settled over [their] country”
“A Sketch of the present state of the objects under the charge of the principal agent for Indian affairs South of the
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in order to raise stock.8 He further observed that the Chickasaws “do not depend entirely on
hunting. Of late years, they have done less than ever.”9 Instead, Doughty stated that the
“Chiccasaws [sic] appear to be verging fast towards the State of ffarmers [sic],” and that they
now “possess a great many Horses & some families have Negroes and Cattle.”10 Doughty
continued, that along with the cattle and horses, Chickasaw men and women raised “Hogs,
Poultry, Eggs,” and “disposed of large Quantities of Bear Oil for the Orleans Markett [sic].”11
Chickasaw men and women continued to expand their husbandry practices throughout the early
nineteenth century. During their forced removal to Indian Territory in 1837, Superintendent of
Chickasaw removal A.M. Upshaw noted that many Chickasaw families “have fine wagons and
teams,” with extensive horse and cattle herds that they “would about as soon as part with their
lives” as to part with their herds.12
As noted in Chapter Three, however, the deerskin trade lasted longer as a profitable
enterprise in Chickasaw country than elsewhere in the Native South because of Chickasaw
access to Quapaw hunting grounds across the Mississippi River. As late as 1797, then,
Chickasaw men still, according to one traveler, “were far in the woods in search of game.”13Even
as late as 1803, Chickasaw Agent Samuel Mitchell noted that men still went on hunts in the fall
and winter.14 Even so, by this time most Chickasaw men split their time as hunters and ranchers,
and they kept “skins, furs, gun, powder, tobacco, tomahawk,” but now also owned a “few
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implements of husbandry.”15 Free range animal husbandry often complimented the roles of
Chickasaw hunters rather than subvert them. In the American South, white Americans and
Southern Indians alike practiced free range grazing for their cattle, which often meant that the
only significant work occurred with driving cattle to market.16 By 1805, Dr. Rush Nutt noted that
Chickasaw men now blended the two economies, as they went on hunts during the fall and
winter and “attend to the farm & stock” in the summer.17
This gradual change is also reflected in Chickasaw purchases at the trade factories and
through the Indian agents. In 1803, for example, Agency expenditures show that Agent Mitchell
supplemented Chickasaw hunters with $209.12 worth of ammunition and rifles while he
simultaneously procured salt for cattle and other implements for husbandry.18 When Adam
Hodgson traveled through Chickasaw country in 1821 he noted that one house in which he
stayed was “hung with… rifles, shot-pouches, powder-horns, and deer, buffalo, and bear skins,”
all the while a “herd of cattle was coming up to be milked.” 19 Chickasaw families consumed the
meats from cattle and hogs, but mostly these herds were raised to sell. When Chickasaw families
settled near the Natchez Trace, for example, they developed a “large stock of cattle,” to sell at
market as well as to white American travelers and soon collectively owned thousands of cattle
that grazed freely over the northern Mississippi landscape.20
Once the civilization plan was introduced to the Chickasaws, their leaders expected the
US to fulfill its promise of federal assistance in their endeavors. In 1800, for example, O’Koy
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(Tishomingo) reminded the Secretary of War that “our first Father [George Washington] …
advised us to settle out and raise stock and become farmers,” implying that this transformation
was the result of federal encouragement, and that Washington told the Chickasaws he “would
give us assistance.”21 Another example of expected support was for travelers along the Natchez
Trace to purchase their foods and accommodations from Chickasaws. Many of these travelers
traversed the Natchez Trace with pockets of cash that the Chickasaws expected them to spend at
Chickasaw stands and inns.22 In a letter to the Secretary of War, O’Koy (Tishomingo) detailed
that the construction of stands for “our own people” north of the Tennessee River would “do
justice to travelers” on their way through Chickasaw country.23 O’Koy (Tishomingo) also
requested from the United States a plow for each of the new owners of stands in Chickasaw
country to “inable [sic] them to raise corn” for travelers. 24 By 1807, when American minister
Jacob Young passed through Chickasaw country, he was not only confronted by elite
Chickasaws who owned stands along the Natchez Trace, he also noted that almost every
Chickasaw they passed on the Natchez Trace “had something to sell.”25 Chickasaw men, Young
noted, even defined their demands through the lens of their pragmatic peace with the United
States. Upon sale, Young noted that they often stated “’We Chickasaw, we friend white man,
give me two bits.’”26 Young may have exaggerated the terms that the Chickasaw men outlined
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for their sales, but it is of note that even rank-and-file Chickasaws used their long-standing peace
with the United States for their economic gain.
Another way that Chickasaws near the Natchez Trace profited from American travelers
was through the sale of alcohol. Understanding the deleterious effects of alcohol on their people,
Chickasaw leaders, like Indian leaders across the Native South, early on demanded that
American traders refrain from liquor trade.27 Chickasaws who owned stands, inns, and ferries on
the Natchez Trace, however, requested alcohol for their places of business, ostensibly for sales to
Euro-American travelers. The Natchez Trace was an artery for American settlers to travel west
and reach the nascent cotton plantations near Natchez, Mississippi, but it was also an avenue for
American merchants to travel back east. Prior to invention of the steam engine by Samuel Fulton
in 1807, travel up the Mississippi River was a treacherous and time-consuming venture.28 Often,
merchants and farmers who traveled to New Orleans to sell their goods at market traveled the
Mississippi River on flatbed rafts which they then sold as surplus in New Orleans or Natchez.
They then traveled on foot up the Natchez Trace with pockets of cash that they spent at
Chickasaw stands and inns.29 In 1803, Agent Mitchell reported that many Chickasaws who had
recently relocated to the Natchez Trace “generally keep spirits,” that they sold to white
Americans.30 Chickasaw headmen pointed out that stand owners, and others on the Natchez
Trace, used the sale of alcohol in order to secure from white American travelers the “money to
buy salt” that they needed for cattle and horse herds. 31
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When Tisho Minko George Colbert negotiated for the Natchez Trace through Chickasaw
country in 1801, it was with the intention that Chickasaws, and especially his own family, were
to profit from the road.32 George Colbert and his brothers William, Levi, and James, were
wealthy Chickasaw elites who inherited property from their father, English trader James Logan
Colbert, and they were favorably inclined toward America.33 Southern Indian families of mixed
descent were typically receptive to civilization policies and promoted them in their towns, and
the Colberts were no exception.34 They also were in a position to exploit the needs and goals of
the United States to their own profit. One of the stipulations for the 1801 Treaty that George
Colbert signed with the United States to establish the Natchez Trace, for example, was a ferry
system on the Tennessee River owned and operated by him. George’s brothers, James and Levi,
owned inns along the Natchez Trace that they often intermixed with other economic ventures.35
When Adam Hodgson traveled on the Natchez Trace, for example, he noted that Levi “kept a
stand” but also had a “cow-pen with several hundred head of cattle” nearby that often fed his
patrons.36
In 1804 the Colberts used federal funding to subsidize the cost of two new ferry boats for
the “crossing of the Tennessee Natchez Road,” as well as the sum of $432 for the “passage of the
Tennessee Volunteers,” for a military expedition “to and from Natches [sic] in the years 1803-

“Minutes of a conference at Chickasaw Bluffs,” October 21-24, 1801, ASPIA, 1:651-652.
For more concerning the Colberts and their kinship connections to both the larger global economy and their roles
as Chickasaw headmen and leaders, see Natalie Inman, Brothers and Friends: Kinship in Early America (Athens:
University of Georgia, 2017) and Theda Perdue, "Mixed Blood" Indians: Racial Construction in the Early
South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2003), 33-69.
34
For more on Southern Indians with European heritage and their involvement in the Southern economy, see
Perdue, “Mixed Blood” Indians, 33-69.
35
Dawson A. Phelps, "Colbert Ferry and Selected Documents," Alabama Historical Quarterly 25, no. 3/4 (1963):
206-216; Dawson A. Phelps, "Stands and Travel Accommodations on the Natchez Trace," Journal of Mississippi
History 11, no. 1 (1949), 39-46.
36
Hodgson, Remarks, 282.
32
33

218

4.”37 In 1807, Reverend Young stated that George Colbert was a “very shrewd, talented man”
and that they were “considerably entertained with his… witticism.” Colbert and his brothers sold
Young and his party corn, pumpkins, and other food “for which he charged a very high price.” 38
Traveling through Chickasaw country on the Natchez Trace in 1811, Mexican Revolutionary
Jose Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara labeled Colbert a “rich Indian” whose “house looks like a
country palace with its abundance of glass in doors and windows.”39 The ferry itself, le Baras
noted, employed “two ferry-boats (chalanes) which ply on this great river” and that Colbert
himself “makes a great deal of money” operating the ferry.40
In addition to entrepreneurial activities and ranching, the civilization plan also called for
the Chickasaws to begin growing commercial crops, especially cotton. The Black Prairie, with its
fertile soils, is good agricultural lands as well as ranch lands, and the Chickasaws had been
farming it for almost 200 years by the turn of the nineteenth century. Their agriculture was
swidden agriculture, and their main crops were corns, beans, and squash, although by the
nineteenth century they had also adopted several Old World cultigens such as cow peas, sweet
potatoes, and even rice. Now they also experimented with raising cotton. Even so, because EuroAmerican plows were so unwieldy, difficult, and harmful to draft animals, Chickasaw farmers
were not keen on them, at least in the first few decades. At a conference in Nashville in 1792, for
example, Chickasaw headman Piomingo told the commissioners that Chickasaw families “want a
great many axes and hoes, but not so many ploughs.”41 In 1801, the Department of War sent
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Chickasaw headmen Wolf’s Friend, William Colbert, and George Colbert ten weeding hoes and
ten axes, but only four plows. 42 At the 1801 treaty negotiations for the Natchez Trace, the United
States gave as gifts thirty-six hoes and thirty-six axes to the Chickasaws in attendance, but no
plows.43
That same year, Chickasaw leaders informed federal agents that “we shall want canoes to
carry [crops] to market, and adzes are necessary to build them,” which indicated that they were
not only planting new crops, but that they intended to sell their produce in the larger commercial
market.44 Chickasaw headmen told the Secretary of War that they expected “that we shall be
furnished” with the goods needed to plant and produce cotton for market.45 In 1803, Chickasaw
planters secured $46.13 worth of cotton seeds from Choctaw Agent John McKee, and in 1805,
Agent Mitchell reported that “great preparation is making [sic] to plant cotton this season.”46
Similar to their requests in 1801, the Chickasaws expected Mitchell to assist them in their new
economic practices.47 In 1804, hundreds of dollars’ worth of tools and “sundry elements of
husbandry” were furnished for the Chickasaws. 48 In this delivery, there were three-hundred hoes,
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one hundred-fifty small axes, and fifteen-hundred pounds of bar iron for use to construct
spinning wheels.49
Certainly, the civilization plan called for the sale of cotton on the market, but it also saw
cotton production as integral to the cottage industry of cloth production. The idea was for Indian
women to produce homespun cloth, thereby weaning the Indians off of manufactured cloth they
purchased on the market. Making homespun cloth required training as well as spinning wheels,
looms, cotton cards, and other tools that the Indians did not have or construct themselves.
Southern Indian women had been making beautiful cloth for centuries, but it was a laborious and
tedious task, which is one reason why cloth was always an important trade item from its first
appearance in the trade houses in the seventeenth century. Once available, Indian women
welcomed the new techniques and tools of cloth production. Benjamin Hawkins in 1801 bragged
that he had delivered “one hundred pair cotton cards, and eighty spinning wheels” to the
Creeks.50 That same year, Chickasaw Agent Mitchell reported that he had spent $847.73 for the
“pay of weavers” as well as the purchases of “wheels, cards, plows, looms to the end of the year
1802.51 Mitchell also reported that he paid for the construction of 36 cotton spinning wheels at
the Agency in 1802 and that the wheels were “used by the Indians to great advantage.”52 By
August of 1803, Mitchell paid for the construction of fifty more sets of irons for cotton wheels
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by blacksmith William Perry and in November, he paid Ezekial Hide for the construction of fifty
cotton wheels, but the Chickasaws asked for even more.53
O’Koy (Tishomingo) acknowledged the receipt of the cotton cards, spinning wheels, and
other tools, but that the amount Mitchell procured in 1802 and 1803 was “not enough.”54 Due to
this criticism, Mitchell personally traveled to Nashville in the winter of 1803 to purchase fifty
cotton cards and a half dozen plows as well as new axes to clear fields and imported another six
dozen cotton cards in the summer of 1804.55 By 1805, the Chickasaw Agency began to import
cloth-making tools in even greater numbers. In that year, another 100 cotton wheels were made
available for Chickasaw women for spinning cloth, and Mitchell set aside $947.50 to purchase an
additional “quantity of spinning wheels, wheel irons, & stocking ploughs.”56
The Chickasaws also managed to procure a cotton gin in Chickasaw country, albeit by
way of the Choctaws. Choctaw leadership requested a gin be erected in their country in 1800, but
in 1801, Choctaw Robert McClure stated that the gin he requested, and that the Department of
War agreed to fund and build, was “refused by our Chiefs.”57 Choctaw Agent John McKee,
however, had already procured the $400 for the gin so it was built in Chickasaw country instead.
Located near present-day Amory, Mississippi, on the Tombigbee River, the Chickasaws used the
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gin to ready cotton for market until 1811 when a group of Choctaws burned it down.58 The
Department of War later compensated the Chickasaws a sum of $1,000, a 250% increase over
the previous investment to erect the gin.59
Cloth making also gave Chickasaw women new avenues of wage labor. As agent,
Mitchell hired Chickasaw women as employees: he commissioned one woman to weave “one
month in a remote part of the nation, as she has a loom of her own and geer [sic] and understands
the business,” and retained more Chickasaw weavers to instruct other Chickasaw women who
“appear anxious to be taught that art.”60 By 1803, Chickasaw women produced hundreds of yards
of cotton, enough to clothe their families and transitioned to produce cotton cloth for sale.61
Although most of this homespun cloth was intended for personal use, any surplus of cotton and
cloth now opened a new avenue into the market, especially for women. Dr. Nutt noted that
Chickasaw women were putting these tools to good use and made cloth with a “perfect & skillful
use of the needle and shaves,” wove more than 3,000 yards in 1805 alone, made their own
clothes “remarkably well” and that the Chickasaw dress “much tidier & better put on than
common white people.”62
The agents and the Chickasaw Agency, especially after 1801, were central to cloth
making, cotton production, and most everything connected to the new economy because the
Agency was the funnel through which instructions and tools for ongoing economic changes came
into Chickasaw country. For example, Chickasaws had previously requested three or four
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American weavers move to their country in the 1790s and stated they would give them “corn
meat, and cows to give them milk & treat them kindly.”63 After the creation of the Chickasaw
Agency, trained American blacksmiths, weavers, and wheelwrights maintained a constant
presence in Chickasaw country throughout the era of the civilization plan. Two weaving
instructors, Andrew Watson and Thomas McCoy, began their employment in Chickasaw country
in 1804 and remained employed at the Agency until at least 1814.64 Beginning in 1814, Thomas
Cheadles performed duties as the Agency’s wheelwright, per President James Monroe’s request,
but he was not alone.65 Both John Bynum and John Sphar also produced agricultural tools for the
Chickasaws throughout the civilization plan. For the first two decades of the plan, the Agency
normally employed at least two blacksmiths in Chickasaw country. For example, John Moore,
James Watkins, and James Osburn, were all employed by the Agency as blacksmiths from 1814
until at least 1824. The Agency also employed at least two Americans as blowers and strikers to
assist three blacksmiths, with Andrew Lynch and Levi Thomas beginning their work at the
Agency in 1821 and continuing into the late 1820s, and Chickasaw slaveholders often rented
enslaved black men to assist the blacksmith.
The records of the Chickasaw Agency provide a detailed outline of how the Chickasaws
integrated themselves into the new Southern economy, what they endorsed, and illustrates their
gradual adoption of new economic tools and opportunities. The expenditures, begun by Mitchell
in 1801, continued with the tenure of Thomas Wright. In the third quarter of 1806, for example,
Wright spent $962 on civilization programs, notably, pay for weavers “instructing the natives,”
making and repairing looms, cotton cards, and for “conveying blacksmith tools and iron” from
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the trade factory at Chickasaw Bluffs to the Agency.66 The importation of iron and steel begun
by Wright accelerated after his tenure as agent. For example, James Neelly purchased 1,912
pounds of iron on May 17, 1810.67 A year later, Neelly reimbursed George Colbert on December
23, 1811 for the transport of another 723 pounds of iron to the Agency for use at the
blacksmith.68 In 1812, Chickasaw Agent James Robertson signed off on a shipment of 2,000
pounds of iron “for the purpose of making farming utensils for the use of the Indians with a view
to stimulate them to industry.”69 Between 1804 and 1826, the Agency recorded a total of at least
15,000 pounds of iron and steel had made its way into Chickasaw country, most of which
became tools for the new commercial agricultural enterprise.70
Federal agents employed blacksmiths and craftsmen to turn the imported iron and steel
into plows, looms, and spinning wheels. By the second decade of the nineteenth century,
Chickasaw farmers were reconsidering the plow, and tools produced and imported to the
Chickasaws included a majority of plows rather than hoes. For example, John Sphar was
reimbursed on April 1, 1810 for constructing a loom and repairing other tools, while John Moore
was paid $31 for “repairing sundry plows, axes, etc. for Chickasaw Indians” in March 1810.71
On July 27, 1812, Sphar was paid for making thirty plows, one hundred and six cotton spinning
wheels, and four looms in the previous three months, a significant difference in tools compared
to the first decade of the civilization plan where Chickasaw headmen prioritized hoes and axes.72
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Chickasaw agents were hard pressed to keep up with the demand for new tools by the
Chickasaws. In 1813, Thomas Cheadle replaced Sphar as the primary craftsman for the
Chickasaws and furnished the Agency with at least 146 plows, 73 spinning wheels, and five
looms from 1813-1815, but he soon was overwhelmed with production demands.73 By 1815,
James Robertson contracted Godfrey Jones to construct 160 spinning wheels over the next three
years and to assist Cheadle in stocking plows and “doing the repair of wheels and plows”
brought in by Chickasaw farmers and weavers.74 As agent, William Cocke hired out and
employed James Davis to stock ten plows and serve as a blacksmith in July 1816.75 At times,
agents simply imported plows and plow molds in order to keep up with demand. Robert Nicholas
received twenty-nine plow molds from Winchester & Carr on November 9, 1821, while
Benjamin Smith purchased thirty plow molds and 1,154 pounds of iron in February 1824 and
another five plow molds in June 1825.76 Men employed by the Agency, like Jones, Cheadle,
Davis, and Sphar are often compensated in the treasury records for simply “stocking plows and
making wheels for the Chickasaws,” without specific numbers attached.77 But the amounts that
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are recorded along with the significant amount of iron and steel imported to Chickasaw country
implies that their work was a significant help to Chickasaw families as they transitioned to the
new Southern economy.
Records from the Chickasaw Agency also indicate that rank-and-file Chickasaws, and not
only elite Chickasaws, were invested in new economic opportunities. Receipts from the Agency
from 1801-1830 note a significant number of agricultural products imported into Chickasaw
country for use in farming—more than could have been used by elite Chickasaw families alone,
suggesting that non-elites also pursued new economic endeavors. In three shipments of plows in
1816 and 1817, for example, manufacturer Thomas Cheadle specifically named over forty
individual Chickasaw men for whom he made plows.78 As one traveler argued in 1821, the
Chickasaws are “most solicitous for civilization,” with “many of them growing cotton” with the
help of plows built at the Agency.79
While men gradually adopted farming, Chickasaw women persisted as agriculturalists,
even as they experimented with new economic practices, like spinning and weaving. In the first
two decades of the civilization plan, Agency records note the hundreds of cotton wheels and
dozens of looms built for the Chickasaws, but they also mention plows built specifically for
women. In 1816, for example, Thomas Cheadle recorded plows built specifically for Betsy
Dunford and a Mrs. Glover, who was most likely the wife of Chickasaw headman William
Glover.80 In a letter to President James Monroe in 1817, Chickasaw headman James Colbert
noted that “our women last season made a very good Crop of cotton,” attributing the success of
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Chickasaw commercial crops to women rather than men.81 Colbert went on to complain that due
to issues with Chickasaw Agent William Cocke, Chickasaw women “cannot get cards, nor
wheels to spin it to make cloathing [sic],” and condemned Cocke for impeding Chickasaw
pursuit of new economic developments.82 Like men hunting at the same time as they farmed and
ranched, Colbert’s comments illustrate that Chickasaw women participated in a gradual
transition of their economic roles.
While the Agency promoted husbandry and agriculture, Chickasaw men and women also
learned trades. Often, Chickasaws apprenticed themselves to learn new skills. Chickasaw
headmen stated that they wanted “our women to learn to make our Cloathing [sic]” and
requested that agents educate rank-and-file women on how to weave and spin cotton.83 In 1803,
Mitchell also proposed that some young Chickasaw men apprentice with weavers, blacksmiths,
strikers, and craftsmen so that they “may in time become service to themselves and to their
nation.”84 As Mississippi governor, W.C.C. Claiborne agreed that it would be a “prudent
measure to place a few active Indian Lads with the Wheel-Maker.”85 Claiborne also agreed with
the Chickasaw request and insisted that Mitchell “induce a few young Indian Girls to pass some
time with the Weaver, and he would undertake to teach them” the craft.86 Interpreter Malcolm
McGee later recalled skills learned by Chickasaws throughout the civilization plan, and noted
that one Chickasaw man studied a loom crafted by employees at the Agency and “went & made
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one himself, & wove a good article of cloth before anyone else was aware of it.”87 By 1819,
Chickasaw craftsmen were now employed at the Agency as skilled workers. In that year, Agent
Henry Sherburne reported that a Chickasaw man was hired to build one plow and repair two
more, while Benjamin Smith hired a man known as Tookpulca to build a kitchen at the new
Chickasaw council house in 1822.88
Chickasaws were also employed in short term work as express mail riders, cooks, and
other odd jobs around the Agency. Agents kept avenues of communication open throughout the
Interior South and hired rank-and-file Chickasaws as riders to deliver mail, messages, and other
communiques. For example, Robert Nicholas employed Ushartubby, Warperstchee, and
Christainay in June and August of 1822 to travel to and from the post office in Columbus,
Mississippi.89 Similarly, Agent Benjamin Smith paid Chickasaw men Oaklanhhinlah and
Tushoyatubby on June 26, 1824 for “services as an express rider,” paying the men between $5
and $9 for each trip.90 This short-term work provided rank-and-file Chickasaw men cash that
they funneled into projects at home as well as small luxuries, like coffee, sugar, and imported
cloth.
Two decades into the civilization plan, Chickasaw families, both elites and rank-and-file,
sold crops and livestock at markets and sometimes in large quantities. At treaty negotiations and
annuity distributions, the Agency was usually responsible for purchasing corn, beef, and salt to
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feed Chickasaw families in attendance, most of which was imported. By 1815, however, the vast
majority of corn and beef were sold by Chickasaws themselves to the Agency. When Agent
Cocke convened a national council for the Chickasaws in May 1815, George Colbert supplied
the attendees with 1,267 pounds of beef, thirty-five bushels of corn, and two gallons of salt for
which he was paid $124.68.91 For the 1819 annuity, Chickasaw district headman Emubbee
provided 22 bushels of corn, while Sherwahay sold the Agency 5,858 pounds of beef to feed the
assembled Chickasaws.92 The next year, Thomas Chico and James Colbert secured contracts for
corn and beef for the assembled Chickasaws and Chico was paid $248.12 for 6,203 pounds of
beef furnished for the “annuity payment conference.”93 Clearly, by this time many Chickasaws,
especially the elites, were thriving in this new Southern economy.
Throughout the civilization plan, it is important to identify how Chickasaw men and
women asserted agency over changes in their country, but it is also important to note how
specific social, political, and cultural structures persisted. Previously, I have argued the
continued importance of town-based structures after families settled out for economic reasons.
Similarly, political and judicial structures persisted even with the need to incorporate the United
States, federal agents, and roles on theft and murder into their interactions with the outside
world.
One item that some consider frivolous is also an important identity marker—social
scientists have long recognized the importance of dress in establishing social inclusion and social
exclusion and distance of a group. One can, then, use Chickasaw dress during the era of the
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civilization plan as cultural signifiers that illustrate the extent of the so-called transformative
effects of the civilization plan. Chickasaws drew critiques from federal agents, American
travelers, and even early historians in the manner that they appropriated funds when it came to
dress and fashion, many of whom considered their fashion choices wasteful. In 1799, Reverend
Bullen noted that “Chickasaw men are very effeminate and dressy,” and noted the use of
handkerchiefs, silver bands, and the incorporation of calico shirts.94 When visiting the trade
factory at Chickasaw Bluffs, Chickasaw men were also depicted as dressing “fantastically,” with
one identified as painted “in such a manner as to leave us in doubt as to his sex until we noticed a
bow and arrow in his hand.” For the fifty or so Chickasaw men described, all wore gorgets,
earrings, and ornamented leggings.95 Fifteen years later, this remained the case, as traveler Adam
Hodgson remarked on the “magnificence” of their clothing and that it “exceeded any thing [sic]
that we had yet to see; and the profusion of silver ornaments was far greater than among the
Choctaws.”96 In 1826, Agent Benjamin Smith noted to Thomas McKenney that Chickasaws
often ridiculed and insulted any others who adopted American manners of dress and that they
were “forced to abandon them or subject himself to frequent insult and his influence among them
completely destroyed.”97
Although criticized for what white Americans considered an over-attentive attitude
toward dress, this interest apparently did not interfere with other daily activities. Adam Hodgson
noted that the Chickasaws spent more of their savings and annuity on dress and “ornaments”
compared to the Choctaws, but he also pointed out that their fields and cattle herds were still
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maintained, and they did not neglect “agricultural or pastoral labours [sic].”98Chickasaws
identified how they planned to accept the civilization plan and happily differentiated themselves
from Americans as well as other Southern Indians, an identity that was uniquely Chickasaw. As
historian David Nichols notes, the Chickasaws were not interested in the stages of civilization
that the federal agents sought to guide them through, nor were they interested in measuring up to
Southern Americans living around them. Rather, their ultimate goal was to “remain Chickasaw,”
and clothing remained a tether to that identity.99
American officials also hoped that commercial crop production, cottage industries such
as cloth making, and ranching would promote changes in gendered labor roles and transform
Chickasaw families into nucleated American families where men farmed and women worked
domestically. These long-term structures, however, did not appreciably change. In 1811, federal
negotiators reported that the Chickasaws had “rent the shackles of prejudice” and now cast “their
eyes to the earth for sustenance and for comforts.”100 They went on to note that they believed the
Chickasaws would encourage the Choctaws to do the same and noted, in an apt comparison to
the Chickasaws, that a “very few [Choctaw] families have commenced the culture of cotton.” 101
In a letter to Agent Mitchell, Governor Claiborne praised his efforts to continue to “excite the
Chickasaw Men to agricultural pursuits.”102 But Claiborne also reminded Mitchell to be “equally
Zealous in encouraging a spirit of Domestic Economy among the women… that you should
continue to supply them with wheels and Cards and also retain in your employ a weaver.”103
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Prior to the civilization plan, Chickasaw men and women held complimentary, but
dichotomous, economic labor roles.104 Women's roles pivoted around the domestic sphere and
matrilines. They were responsible for the farming, and they maintained and farmed matrilineal
communal fields intermixing corn, squash, and beans. Other tasks involved gathering firewood,
cooking, maintaining the household, child rearing, and so on. In 1771, Bernard Romans wrote
that Chickasaw women “labour vastly hard, either in their field for cultivation of corn, or
fetching nuts, firewood and water…their burdens would amaze a stranger, being rather fit for
asses than women to carry.”105 Despite the arduous work, Chickasaw women enjoyed
considerable economic autonomy and influence—they owned the produce of their labors such as
the agricultural crops, they held decision-making power in all domestic affairs, and informal
power in public affairs through their matrilineal kinsmen. 106
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Chickasaw men, like most Southern Indian
men, participated in the larger global economy through the deerskin trade. Chickasaw hunters
participated in this market as producers of raw goods that they then sold to European and EuroAmerican traders.107 And Chickasaw men were excellent hunters. Romans stated that Chickasaw
hunters are the “most expert of any perhaps in America in tracking what they are in pursuit of,”
and that they would follow their quarry “on a long gallop over any kind of ground without
mistaking.”108 Chickasaw men hunted in parties throughout the fall and winter for deer while
Chickasaw boys often hunted wild turkey, squirrels, and other small game with blowguns near or
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around their townships until they were old enough to go on extended hunts.109 Other male duties
included those most associated with the public spheres such as maintenance of public building
like the square grounds and council houses, military affairs, diplomatic affairs, and so on.
In the gendered division of Chickasaw labor, men typically participated in agricultural
roles only when clearing new fields; but by 1803, Mitchell noted that some Chickasaw men
“remained at home” rather than hunt and made “preparation for enlarging their farms.”110 In
1805, Dr. Nutt noted that some Chickasaw men now “labour in the field” rather than go on
hunts.111 Headmen like Wolf’s Friend, O’Koy (Tishomingo), Appassantubby, Ishtehotopa, and
Samuel Sealey all participated in farming and ranching, acting as examples for fellow Chickasaw
men. Chickasaw interpreter Malcolm McGee noted that Minko Ishtehotopa plowed his lands
alongside his slave and hired hands, which indicates that some headmen did not always avoid
agricultural work previously considered feminine, but actively participated in farming.112
Even as labor roles evolved due to such economic changes, deep cultural structures
persisted. Polygamy and matrilineality still defined family life and kinship ties. Chickasaw men,
even ones viewed as “acculturated” like Levi Colbert, did not adopt white American monogamy,
sometimes marrying multiple women and fathering dozens of children in multiple households.
Former Chickasaw interpreter Malcom McGee, for example, recalled one Chickasaw elite who
“had seven [wives] & all lived in separate lodges” and that he “alternated his time with them.113
In Chickasaw Removal, historian Daniel Littlefield has illustrated through his analysis of
removal land surveys in Chickasaw country that, although some Chickasaw elite men managed
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large plantations and ranches, they maintained a distance between them and their wives’
domiciles as matrilineal kinship patterns and women’s control of the household persisted. 114 For
women and men, many cultural and social identities persisted even as economic roles changed.
Men participated in agriculture, yet women still farmed and maintained control over the
household.115 Polygamy and matrilineality still structured family life and kinship ties. When
assigning land sections in Indian Territory to the Chickasaws in 1832 and 1834, for example,
John Coffee and other federal negotiators assumed a nucleated household of one man and one
woman that frustrated the majority of the Chickasaw delegation.116 Both Chickasaw headmen
and United States officials expected that heads of household would receive the assigned familial
allotments, but their conceptions of families differed, and Chickasaws still assigned women as
leaders of domestic and familial issues.
One famous example illustrates the persistence of matrilines. After the forced removal of
the majority of the Chickasaws to Indian Territory in 1837, Chickasaw Betsy Love, who
remained in Mississippi, lost her slave Toney due to a Mississippi state court ruling on a debt her
husband, James Allen, owed to John Fisher. 117 This ruling, however, was overturned as
Chickasaw matrimonial property laws presented a precedent for a wife to maintain property
ownership outside of her husband’s legal grasp. In 1839, Congress passed the Married Women’s
Property Act, permitting married white American women to own property separate from their
husband’s property. The act itself was “too innovative” if not for the precedent set by the Fisher
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vs. Allen case.118 Even after transformative changes to their settlement patterns and economy,
Chickasaw women maintained their right to personal property outside of their husbands, the
matrilines remained intact as well as their right to pass their property on to their children, nieces,
or nephews without the permission of their husbands.
The financing of the civilization plan came from treaty settlements and the annuities from
land sales paid to Indian nations by the federal government. At the onset of the civilization plan,
the federal government established Trade and Intercourse acts that set aside $15,000-20,000 a
year to “promote civilization among friendly tribes.”119 These funds were often disproportionally
distributed to Southern Indian communities, who used them for “spinning-wheels, looms,
implements of husbandry, &c.”120 The majority of federal assistance for Southern Indian
economic change, however, came via annuities. As discussed in Chapter Four, annuities often
went hand in hand with treaties that dispossessed Indian communities of their land, a constant
reminder that the real goal of the civilization plan was the orderly acquisition of Indian land. 121
These yearly stipends administered by the United States in exchange for land cessions were used
for new economic tools, education, animals, and the employment of craftsmen and blacksmiths.
For instance, In 1816, the governor of Mississippi Territory, David Holmes, asked Agent
Cocke about the employment of more “mechanics,” blacksmiths, and weavers in Chickasaw
country.122 Specifically, Holmes wondered if the Chickasaws would “be satisfied to have any
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part of what they annually receive from the United States applied to the support of these
establishments.”123 Holmes’ proposal seems to have been approved by the Chickasaws. In 1821,
then Chickasaw Agent Robert Nicholas paid for at least seven blacksmiths and blacksmith
assistants: Jacob Gholston, George Fraser, McLish, Moore, James Watkins, Andrew Lynch, and
“Molly Fraser’s Slave.”124 This constituted a massive investment by the Chickasaws for the
production of new goods at the Agency’s blacksmith shop.
Although much of the accoutrements of the civilization plan were financed by Chickasaw
annuities, annuity payments also provided Chickasaw families with something that many
Southern white yeoman farmers lacked: a small amount of cash to spend in the expanding market
economy, a means for rank-and-file Chickasaws to define their new economic lifestyles. For the
Chickasaws, the lack of violence on the frontier meant very little of their annuity went to settling
debts and thefts with Americans, and instead went to supporting their economic endeavors.
Chickasaws were also cognizant of American banking and monetary systems and understood the
value of their currency. For example, in 1821, Chickasaw leaders rejected the paper banknotes of
the Bank of Huntsville for their annuities, possibly due to inflationary concerns, and demanded
hard currency from a branch of the Second Bank of the United States.125 After this refusal,
Chickasaw annuities were shipped in as United States specie, providing hard currency for
individual Chickasaw families.
The refusal of the Bank of Huntsville notes illustrates the knowledge of the American
financial system some Chickasaw elites held, but it also illustrates a remarkably savvy way to
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squeeze more profits and cash from the United States. Agents were forced to provide hard specie
for the Chickasaws. The cash for the annuity often weighed over 2,000 pounds. These monies
were housed in New Orleans and required wagons rented from Chickasaws or white Americans
at the Agency.126 For the trip to Chickasaw country, agents hired guards for the annuity, and
these guards were often Chickasaw warriors. In 1824 for example, Agent Benjamin Smith paid
$0.75 per day for twelve days to Emubbee, Moolarsubby, Ninarcasubby, Shayna, Jerry Sealy,
Ihunartubby, Ohayacubba, Harhetcha, Astarchubby, Immubby, and Oaklaruntubby to guard and
transport the annuity for the Chickasaws.127 These men also received another $105 as they rented
packhorses to the Agency to transport the annuity.128
With the cash annuities and other profits from their new economy, some Chickasaw
families purchased enslaved black men and women. Slave owning was not new to the
Chickasaws, or any Southern Indians. Even in the pre-colonial era, there is good evidence for
Indians enslaving other Indians. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the
Chickasaws contributed to the Indian slave trade as slave catchers, transforming war captives
into commodities that they sold to English merchants. 129 A hundred years later, as they embraced
economic change, the Chickasaws adopted American ideas of chattel slavery and incorporated
enslaved black men and women into their new economy. In the mid-eighteenth century, British
traders in Chickasaw country often owned some enslaved peoples. These British traders usually
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married into Chickasaw families and then passed on their property, including their enslaved
peoples, to their offspring. For example, in 1795, James Robertson noted that William Colbert,
the son of James Colbert, had “six negroes, which he intends to put in, with some person, for a
crop”--these were probably enslaved people he inherited from his father.130
During the era of the civilization plan, Chickasaws became the largest importers of
chattel slaves per capita in the Native South. In 1822, Chickasaw Agent Robert Nicholas noted
that between 200 and 300 black slaves inhabited Chickasaw country out of a Chickasaw
population of around 3,600.131 The next generation of Chickasaws witnessed an exponential
increase in slave ownership. A partial examination of the census data for the 1837 removal found
that out of 758 Chickasaw families, 146 held at least one slave, meaning 19% of Chickasaw
families surveyed were slaveowners.132 Removal census data taken in the 1830s recorded 1,233
slaves living with 5,000 Chickasaws, put another way, slaves comprised 19% of the total
population. In comparison, 521 slaves were owned by a Choctaw population of 19,500
(comprising only 2% of the total population), and 902 slaves in a Creek population of 22,700
(comprising 3% of the population), and 1,277 slaves in a Cherokee population of 16,000
(comprising 7% of the population).133 Chickasaw imports of slaves dwarfed those of other
Southern Indians communities in both volume and per capita, and even rivaled or surpassed
many American Mississippi communities.
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Chickasaws put their slave labor to work on plantations, ranches, and at the Chickasaw
Agency. For example, at least four slaves, one owned by James Colbert and the other three
owned by James Perry, were loaned to the Agency for a number of years for general labor and as
blacksmith assistants. One of Perry’s slaves, Jack, became a full blacksmith, earning $81 each
quarter during the years after the War of 1812. Chickasaw families who relocated to create
stands and inns on the Natchez Trace to profit from white Americans traveling through their
county often brought enslaved peoples with them to do menial labor and cultivate foodstuffs for
their paying customers.134 In fact, near Bear Creek, Mexican revolutionary de Lara reported his
party “passed the night at the house of a rich Indian whose slave quarters looked like a little
village.”135
Enslaved black men and women acted as a bridge for Chickasaw men to transition from
hunting duties to agricultural duties, something previously held only by women. Rather than
plant or farm themselves, Chickasaw men who owned enslaved people sometimes acted as
overseers, much like Southern plantation owners in the United States. But women, who were the
conventional farmers, also acquired slaves. Asserting their identity as heads of households and
property owners, Chickasaw women like Patsey Camp, Betsy Love, and Sally Underwood,
owned slaves. Some women even owned dozens of slaves. For example, Elizabeth Perry owned
35 slaves while Delilah Love Moore presided as matron of her family’s 138 slaves at the time of
removal.136 In reality, what Chickasaw men and women created was a society with slaves where
enslaved peoples shifted between male and female work in order to best fit the needs of their
Chickasaw masters. This pattern was similar to how Southern plantation owners transformed the
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work of enslaved peoples to fit their needs no matter the gendered norm. Chickasaw slave
owners used enslaved peoples in roles that probably included ranching, farming, and plowing,
and mixing roles to fit their needs.137
The Chickasaws incorporated slave labor for numerous reasons, but, as in other parts of
the South, slaves would have been necessary in Chickasaw commercial cotton ventures. And by
all counts, Chickasaw cotton production was doing well. In 1830, acting agent for the
Chickasaws, John Allen, reporting on the Chickasaw economy, noted that “labor in the field is
much changed, the men now (with a few exceptions) cultivate the earth.”138 By that time, the
Chickasaws were exporting cattle, hogs, corn, and cotton rather than deerskins, and the men
aided women in commercial agricultural activities; Allen reported 1,000 cotton bales sold by the
Chickasaws in 1830 alone.139 The proceeds from the exports of these agricultural products went
to the “purchase of necessities and Luxuries of life; slaves, shugar [sic] and coffee,” among other
items.140 The amount of cotton production is comparable to Americans in northern Mississippi
and their slaves ten years later. The 1840 census illustrates that counties within former
Chickasaw country, like Tishomingo, Itawamba, and Pontotoc produced cotton crops in 1839 of
515, 795, and 428 bales respectively with per capita slave numbers similar to that of pre-removal
Chickasaws.141
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Successes in cotton production and ranching prompted Indian Superintendent Thomas
McKenney to pronounce in 1826 that the Chickasaws were “more or less cultivators of the
ground” and that they had successfully transformed their country to fit the new Southern
economy.142 In 1827, Southern Indian Superintendent Thomas McKenney provided numbers for
the progress of the new economy in Chickasaw country. He reported 10 mills, 50 workshops, and
a few plantation-style homes, like the two-story house of George Colbert, which had glass
windows and cost upwards of $650.00 to construct.143 McKenney also estimated the expense of
fencing in Chickasaw country to be around $50,000.
Chickasaw elites and headmen capitalized on the new Southern economy. But McKenney
notes that even rank-and-file Chickasaw families averaged two horses, two cows, five pigs, a
dozen fowl, and farmed corn, squash, and beans, a similar representation of American settlers in
the Interior South.144 In less than forty years, the Chickasaws altered their living conditions,
constructed thousands of dollars of fences, and shifted to an economic system remarkably similar
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to white American yeoman farmers and plantation elites of the Antebellum South.145 And, unlike
with other Southern Indians, this transition occurred relatively peacefully, cooperatively, and
with relationships between the Chickasaws and the US intact. Indeed, the Chickasaws were
thriving.
Chickasaws saw the civilization plan as a tool; an accelerant to already ongoing
transformations in their country. Because of the treasury accounts, we know that a significant
portion of Chickasaws invested in the new economy. The civilization plan assisted the
Chickasaws to not only find success in the new Southern economy of cotton and ranching, but to
act as instigators in its creation. Chickasaw men and women altered their economic practices to
include commercial crops, ranching, cottage industries, and chattel slavery. Even so, these
changes did not alter deep cultural structures such as identity, matrilineality, polygamy,
inheritance rules, and territorial sovereignty. Rather than finding themselves at a disadvantage,
the Chickasaws encouraged and practiced an economic system very similar to the rest of the
antebellum South. Through their adaptive propensity that leaders encouraged but in which the
nation as a whole participated, the Chickasaws turned a civilization plan that US federal leaders
envisioned as a revolutionary change into a constructive means to thrive in a time of increasing
outside pressures and American hunger for their lands.
By the time of Indian Removal, Chickasaw men and women had settled farmsteads
outside of their towns, participated in ranching, were relying less and less on the deerskin trade
for access to commercial markets, and were experimenting with commercial crops like cotton
and cottage industries such as cloth making, blacksmithing, and so on. Some were growing quite
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wealthy and had established inns, taverns, ferries, and other entrepreneurial endeavors.
Chickasaw successes at this time ask us to reconsider the idea that the civilization plan and
federal policies were at the heart of economic transformation in Chickasaw country. I argue that
historians reorient their perspective and recognize the agency of the Chickasaws themselves in
this transformative era. Due to their geopolitical location in the Interior South, their pragmatic
friendship with the United States, and their leadership practices that manipulated federal agents,
and their eager almost universal embrace of the new economy, the Chickasaws were architects of
their own economic change. For the Chickasaws, the federal civilization program was
transformed from a top-town imposed regime into one that complimented their own economic
changes and, in effect, became, in today's parlance, an economic “stimulus package” that
imported necessary tools and instruction that accelerated the successes the Chickasaws
manufactured themselves.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
On October 10, 1830, leaders of the nascent state of Mississippi celebrated and toasted
the recently concluded Treaty of Franklin that finalized Chickasaw removal west of the
Mississippi. In their rounds of toasts, the leaders of the dinner celebrated President Andrew
Jackson, noting that he “found one half of our territory occupied by a few wandering Indians. He
will leave it in the cultivation of thousands of grateful freemen.” These toasts imagined a vacant
land, a blatantly teleological viewpoint of the racist ideology of the antebellum South that
refused to acknowledge the economic changes Chickasaw country underwent in the previous
forty years. Instead these Americans stated that the “dawn of civilization now beams on the
horizon” of the newly acquired territory.1
Similar to the welcome sign in present-day Itawamba County, these toasts illustrate the
marginalization of the Chickasaws as well as the role they played in the transformation of their
homeland. The lands that the Americans toasted were far from vacant or unimproved.
Chickasaws in the previous half-century farmed, cultivated, and ranched their country in presentday northern Mississippi in a manner that resembled the men who toasted the acquisition of this
land. For American settlers and surveyors, the creation of a mythic frontier, one that denied the
improvements and changes the Chickasaws instigated, gave credence and credibility to their
forceful removal of the Chickasaws.2 In their toasts, the Mississippians acknowledged the
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Chickasaws, but did not account any of the changes and successes of the new Southern economy
in northern Mississippi to them. Instead, they raised a glass to their departure as one that would
finally force the Chickasaws to “learn the right of individual property, and self government
[sic].”3
These toasts, and the mindset behind them, are illustrative of new federal Indian policies
in the 1820s and 1830s that shed civilization programs and adopted doctrines of forced removal.
Indian policy is often a harbinger of changes in American cultural identity, a canary in a coal
mine that illustrates values embodied by Americans. Throughout the era of the civilization plan,
federal elites believed that Indian communities could, and would, be incorporated into the United
States, assimilated into the larger American populace and that they would willingly give up their
land and sovereignty. In his final report as Secretary of War in December of 1794, Henry Knox
focused almost entirely on the progress of the civilization plan in Indian country. Knox was
quixotic as he described the achievements of the civilization plan. He noted that Indian
communities who adopted civilization programs “cannot fail to afford satisfaction to every
philosophic and humane mind” concerning their progress.4 The sentiments of Knox recycled
over and over in the next three decades by federal leaders, often far away from Indian country.
When then-Cherokee agent Silas Dinsmoor arrived to meet with George Washington at Mount
Vernon in 1798, his letter of introduction by Benjamin Hawkins once again stated that the
civilization plan was a success, and that the “Cherokees are no longer to be called savages.” 5 In
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1824, agent Benjamin Smith reiterated a similar sentiment, hopeful that “I can with truth say if I
can be the means of advancing them [the Chickasaws] to civilization, (the object wished by the
government) the measures of my hopes… will be fulfilled.”6
However, the civilization plan was always a means to Western expansion. In the
beginning, a weak federal government saw assimilation as the most efficient means of
expansion. By the 1820s, however, the political and economic winds had shifted, and federal and
state leaders promoted Indian removal as the best means of expansion. In the Native South, US
victories in the War of 1812 and the Red Stick War signified that the civilization plan was no
longer necessary. Instead, territorial expansion could now take place in a more ruthless fashion. 7
The subsequent Treaty of Fort Jackson in 1814, which ceded 23 million acres of Creek country
to the US, and the Adams-Onis Treaty in 1819, which ceded the present-day state of Florida
from Spain to the US, secured the American South from European countries and opened up
millions of acres for the rapidly expanding cotton economy. 8 A belief in racial superiority that
was fixed, rather than one that could be overcome, now influenced federal elites as they
expanded demands for lands from Indian communities. American elites now argued that
Southern Indians, like the Chickasaws, had been “called upon to take one bold stride from the
savage to civilized state” by the federal government, but they were “utterly incapable.”9 Instead,
these American elites stated that there was hardly a “single Indian who lives and moves like
civilized men.”10 Even some missionary groups that previously proselytized in the Native South
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turned their backs on the civilization plan and now argued that there was “no alternative left [but]
the final and speedy removal of the Indian tribes.”11
The problem, however, was not that the civilization plan was a failure; rather the problem
was that Western expansion continued to be thwarted because, despite many Indian communities
participating in the civilization plan, they did not forgo their territorial and political autonomy,
nor did they care to assimilate into American society. They wanted to remain Indian and on
Indian territorial lands and with Indian political sovereignty. For the federal and state leaders,
however, this was not tenable. As articles for Indian removal took shape, some missionary
groups noted the hypocrisy of federal policy towards Indian communities. One stated that the
federal government, “professing a desire to civilize… lost no opportunity to purchase their
lands,” disrupting civilization programs and “consistently defeated its own policy.” 12 Along with
the dichotomized roles of the civilization plan, Indians who adopted new economic practices
now valued their lands for commercial crop production and as free-range grazing for their
livestock. For the federal government, this was not the goals they had in mind when they
introduced the civilization plan and they now abandoned their civilization plan in place of forced
removal.
Examination of the civilization plan through the lens of the Chickasaws, however,
illustrates a different perspective. Chickasaw men and women incorporated the plan, especially
its economic programs, into economic shifts already underway. Through a focus on land,
leadership, and labor, this dissertation argues against a mythic past that imagines an
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underdeveloped wilderness in the American South prior to the arrival of white settlers and
illustrates how the Chickasaws adapted and thrived throughout the pre-removal period. Their
geopolitical location in the Interior South created economic avenues to the west which meant that
economic change was gradual. Chickasaw country was also highly conducive to new economic
activities, like plow-based agriculture and ranching, and did not hit an ecological wall that
occurred in Creek country directly to the east of the Chickasaws. The Chickasaws navigated a
pragmatic peace with the United States that, combined with their distance from American
settlements in the Interior South, prevented intense land speculation and encroachment. For the
first twenty-five years of the civilization plan in Chickasaw country, economic programs were
not poisoned by settler violence, theft, and invasion. This pragmatic peace combined with unified
leadership practices as Chickasaw headmen manipulated and undermined the influence of federal
agents in their country and demanded that Chickasaw goals, namely that of gradual economic
change and territorial autonomy, were central to the civilization plan in their country. These
actions created a peaceful response to new economic practices and labor roles that extended
throughout the Chickasaw populace in the era of the civilization plan.
Chickasaw economic practices underwent changes that seemed radical from the outside,
but the Chickasaws themselves saw them as a means to constructively redesign their economy in
a manner that did not result in wrenching change. Federal leaders sought to control and shape the
changes in Indian country in hopes to assimilate Native communities and assign lands held
sovereign by them to white yeomen farmers, speculators, and plantation owners. But American
leaders lacked the consistent exterior threat of waves of American settlers, frontier violence, and
trade debt in Chickasaw country that they exploited with other Southern Indian communities.
Instead, the adoption of the policies of the civilization plan in Chickasaw country was pragmatic,
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one that enabled the Chickasaws an easier way to transition from a global market built on furs to
one built on ranching and commercial crops. Common Chickasaw men and women adopted the
civilization program by farming, using plows, owning slaves, spinning and weaving cotton, and
evolving their concepts of gendered labor, while maintaining their political sovereignty and
territorial base, as well as much about what it meant to be Chickasaw. The Chickasaws, by using
the civilization plan as a tool for their economy illustrated pragmatic fluidity in labor gender
roles, land use, and economics to survive in what was becoming an increasingly hostile
American South. Simply put, the Chickasaws answered the question of “whose civilization plan
was it” by claiming control of it.
Chickasaw economic and settlement practices, however, did not stop their forced removal
by the United States. On May 30, 1830, President Andrew Jackson signed the Indian Removal
Act into law after it narrowly passed the US Senate. In the same time period, southern states also
established laws that extended jurisdiction over Indian communities within their purported
boundaries. In February 1829, the state of Mississippi extended jurisdiction over the Choctaws
and Chickasaws. On January 19, 1830, they abolished the rights of their national governments
and even made it a crime for minkos to refer to themselves as leaders of their nations.13 These
actions by state and federal governments were often immediately celebrated and toasted by white
Americans who benefited from the cheap acquisition of Indian land. While the Chickasaws were
eventually forcibly removed, the October 10, 1830, celebration of the Treaty of Franklin lends
itself to an ironic twist. Those toasting the acquisition of Chickasaw land spoke too soon, as the
Treaty of Franklin was subsequently nullified when the Chickasaws could not find land suitable

13

James Barnett, Mississippi’s American Indians, (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2012), 192-193.

250

to them west of the Mississippi River.14 Instead, the Chickasaws did not sign a formal removal
treaty until the 1832 Treaty of Pontotoc Creek.15 For the Chickasaws, removal did not begin until
1837, and the land coveted by these white landholders was developed and cultivated by
Chickasaw men and women for nearly a decade after their toasts.16
Between 1837 and 1850, the majority of the Chickasaw populace was forcibly removed
to their new territory located in Indian Territory, present-day Oklahoma. The trauma of the
removal process included fever, dysentery, attacks by indigenous raiders, and price gouging by
white Americans who sold them necessities along the way. But Chickasaw removal negotiations
mitigated some disasters that occurred with other Southern Indian communities. Compared to the
Choctaws, who were forced to carry only a small number of items, Chickasaw emigration
included their horse herds that numbered in the thousands, wagons, cattle, and other goods that
stretched for miles on their trek.17 Even through forced removal, Chickasaw leadership looked to
direct what change they could control, drawing upon their decades of experience manipulating
federal agents for the civilization plan.
Today, the Chickasaw Nation is economically strong, self-sufficient, and growing. From
their national capital in Tishomingo, Oklahoma, Chickasaw leadership, along with tens of
thousands of enrolled tribal citizens, continue to illustrate their persistence and influence in the
modern era. As one of the founding members of the Center for Sovereign Nations at Oklahoma
State University, the Chickasaw Nation works to preserve their future. The establishment of the
Chickasaw Press in 2006 and the annual celebration of Chickasaw Days in present-day Holly
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Springs and Tupelo, Mississippi connects the Chickasaws to their past and homeland as they
retain an identity of “unconquered peoples” that persist to this day.

252

BIBLIOGRAPHY

253

Manuscript Collections:
J.D. Williams Library, University of Mississippi, Oxford, MS
National Archives and Records Administration Federal Repository
Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Relating to Indian Affairs, 1800-1824,
Microfilm M-15
Letters Received By The Office Of Indian Affairs, 1824-1881, Microfilm M-234
Letters Received by the Office of the Secretary of War Relating to Indian
Affairs, 1800-1823, Microfilm M-271
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington DC
Pamphlets in American History, Microfiche 1014
Mississippi Department of Archives and History, William F. Winter Archives and History
Building, Jackson, MS
Record Group 2
Superintendent’s Journal, Microfilm 2040
Series 488: Administration Papers 1769-1817
Series 491: Executive Journals
Diary of John McKee
National Archives Holdings and Records Administration Southeast Region, Atlanta, GA.
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75
Chickasaw Census Roll, 1847, and Muster Rolls 1837 and 1839, Microfilm A-36
Documents Relating to the Negotiation of Ratified and Unratified Treaties with
Various Indian Tribes, 1801-1869, Microfilm T-494
Letters Received by the Superintendent of Indian Trade, 1806-1824, Microfilm T58
Letters Sent by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1881, Microfilm M-21
Letters Sent by the Superintendent of Indian Trade, 1807-1823, Microfilm M-16
Records of the Cherokee Indian Agency in Tennessee, 1801-1835, Microfilm M208
Register of Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1880,
Microfilm M-18
National Archives and Record Service, Washington DC
Bureau of Indian Affairs Records. Record Group 75
Records of the Office of the Indian Trade
Letters Sent Pertaining to the Chickasaws, 1807-30
Letters Received Pertaining to the Chickasaws 1806-24
254

Choctaw Factory, 1803-25
Records of the Cherokee Agency
Records of the Chickasaw Indian Agency, AL-TN
Correspondence (1812-16)
Records of the Choctaw Indian Agency, East
Correspondence and Other records (1817-21)
Records of the Choctaw Trading House
Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. Record Group 107
General Records, Correspondence
Letters Received by the Secretary of War, 1800-70
Correspondence of the War Department Relating to Indian Affairs
Records of the Accounting Officers of the Department of Treasury. Record Group 217
Journals of the Accountant of the War Office, Entry 366
Registers of Warrants, War Department Accountant, Entry 374
Settled Indian Accounts and Claims, Entry 495
Settled Indian Accounts and Claims, Entry 525
Additional Settled Indian Accounts and Claims, No Entry Number
Published Primary Sources:
Adair, James The History of the American Indians, ed. Kathryn Braund. University of Alabama
Press, 2005.
Allen, Thomas, comp. 1840 Census: Compendium of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants and
Statistics of the United States. Washington D.C., 1841.
American State Papers: Indian Affairs. 2 volumes. Washington, 1832-34.
Atkinson, James R., comp. Records of the Old Southwest in the National Archives: Abstracts of
Records of the Chickasaw Indian Agency and Related Documents, 1794-1840. Chickasaw
Nation, 1997.
Atkinson, James R., ed. "A Narrative Based on an Interview with Malcolm McGee by Lyman C.
Draper." Journal of Mississippi History 66, no. 1, 2004: 37-74.
Baily, Francis. Journal of a Tour in Unsettled Parts of North America in 1796 and 1797,
London, 1856.
Bergh, Albert and Andrew Lipscomb, ed. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. 20 volumes.
Washington D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association of the United States, 190304.
Carter, Clarence E., ed. The Territorial Papers of the United States: The Territory Northwest of
the River Ohio, 1787-1803, Volume II. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1934.

255

Carter, Clarence E., ed. The Territorial Papers of the United States: The Territory South of the
River Ohio, 1790-1796 Volume IV. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1936.
Carter, Clarence E., ed. The Territorial Papers of the United States: The Territory of Mississippi,
1798-1817, Volume V. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937.
Carter, Clarence E., ed. The Territorial Papers of the United States: The Territory of Mississippi,
1809-1817, Volume VI. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938.
Carter, Clarence E., ed. The Territorial Papers of the United States: The Territory of LouisianaMissouri, Volume XIII. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948.
Caughey, John Walton. McGillivray of the Creeks. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,1938.
Corbitt, D.C., ed. “Papers Relating to the Georgia-Florida Frontier, 1784-1800.” Georgia
Historical Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1939): 189-202.
Deloria, Jr., Vine and Kirke Kickingbird, eds. Treaties and Agreements of the Five Civilized
Tribes, Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Development of Indian Law, 1974.
Fitzpatrick, John C., ed. The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript
Sources, 1745-1799. 39 volumes. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1931-44.
Hall, James. "A Brief History of the Mississippi Territory." Publications of the Mississippi
Historical Society 9, 1906: 540-575.
Hawkins, Benjamin. The Collected Works of Benjamin Hawkins, 1796-1810. Compiled by
Thomas Foster. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2003.
Hawkins, Benjamin. Letters, Journals, and Writings of Benjamin Hawkins. Edited by C. L.Grant.
Savannah, GA: Beehive Press, 1980.
Hawthorn, Stayce and Robin Sabino. "Views and Vistas: Traveling through the Choctaw,
Chickasaw, and Cherokee Nations in 1803," The Alabama Review 54, no. 3, 2001: 208220.
Henry, William Wirt, ed. Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence and Speeches. New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891.
Hodgson, Adam. Remarks during a Journey through North America in the Years 1819, 1820,
and 1821, in a Series of Letters. New York, 1823.
Jackson, Andrew, John Spencer Bassett, and David Maydole Matteson. Correspondence of
Andrew Jackson. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926.
256

Jennings, Jesse D. "Nutt's Trip to the Chickasaw Country." The Journal of Mississippi History 9
(1947): 34-61.
"John Forbes & Co., Successors to Panton, Leslie & Co., vs. The Chickasaw Nation: A Journal
of an Indian Talk, July, 1805." The Florida Historical Society Quarterly8, no. 3 (January
1, 1930): 131-42.
Kappler, Charles J., comp. Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. 2 volumes. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1904.
Ker, Henry. Travels Through the Western Interior of the United States, From the Year 1808 up
to the Year 1816. Elizabethtown, NJ: Printed for the Author, 1816.
Nairne, Thomas. Nairne’s Muskogean Journals: The 1708 Expedition of to the Mississippi River,
ed. Alexander Moore University Press of Mississippi, 1988.
Parker, William B. and Jonas Viles, ed. Letters and Addresses of Thomas Jefferson. Buffalo:
National Jefferson Society, 1903.
Parsons, John E., ed. "Letters on the Chickasaw Removal of 1837." The New York Historical
Society Quarterly 37, no. 3, 1953: 273-283.
Phelps, Dawson A., ed. "Excerpts From the Journal of the Reverend Joseph Bullen, 1799 and
1800." Journal of Mississippi History 17 (October 1955): 254-81.
Phelps, Dawson A. “Colbert Ferry and Selected Documents." Alabama Historical Quarterly 25,
no. 4 (1963): 203-236.
Robertson, James. “Correspondence of General James Robertson.” American Historical
Magazine. 1, nos. 1-4 (1896); 2, nos. 1-4 (1897); 3, nos. 1, 3-4 (1898); 4, nos. 1-4 (1899);
and 5, nos. 1-3 (1900).
Rowland, Dunbar, ed. Executive Journals of Governor Winthrop Sargent and Governor William
Charles Cole Claiborne. Nashville, TN: Brandon, 1905.
Rowland, Dunbar, ed. Official Letter Books of W.C.C. Claiborne: 1801 – 1816. 6 volumes. New
York: AMS Press, 1972.
Schoolcraft, Henry R. Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the History, Condition and
Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States. Washington DC: Bureau of Indian Affairs,
1847.

Storm, Colton ed., "Up the Tennessee in 1790: The Report of Major John Doughty to the
Secretary of War." East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications 17 (1945): 118-132.

257

Stuart, John to George Germain, August 10, 1778. Documents of the American Revolution, 17701783. vol. 15, 183-184.
Tuttle, Sarah. Letters on the Chickasaw and Osage Missions. Boston, MA, 1831.
Walker, Robert J. Public Dinner, given in Honor of Chickasaw and Choctaw Treaties at Mr.
Parker's Hotel in the City of Natchez, on the 10th Day of October, 1830.
Washburn, Wilcomb E., comp. The American Indian and the United States; A Documentary
History. New York: Random House, 1973.
West, Elizabeth Howard. “Diary of Jose Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara, 1811-1812.” The American
Historical Review, 34, no. 1 (1928): 55-77.
Young, Jacob. Autobiography of a Pioneer: Or, the Nativity, Experience, Travels, and
Ministerial Labors of Reverend Jacob Young. Cincinnati: Poe & Hitchcock, 1860.
Secondary Sources:
Abbott, Martin. "Indian Policy and Management in the Mississippi Territory, 17981817." Journal of Mississippi History 15, no. 3 (1952): 153-169.
Anderson, Virginia DeJohn. Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early
America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Atkinson, James R. Splendid Land, Splendid People: The Chickasaw Indians to Removal.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004.
Atkinson, James R. “A Surface Collection from the Chickasaw Agency Site, 22-Cs-521, on the
Natchez Trace in Chickasaw County, Mississippi.” Mississippi Archeology 20, no. 2
(1985): 46-63.\
Atkinson, James R. “The Ackia and Ogoula Tchetoka Chickasaw Village Locations in 1736
During the French-Chickasaw War.” Mississippi Archeology 20, no.1 (1985): 53-72.
Axtell, James. "Ethnohistory: An Historian's Viewpoint." Ethnohistory 26, no. 1 (1979): 1-13.
Barnett, James F. Mississippi's American Indians. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi,
2012.
Beck, Robin. Chiefdoms, Collapse, and Coalescence in the Early American South. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Benson, Megan. "Fisher v. Allen: The Southern Origins of the Married Women's Property Acts."
Journal of Sothern Legal History, 1997-98, 97-122.

258

Berkhofer, Robert F. The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to
the Present. New York: Vintage Books, 1978.
Boulware, Tyler. Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation: Town, Region, and Nation Among
Eighteenth-Century Cherokees. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011.
Braund, Kathryn E. Holland. "The Creek Indians, Blacks, and Slavery." The Journal of Southern
History 57, no. 4 (November 01, 1991): 601-36.
Braund, Kathryn E. Holland. Deerskins & Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade With Anglo-America,
1685-1815. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993.
Calloway, G. Colin. The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native
American Communities. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Calloway, G. Colin. The Victory With No Name: The Native American Defeat of the First
American Army. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Calloway, G. Colin. The Indian World of George Washington: The First President, The First
Americans, and the Birth of the Nation. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Carney, Judith. “Rice Milling, Gender and Slave Labour in Colonial South Carolina.” Past &
Present, No. 153 (1996): 108-134.
Carson, James Taylor. "Native Americans, the Market Revolution, and Culture Change: The
Choctaw Cattle Economy, 1690-1830." Agricultural History 71, no. 1 (1997), 1- 18.
Carson, James Taylor. “Horses and the Economy of the Choctaw Indians, 1690-1840.”
Ethnohistory, 42, no. 3 (1995): 495-513.
Carson, James Taylor. "Choctaw and Chickasaw Women, 1690-1834." In Mississippi Women:
Their Histories, Their Lives, edited by Elizabeth Anne Payne, 7-22. Vol. 2. University of
Georgia Press, 2010.
Carson, James Taylor. Searching for the Bright Path: The Mississippi Choctaws from Prehistory
to Removal. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999.
Champagne, Duane. Social Order and Political Change: Constitutional Governments Among the
Cherokee, the Choctaw, the Chickasaw, and the Creek. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1992.
Cegielski, Wendy and Brad R. Lieb. "Hina' Falaa, ‘The Long Path’: An Analysis of Chickasaw
Settlement Using GIS in Northeast Mississippi, 1650-1840." Native South 4, no. 1
(2011): 24-54.

259

Coker, William S., and Thomas D. Watson. Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish
Borderlands: Panton, Leslie & Company and John Forbes & Company, 1783-1847.
Gainesville, FL: University Presses of Florida, 1986.
Cotterill, Robert S. “The Virginia-Chickasaw Treaty of 1783.” The Journal of Southern History,
Vol. 8, No. 4 (1942): 483-496.
Cronon, William. Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England.
New York: Hill and Wang, 1983.
Cushman, H.B. History of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Natchez Indians. Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1999.
Daggar, Lori J. "The Mission Complex: Economic Development, "Civilization," and Empire in
the Early Republic." Journal of the Early Republic 36, no. 3, 2016: 467-491.
Dinisi, Thomas. " The Real James Neelly: Meriwether Lewis' Caretaker." We Proceeded On 40,
no. 4, 2014: 9-26.
Dowd, Gregory Evans. A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity,
1745-1815. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.
Dowd, Gregory Evans. “Jacksonian Democrats, Some Whigs, and Hunters.” Paper presented at
Society for Historians of the Early American Republic Annual Conference, Philadelphia,
PA, July 21, 2017.
DuVal, Kathleen. The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.
DuVal, Kathleen. Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the American Revolution. New York:
Random House, 2016.
Elliot Jr., John D. "Paving the Trace." Journal of Mississippi History LXIX, no. 3, 2007: 199233.
Ellisor, John T. The Second Creek War: Interethnic Conflict and Collusion on a Collapsing
Frontier. Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2010.

Ethridge, Robbie. Creek Country: The Creek Indians and Their World. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2003.
Ethridge, Robbie. "Creeks and Americans in the Age of Washington." In George Washington's
South, edited by Tamara Harvey and Greg O'Brien. Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 2004.

260

Ethridge, Robbie, and Sheri Shuck-Hall. Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone: The Colonial
Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the American South. Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 2009.
Ethridge, Robbie and Thomas J. Pluckhahn editors. Light on the Path: The Anthropology and
History of the Southeastern Indians. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006.
Ethridge, Robbie. “The Making of a Militaristic Slaving Society: The Chickasaws and the
Colonial Indian Slave Trade.” In Indian Slavery in Colonial America, edited by Alan
Gallay. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009.
Ethridge, Robbie. From Chicaza to Chickasaw the European Invasion and the Transformation of
the Mississippian World, 1540-1715. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2010.
Ethridge, Robbie. foreword to Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun: Hernando De Soto and the
South’s Ancient Chiefdoms Twentieth Anniversary Edition. By Charles Hudson. Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2018.
Fixico, Donald Lee, ed. Rethinking American Indian History. Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1997.
Flaherty, Daniel. "People to Our Selves": Chickasaw Diplomacy and Political Development in
the Nineteenth Century. PhD diss., 2012.
Fortwendel, Cletus F. "Silas Dinsmoor and the Cherokees: An Examination of One Agent of
Change." Journal of Cherokee Studies 17, 1996: 28-48.
Frank, Andrew K. Creeks and Southerners: Biculturalism on the Early American Frontier.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005.
Gallay, Alan. The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South,
1670-1717. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.
Gibson, Arrell Morgan. The Chickasaws. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971.
Gilmer, Robert. "Chickasaws, Tribal Laws, and the Mississippi Married Women's Property Act
of 1839." Journal of Mississippi History, 2006, 131-48.
Goodrich, William. “William Cocke-Born 1748, Died 1828.” American Historical Magazine, 1,
No. 3, 1896: 224-229.
Gould, Eliga H. Among the Powers of the Earth the American Revolution and the Making of a
New World Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014.

261

Gould, Eliga H. “Independence and Interdependence: The American Revolution and the Problem
of Postcolonial Nationhood, circa 1802.” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 74, No.
4, 2017: 729-752.
Green, Michael D. The Politics of Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in Crisis.
University of Nebraska Press, 1982.
Hahn, Steven C. The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2004.
Hatley, Thomas. The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians Through the Era of
Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Haynes, Joshua. Patrolling the Border: Theft and Violence on the Creek-Georgia Frontier,
1779-1796. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2018.
Haynes, Robert V. The Mississippi Territory and the Southwest Frontier, 1795-1817. Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 2010.
Hinderaker, Eric. Elusive Empires Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Horsman, Reginald. Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812. Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1992.
Horsman, Reginald. "The Indian Policy of an ‘Empire for Liberty." in Native Americans and the
Early Republic. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999.
Howe, Daniel Walker. What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Hudson, Angela Pulley. Creek Paths and Federal Roads: Indians, Settlers, and Slaves and the
Making of the American South. University of North Carolina Press, 2010.
Hudson, Charles M. The Southeastern Indians. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976.
Inman, Natalie. Brothers and Friends: Kinship in Early America. Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 2017.
Jennings, Jesse D. “Chickasaw and Earlier Indian Cultures of Northeast Mississippi.” Journal of
Mississippi History 3, 1941: 155-226.
Johnson, Jay K., Patricia Galloway, and Walter Beloken. “Historic Chickasaw Settlement
Patterns in Lee County, Mississippi: A First Approximation.” Mississippi Archeology, 24,
(1985), 45-52.

262

Johnson, Jay K. "The Chickasaws." in Indians of the Greater Southeast: Historical Archaeology
and Ethnohistory. Edited by Bonnie G. McEwan. Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 2000.
Kamen, Henry. The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision. Yale University Press, 1998.
Kennedy, Brendan. “’Not Worth a Pinch of Snuff’: The 1789 Yazoo Land Sale and Sovereignty
in the Old Southwest.” Georgia Historical Quarterly Vol. 101, no. 3, 2017: 198-232.
Kidwell, Clara Sue. Choctaws and Missionaries in Mississippi: 1818-1918. Norman (Okla.):
University of Oklahoma Press, 1995.
King, F.R. "George Colbert- Chief of the Chickasaw Nation." Arrow Points 7, 1923: 54-57.
Kokomoor, Kevin. Of One Mind and Of One Government: The Rise and Fall of the Creek Nation
in the Early Republic. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018.
Knight, Vernon James. “Puzzles of Creek Social Organization in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries.” Ethnohistory 65, no. 3, 2018: 373-389.
Krauthamer, Barbara. Black Slaves, Indian Masters: Slavery, Emancipation, and Citizenship in
the Native American South. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013.
Lane, Kris. Colour of Paradise: The Emerald in the Age of Gunpowder Empires. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2010.
Layton, Brandon. "Indian Country to Slave Country: The Transformation of Natchez During the
American Revolution." Journal of Southern History 82, no. 1, 2016: 27-58.
LeMaster, Michelle. Brothers Born of One Mother: British-Native American Relations in the
Colonial Southeast. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012.
Littlefield, Daniel F. The Chickasaw Freedmen: A People Without a Country. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1980.
Martin, Joel W. Sacred Revolt: The Muskogees' Struggle for a New World. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1991.
McCurry, Stephanie. Masters of Small Worlds: Yeoman Households, Gender Relations, and the
Political Culture of the Antebellum South Carolina Low Country. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995.
McGee, R. Jon and Richard L. Warms. Anthropological Theory: An Introductory History. New
York, The McGraw Hill Companies, 2012. Fifth Edition.

263

McLoughlin, William G. Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1992.
McLoughlin, William G. After the Trail of Tears: The Cherokees' Struggle for Sovereignty,
1839-1880. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993.
Miles, Tiya. The House on Diamond Hill: A Cherokee Plantation Story. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2010.
Moore, John Hebron. The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in the Old Southwest: Mississippi,
1770-1860. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988.
Morgan, David. “Historic Period Chickasaw Indians: Chronology and Settlement Patterns.”
Mississippi Archeology, 31, no.1, 1996: 1-39.
Morgan, Phillip Carroll, and Judy Goforth. Parker. Dynamic Chickasaw Women. Sulphur, OK:
Chickasaw Press, 2011.
Naylor, Celia E. African Cherokees in Indian Territory: From Chattel to Citizens. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2008.
Nichols, David Andrew. Red Gentlemen & White Savages: Indians, Federalists, and the Search
for Order on the American Frontier. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008.
Nichols, David Andrew. Engines of Diplomacy: Indian Trading Factories and the Negotiation of
American Empire. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016.
Nichols, David Andrew. "U.S. Indian Policy, 1783-1830." Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
American History, 2015.
Nooe, Evan. "Common Justice: Vengeance and Retribution in Creek Country." Ethnohistory 62,
no. 2, 2015: 241-261.
Norgren, Jill. The Cherokee Cases: Two Landmark Federal Decisions in the Fight for
Sovereignty. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004.
O'Brien, Greg. Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750-1830. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2005.
O'Brien, Greg. “Quieting the Ghosts.” in The Native South: New Histories and Enduring
Legacies. Edited by Tim Alan Garrison and Greg O’Brien. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2017.
Oakes, James. "From Republicanism to Liberalism: Ideological Change and the Crisis of the Old
South." American Quarterly 37, no. 4, 1985: 551-571.

264

Paige, Amanda L., Fuller L. Bumpers, and Daniel aF. Littlefield. Chickasaw Removal. Ada, OK:
Chickasaw Press, 2010.
Peach, Steven. “The Failure of Political Centralization: Mad Dog, the Creek Indians, and the
Politics of Claiming Power in the American Revolutionary Era.” Native South, 11, 2018:
81-116.
Perdue, Theda. Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society: 1540-1866. Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1979.
Perdue, Theda. Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700-1835. Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1998.
Perdue, Theda. "Mixed Blood" Indians: Racial Construction in the Early South. Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2003.
Perdue, Theda. "George Washington and the "Civilization" of the Southern Indians." In George
Washington's South. Edited by Tamara Harvey and Greg O'Brien. Gainesville: University
Press of Florida, 2004.
Perdue, Theda, and Michael D. Green. The Columbia Guide to American Indians of the
Southeast. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
Pestana, Carla. Protestant Empire: Religion and the Making of the British Atlantic World.
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.
Phelps, Dawson. "Stands and Travel Accommodations on the Natchez Trace." Journal of
Mississippi History 11, no. 1 (1949): 1-54.
Phelps, Dawson. "The Chickasaw Agency." Journal of Mississippi History 13, 1952: 119-137.
Phelps, Dawson. “Colberts Ferry and Selected Documents.” Alabama Historical Quarterly 25,
1963: 203-226.
Piker, Joshua. Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in Colonial America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2004.
Prucha, Francis Paul. American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and
Intercourse Acts, 1780-1834. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.
Prucha, Francis Paul. The Great Father: The United States Government and the American
Indians. Vol. 1. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984.
Rosen, Deborah A. Border Law: The First Seminole War and American Nationhood. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2015.

265

Rothman, Adam. Slave Country: American Expansion and the Origins of the Deep South.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.
Saunt, Claudio. A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek
Indians, 1733-1816. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Saunt, Claudio. Black, White, and Indian: Race and the Unmaking of an American Family. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Saunt, Claudio. “’Our Indians’: European Empires and the History of the American South.” In
The Atlantic in Global History: 1500-2000. Edited by Jorge Canizares-Esguerra and Erik
Seeman. New York: Prentice Hall, 2006.
Saunt, Claudio. "The Native South: An Account of Recent Historiography." Native South 1
(2008): 45-60.
Sheehan, Bernard W. Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973.
Silver, Peter. Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America. New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2008.
Smithey, Emily P. "Transformation of Early Nineteenth Century Chickasaw Leadership Patterns,
1800-1845." Master's thesis, University of Mississippi, 2014.
Snyder, Christina. "Conquered Enemies, Adopted Kin, and Owned People: The Creek Indians
and Their Captives." The Journal of Southern History 73, no. 2 (May 01, 2007): 255-88.
Snyder, Christina. Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early America.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.
Snyder, Christina. Great Crossings: Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in the Age of Jackson. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2017.
St. Jean, Wendy. “The Chickasaw-Quapaw Alliance in the Revolutionary Era.” The Arkansas
Historical Quarterly, 68, no. 3, 2009: 272-282.
St. Jean, Wendy. Remaining Chickasaw in Indian Territory, 1830s-1907. Tuscaloosa: University
of Alabama Press, 2011.
Swanton, John Reed. Chickasaw Society and Religion. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
2006.
Taylor, Alan. The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the
American Revolution. New York: Knopf Press, 2006.

266

Usner, Daniel H. American Indians in the Lower Mississippi Valley: Social and Economic
Histories. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.
Wallace, Anthony F. C. The Long, Bitter Trail: Andrew Jackson and the Indians. New York: Hill
and Wang, 1993.
Wallace, Anthony F.C. Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Walls, Michael D. Rediscovery of a Native American Cultural Landscape: The Chickasaw
Homeland at Removal. PhD diss., University of Kentucky, 2015.
Warren, Harry. “Some Chickasaw Chiefs and Prominent Men.” Publications of the Mississippi
Historical Society, 8, 1904: 555-570.
Waselkov, Gregory A. A Conquering Spirit: Fort Mims and the Redstick War of 1813-1814.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006.
Weeks, Charles A. “Of Rattlesnakes, Wolves, and Tigers: A Harangue at the Chickasaw Bluffs,
1796.” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 3, 2010: 487-518.
White, Richard. The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes
Region, 1650-1815. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
White, Richard. The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change Among
the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983.
Wood, Peter H. "The Changing Population of the Colonial South: An Overview by Race and
Region." In Powhatan's Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast. Edited by Gregory A.
Waselkov, Peter H. Wood, and Tom Hatley. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
2006.
Wood, Peter H. Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the
Stono Rebellion. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1974.
Wright Jr., J. Leitch. The Only Land They Knew: The Tragic Story of the American Indians in the
Old South. New York: Free Press, 1981.
Wright Jr., J. Leitch. Creeks & Seminoles: The Destruction and Regeneration of the Muscogulge
People. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986.
Yarbrough, Fay A. Race and the Cherokee Nation: Sovereignty in the Nineteenth Century.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
Zellar, Gary. African Creeks: Estelvste and the Creek Nation. Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2007.
267

VITA

Jeffrey David Washburn was born September 13,1988 and attended the University of Idaho in
Moscow, Idaho where he graduated in 2010 with a Bachelor of Science in History. Washburn
continued his education at the University of Idaho and completed a Master of Arts in History in
2011. In 2013 he entered the PhD program in the Arch Dalrymple III Department of History at
the University of Mississippi. He is married to Kelli Cameron Daw.

268

